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On Hedge Fund Performance, 
Capital Flows and Investor Psychology
In a relatively short period of time, hedge funds have become major
players in the financial markets. In 2004, the estimated total reached
nearly 8000 funds, and the assets under management had risen to $1
trillion, from nearly $100 billion in 1994. The client base for hedge
funds has expanded beyond foundations and endowments to
company pensions, public pensions, and to less “sophisticated” inves-
tors. However, the increasing and widespread acceptance of hedge
funds as an alternative investment vehicle is disconcerting if we
consider their limited transparency and the restricted liquidity
conditions imposed to investors. On these grounds, serious questions
arise about investors’ ability to make the right investment choices in
hedge funds. This book speaks to these concerns. The four essays
presented here examine the investment process of investors, the
underlying factors determining their choices and the implications for
investors’ wealth and for hedge funds’ performance. Four main
conclusions follow. First, that hedge fund managers exhibit, on
average, persistence in their performance at quarterly horizons,
justifying to some extent an active search for skilled managers;
however, large informational asymmetries prevent investors from
taking timely decisions and exploiting the persistence of good
performing funds while incurring high opportunity costs. In contrast,
investors are able to divest swiftly from the poor performers, which
may have a moderating effect on the risk-taking incentives of
managers. Finally, investors appear to misread the information
available and overreact to persistence patterns, both at the individual
fund level and at the style level. Overall, this study confirms a poten-
tially suboptimal allocation of capital flows across hedge funds,
calling for higher levels of transparency in the demand side for
capital, and more cautious due diligence and increased prudence in
the supply side.
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“And the end of all exploring will be to arrive where we started 
and know the place for the first time”. 
 T.S. Eliot, The Four Quartets 
 
 
Preface 
 
Back to the year 2000, while working as a research assistant at the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, I was very fortunate to become part of a research project on 
hedge funds, initiated by Jenke ter Horst, from Tilburg University and Marno 
Verbeek, then at KULeuven but already appointed at the Rotterdam School of 
Management. At that time there were only a handful of academic papers on hedge 
funds, most of them working papers. Little was known about this mysterious 
investment category, while myths and spectacular stories of rise and fall surrounded 
them. Six years later, we can count the number of academic papers on hedge funds on 
the order of hundreds, covering a multiplicity of research areas, a boom that parallels 
the one of the hedge fund industry itself while reflecting its rapid pace of evolution. 
The seminal academic papers in the late 1990’s concentrated attention, perhaps 
naturally, on three broad areas:  the assessment of risk exposures of hedge funds, the 
potential survivorship biases affecting the few existing datasets, and the persistence in 
performance of hedge fund managers. Not surprisingly, our project had a first paper 
extending this literature, which eventually became the basis for Chapter 2 of this 
book. Jenke and Marno had a large experience investigating survivorship and 
selection biases, and the persistence in performance of mutual funds. Consequently, I 
had the best guides one could possibly have, and the most patient too. In that very first 
project they initiated me into the itineraries of academic research, where one finds at 
times agreeable hiking trails, often very narrow passages, but mostly demanding 
slopes, hidden crevasses, and risky ridges near the summit. What I learned from them 
along the path, from the very early stages until final publication, is of inestimable 
value. I feel honoured to have had two researchers of such stature as co-authors and 
guides, and my first words of deep gratitude go to them both. 
Thereafter, a combination of circumstances and fortuitous encounters with several 
people steered the research focus of this thesis into the behaviour of investors and 
their motivations to open or close the valves of dollar flows to hedge funds. The 
interconnections between money flows and the performance of financial 
intermediaries has been a rising field of research during the last ten years. I am 
especially indebted to Susan Christoffersen, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta and Wessel 
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Marquering, for opportunely drawing my attention to several key theoretical articles 
that gave whole sense to my empirical research. Their encouraging words constituted 
a very timely boost of confidence to continuing ahead. Susan had the extreme 
kindness to read through my initial research proposal on capital flows and I am 
grateful to her for the many valuable insights she gave me in those early and crucial 
stages. My brief encounter with Ignacio at CEMFI paved the way for an empirical test 
to link the patterns of money flows to potential psychological biases, as implemented 
in Chapter 4. I owe him many thanks for his openness and very inspiring talks in 
Behavioural Economics. I am extremely grateful to Wessel Marquering for 
introducing me to the literature on Behavioural Finance and for the innumerable 
exchanges of ideas we had about these topics. We taught a course in Behavioural 
Finance together over the last four years, which proved to be the source of 
innumerable discoveries and research possibilities, partly already reflected in this 
book. Wessel became not only my closest colleague and a co-author but also the most 
supportive and hospitable friend I had in Rotterdam.  
Several colleagues and friends have read through the entire manuscript of this 
book, or parts of it, and provided detailed comments and valuable suggestions. My 
special thanks go to Ben Jacobsen, Marieke van der Poel, Gail Whiteman and the 
members of my doctoral committee, Kees Koedijk, Frank de Jong and Ronald 
Mahieu.  
I am indebted to ERIM, a truly doctoral school with strong impetus, for its 
unconditional financial and academic support. I thank Tineke van der Vhee and Olga 
Novikova for their outstanding administrative work. I gratefully acknowledge the 
financial support from the Department of Financial Management of RSM, the 
Vereniging Trustfonds and the Centre for Economic Studies (CES) of the KULeuven.  
Along my itineraries between Leuven and Rotterdam, two close friends and 
colleagues were influential in many ways in the progression of this thesis, Marco 
Lyrio and my paranimf Wim Koevoets. I have spent with them countless hours of 
enjoyable and stimulating conversation on any possible topic, while sharing the 
vicissitudes of academic life. I owe them too many lessons. They have qualities that I 
lack so much, and they stand as examples of amazing discipline and rigor to be 
emulated.  
Being a Latin-American, to adapt to the life in the Netherlands proved to be more 
than a challenge in four broad areas: the language, the notions of time and space, the 
sense of humour and… housing. I must admit, with much regret, that I have less than 
fully adapted in all four of them, in spite of much struggle. I would like to thank my 
colleagues from ERIM and the Department of Financial Management for their 
understanding, enormous patience, and help in those four essential aspects, and for 
creating a very agreeable and stimulating working environment. As a matter of fact, 
they all proved to be far more adaptable to my -sometimes- unconventional notions of 
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time and space. My special thanks go to Martine Cools, Jana Firdrmuc, Reggy 
Hooghiemstra, Gerard Moerman, Arjen Mulder, Paolo Perego, Ben Tims, and with 
particular esteem to my office-mates along these years: Sara Lelli, Erik Kole, Joop 
Huij and Marieke van der Poel.   
I read somewhere stated that a PhD thesis is primarily an indication of survival. 
There are many people (so many!) in this story of two cities to be thanked for assuring 
that I am still alive. Both in Leuven and Rotterdam,  I was exceedingly fortunate to be 
adopted by two groups of (mostly) foreign PhD candidates who gave me a vital sense 
of belonging that is rarely experienced while living abroad. They became an 
emotional anchoring indispensable to continuing ahead. To name but a few of them, 
in Leuven: Helena Kim, Jürgen Germeys, Rocio Lozano, Azeta Cungu, Steven Simon, 
Marianna Grimaldi and Peter De Goeij; genuinely a family. In Rotterdam: ladies first, 
entrepreneurial, marvellously creative and warm hosts, Julia Kotlarsky, Viara Popova, 
Irina Kotliar, Catia Pimenta de Sousa, Marisa De Brito, Eliane Haseth and Luciana 
Ferreira. The gentlemen, and late hours companion workers, Xueyuan Zhang, Willem 
Smit, Guido Berens, Manuel Hensmans, and my paranimf, Julien Mostard. To all, my 
deep appreciation. 
Marno Verbeek deserves a special place in this preface. All the way since we first 
met in Leuven, I counted on his exceptional mentoring whenever it was necessary. 
We have extensively discussed together each chapter of this book. His guidance on 
the most appropriate econometric techniques for each particular situation was crucial, 
while he challenged and gave shape to my views about a number of econometric and 
finance issues. I only hope that, in retribution, our joint work continues being the 
source of personal satisfactions. But Marno has been far more than a fully committed 
thesis advisor and co-author. I owe him an immense debt of gratitude for believing on 
me when I most hesitated along the route.  And when several personal circumstances 
hindered the achievement of this project, his supportive hand was decisive. Those, I 
believe, are the qualities of a truly educator. In turn, along the journey, I am glad to 
have contributed to bring Marno a little bit closer to the behavioural camp (if not 
entirely!), and I sincerely wish we can continue many more years of collaboration.  
Mi final word of gratefulness goes to my parents, Guillermo Enrique and 
Constance. Their everyday support and close presence, in spite of the 8000 km of land 
and ocean separating us, were the most precious solace along these years. What could 
ever compensate the immense sacrifice for such a long physical distance! This book is 
dedicated to them.   
 I myself am entirely responsible for any errors and omissions.  
 
 
Guillermo Baquero Vinces 
Rotterdam, October 2006 
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“It’s true that the best minds are drawn to the hedge fund business. 
But there are not as many great minds out there 
 as there are hedge funds being started”   
(The Wall Street Journal, June 1998) 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
1.1   Motivation 
 
One of the most debated issues in financial economics remains the fact that the 
industry of actively managed portfolios has grown at rapid pace in spite of having 
underperformed both market indices and passive investment portfolios. In two 
seminal and influential papers, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1992] and Gruber 
[1996] pointed out at this issue while studying the pension fund and mutual fund 
industries respectively, and raised the puzzling question of what accounts then for the 
enormous appeal that these financial intermediaries have among investors. This 
question spawned a vast academic literature over the last ten years devoted to 
understanding the behaviour of investors in this industry. However the puzzle 
deepened with the uncontested evidence that investors are in fact powerfully attracted 
by the best performing managers in the previous year (see e.g. Sirri and Tufano 
[1998]), while most studies on performance persistence of fund managers indicate that 
at annual horizons past performance is uninformative of future performance, 
consistent with standard finance models based on market efficiency (see e.g. Carhart 
[1997]). Different theoretical models of learning have attempted to explain the 
seeming inconsistent behaviour of investors, either in a frame of fully rational and 
competitive markets (see Berk and Green [2004]), either questioning investors’ 
rationality (see Rabin [2002]), either appealing to asymmetric information arguments 
(see Palomino and Uhlig [2001]). Yet, another stream of studies have suggested that 
investors appear to be able to choose the best performing managers in the future (see 
Zheng [1999], Wermers [2003]).  
 
14
Chapter 1 
 
2  
 
The present thesis speaks to this controversy by extending the debate to the rapidly 
evolving industry of hedge funds. The rationale behind the choice of the hedge fund 
industry as our object of study lies in three main considerations. First, its stunning 
growth and its increasingly dominant presence in financial markets; second, the 
increasing concerns that, despite growth, capital is inefficiently allocated across hedge 
funds; and third, the several distinctive institutional features of this industry that are 
likely to limit investors actions or prevent them from taking timely decisions. By the 
end of 2004, the amount of money managed by hedge funds had risen to $1 trillion 
dollars, from nearly $100 billion in 1994. Over the same period, the average quarterly 
return was 2.7% 1, underperforming the S&P500 by nearly 30 basis points. The 
industry is well known for one major feature: it is subject to limited regulation and 
disclosure requirements2. Not surprisingly, blow ups and cases of fraud are relatively 
frequent. In spite of the industry’s polemic nature and the poor quality of information, 
investors’ overwhelming response is disconcerting. Recent surveys indicate that 56% 
of institutional investors are willing to increase even further their allocations to hedge 
funds3, while company and public pension plans constitute the fastest growing 
segment among institutional investors having shares in this industry. But also access 
to less sophisticated investors is becoming easier as minimum investment 
requirements, typically above $1 million dollars, are been lowered down. 
Additionally, funds of hedge funds are an increasingly popular and convenient avenue 
for small investors. This increasing and widespread acceptance of hedge funds as an 
alternative to other investment vehicles has sparked a debate on the regulatory side, on 
concerns of insufficient levels of investor protection and a questionable ability of 
investors to make the right investment choices in hedge funds. 
 
Several organizational aspects unique to the hedge fund industry have direct 
implications for understanding the links between investors’ behaviour and growth. 
First, there are several consequences of limited regulation. The lack of formal 
disclosure requirements together with restrictions on public advertising faced by 
hedge funds in most countries, means that information hurdles for investors are high, 
calling for more circumspect choices. Further, limited regulation gives funds large 
flexibility in the types of positions they can take (namely, by using short selling, 
leverage and derivatives). It allows them to have a dynamic activity by holding 
diverse asset categories and actively shifting their factor exposures. The typical 
dynamic trading strategies employed by hedge fund managers have option-like returns 
                                                 
1 Average quarterly return of the CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index. 
2 Neither domestic hedge funds, nor off-shore funds are subject to SEC regulations.  Domestic hedge funds are 
exempted from regulations and disclosure requirements because they are typically limited partnerships (i.e. 
fewer than 500 investors).  Off-shore funds are not subject to SEC regulations because they are non-US 
corporations and are typically registered in a tax-haven. 
3 Source: Deutsche Bank, 2005 Alternative Investment Survey. 
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that cannot be captured by the usual factor models based on standard asset 
benchmarks (as in Sharpe [1992]). Therefore, understanding and evaluating the 
arbitrage strategies of hedge fund managers requires time and financial expertise. In 
sum, hedge fund investors are confronted to high searching costs, large information 
asymmetries and a complex evaluation procedure, all of which is likely to delay the 
decision to select a fund manager.   
 
Besides limited regulation, a second major feature characterizing hedge funds is the 
structure of managerial incentives. Hedge fund managers on average receive 1% of 
assets under management as a fee for administering the fund, but also about 20% of 
annual profits. This performance-based incentive rewards managers for achieving 
absolute returns. The incentive fee is paid under two conditions: first, returns must 
surpass a hurdle rate, typically set as the risk-free rate. Second, the fund’s value has to 
surpass a “high water-mark” which requires the manager to have recovered previous 
losses. This incentive structure could lead to excess risk, but this is often mitigated by 
a substantial managerial investment in the fund and the fact that managers are general 
partners and thus may incur in liabilities in case the fund goes bankrupt (see 
Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft [1999]).   
 
A third important feature of hedge funds is their illiquidity, a distinctive characteristic 
of any alternative investment.  Institutional investors in the US typically participate in 
alternative investments through a limited partnership structure. With rare exceptions, 
limited partnerships are not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
Therefore, limited partners cannot freely trade their ownership interests in the public 
market. Moreover, withdrawals are restricted. Lock-up periods are common and 
redemptions are limited to certain dates, typically the end of a month or a quarter. 
Investors are thus forced to have a longer term investment horizon. There are also 
subscription periods and minimum investments required are large to allow 
participation of sophisticated investors exclusively. Finally, a fund may decide to 
close to new investments either because of legal requirements on the maximum 
number of investors or because of capacity limits. All in all, hedge fund investors’ 
decisions of supplying capital or redeeming their shares are constrained by the 
organizational structure on the demand side for capital. 
 
The four essays presented in this book constitute an empirical investigation of capital 
flows to hedge funds. They examine the investment process of investors, the 
underlying factors determining their choices and the implications for investors’ wealth 
and for hedge funds’ performance. The emphasis is placed in the interconnections 
between capital flows and performance, where most of the academic controversy lies. 
The notion of delegated portfolio management entails by nature a situation of 
16
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asymmetric information between managers and investors at the time of signing the 
contract. Investors do not observe managers’ actual investment skills and must infer 
their ability from observed prior performance signals and other characteristics. Within 
this simple frame, the questions that arise pertain to:  1) the quality of the performance 
signal (i.e. how informative is past performance of future performance of the 
manager),  2) the investors’ perception of performance signals (i.e. what the impact of 
past performance on money flows is), and  3) the effectiveness of investors learning 
(i.e the relation of money flows and subsequent performance).  These are the central 
concerns of this thesis.   
 
A situation of asymmetric information of different nature than the one described 
above, develops subsequent to signing the contract. Investors do not observe the true 
actions of the manager and the contract is designed to align managers’ behaviour with 
investors’ interests. These agency problems are not our object of investigation here, 
thus the question of what the optimal contract for the manager should be is not 
explicitly addressed. However a number of interactions between agency problems and 
the issues at stake in this thesis are possible, and we shall refer to them when 
appropriate. For example, under certain conditions, and depending on the investment 
horizons of investors, their responsiveness to past performance may represent an 
implicit incentive for managers to adopt gambling behaviour (see e.g. Chevalier and 
Ellison [1997]). In turn, if this is the case, it may not be optimal for investors to 
choose the best performer in the past, as this might be signalling higher risk (see e.g. 
Palomino and Uhlig [2001]). On the other hand, one of our main results suggests that 
a relatively fast response of investors to bad performance may have an opposite effect 
and restrain managers from increasing the risk of their portfolios. 
 
The first part of this thesis consists of two essays exploring separately and in detail the 
three broad questions described previously, namely, the relation between past 
performance and future performance, the relation between money flows and past 
performance and the relation between money flows and subsequent performance. The 
two chapters in the second part attempt each to integrate the three questions under one 
single unifying behavioural argument.    
 
 
1.2   Outline of the thesis  
 
Chapter 2 studies the information content of performance signals. The notion that 
future fund performance relates to past performance is referred to as persistence. 
Persistence matters as investors tend to allocate their money across funds based on 
17
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past performance and it is even more relevant in the case of hedge funds since 
investors are confronted to lock-up periods and restrictions on withdrawals. The 
commonly used research methodologies of persistence evaluation, however, impose a 
survival conditioning bias referred to as look-ahead bias (e.g. Brown et al. [1992]). As 
a result, spurious performance persistence might arise. Ter Horst, Nijman and 
Verbeek [2001] proposed a methodology to correct for this potential bias based on a 
weighting procedure which requires modelling the survival process and relating it to 
historical performance. We apply this approach in studying the persistence in 
performance of hedge funds. We investigate look ahead bias for different time 
horizons and we show that past performance is an important determinant of 
subsequent liquidation rates at least over four subsequent quarters: funds with low 
returns are more likely to disappear than funds with high returns. This suggests that 
look-ahead bias is quite severe. Without corrections, at four quarter horizons average 
returns may be overestimated by as much as 3.8% for the worst decile. The 
corrections are most pronounced for the extreme deciles, which might be explained 
given that these deciles contain the more risky funds.  For the one-quarter and four-
quarter horizons, the corrected results show positive persistence in raw returns for the 
best three decile portfolios as they provide above average expected returns in the 
subsequent evaluation period. Persistence is particularly strong at quarterly horizons 
and somewhat weaker at annual horizons. Very importantly, our results are not driven 
by well performing funds closed to new investments, which indicates that 
performance persistence is susceptible of exploitation. Finally, we also investigate the 
effect of style or risk characteristics on performance persistence by subtracting from 
raw returns the return of the corresponding style benchmark. Following the same 
procedure to correct look-ahead bias as with raw returns, we find that funds in the top 
decile outperform their style benchmark by 6.7% (annualised) at a quarterly horizon 
and by 6.2% at the annual horizon. Again, the look-ahead bias is most severely 
present in the worst decile. At the biannual horizon hedge funds underperform, in 
general, their style benchmark. 
 
These results make clear that past performance contains potentially useful information 
for investors. But, to what extent it actually determines investors’ decisions? This is 
the subject of the first part of Chapter 3. The interconnections between persistence and 
the responsiveness of flows to past performance have been addressed by various and 
conflicting theoretical models. While Ippolito [1992] argues that the response of 
investors is stronger where the performance signal is of better quality, Berk and Green 
[2004] contend that in equilibrium and under decreasing returns to scale, money flows 
chase the winning funds to the point where the risk-adjusted expected excess return is 
zero. In this view, there is no persistence precisely because investors rationally shift 
their money to the managers with the best track records. Since hedge fund persistence 
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is stronger at quarterly horizons and weaker at annual horizons, as shown in Chapter 
2, the latter argument implies a weaker flow-performance relation at quarterly 
horizons compared to annual horizons. To test this hypothesis, we undertake an 
investigation of the flow-performance relation for hedge funds by explicitly separating 
the investment and divestment decisions of hedge fund investors. This separation has 
been overlooked in previous studies in mutual funds and hedge funds and it has 
several major implications. First, if money inflows and outflows are not modelled as 
two distinct regimes, the impact of past performance and several control variables like 
size, age and style upon money flows is improperly estimated. Using a regime 
switching model with endogenous switching reveals a number of important 
asymmetries between both regimes of money flows that we interpret in terms of both 
high searching costs and liquidity restrictions which affect differently inflows and 
outflows. Second, this separation allows us to identify a different response time of 
inflows and outflows to past performance, which implies a different shape of the flow-
performance relation across evaluation horizons in the way predicted by Berk and 
Green [2004]. While money inflows chase the winners at annual horizons, outflows 
are highly responsive to the losers at quarterly horizons. This immediate and sustained 
response of investors to poor performance over the following two or three quarters 
remained hidden in previous studies over annual horizons.  
 
Several economic implications follow, which are addressed in the second part of 
Chapter 3. We study the performance of the portfolio of hedge fund investors and the 
extent of investors’ ability to exploit persistence patterns by looking into detail at the 
performance of aggregate investors allocations and de-allocations. Our evidence 
indicates that inflows are not fast enough to exploit and compete away the quarterly 
performance persistence among the winners, following Berk and Green [2004]’s 
argument. Put differently, hedge fund investors are limited in identifying and directing 
their capital towards the best performers in the short run. They invest mostly in funds 
that subsequently perform poorly, underperforming an equally-weighted allocation by 
nearly 50 basis points per quarter on average. Conversely, investors are fast and 
successful in de-allocating from the persistent losers, ensuring a disciplining 
mechanism for low-quality funds. Fast outflows pose a credible threat of termination 
that mitigates the incentives of hedge fund managers to increase volatility to meet 
their high watermark. We interpret our results as a consequence of the asymmetric 
response time of investors’ purchasing and selling decisions.  Our findings do not 
support the existence of smart money, and put under question investors’ rationality. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the possibility that investors are less than fully rational. It asks 
whether the momentum strategies followed by investors as documented in Chapter 3, 
are at least partly the result of a well known cognitive bias referred to as the law of 
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small numbers. Believers in the law of small numbers tend to overinfer the outcome 
of a random process after a small series of observations. They believe that small 
samples replicate the probability distribution properties of the population. We provide 
empirical evidence indicating that investors are mistakenly driven by this 
psychological bias when hiring or firing a fund manager after a successful (or losing) 
performance streak, in line with the theoretical model of Rabin [2002]. We analyze 
actual money flows into and out of hedge funds and their relationship with the length 
of the streak. We first show that persistence patterns have a predictive ability of future 
relative performance of a manager, consistent with our results in Chapter 2: the longer 
the winner streak, the larger the probability for a fund to remain a winner. Investors, 
in turn, appear to be aware of quality dispersion across managers and respond by 
following a momentum strategy: the longer the winning (losing) streak, the more 
likely they will invest in (divest from) that fund. Yet, we find that investors place 
excessive weight in the managers’ track record as a criterion for decision. Our model 
shows that the length of the streak has an economically and statistically significant 
impact on money flows beyond rationally expected performance, which confirms a 
“hot-hand” bias driving to a large extent momentum investing, with potential adverse 
effects on investors’ wealth. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 explores the hypothesis that one component of investors’ learning 
takes place at the style level as the result of extrapolative expectations. This is a 
prevalent and a key assumption in several models of aggregate capital flows in 
financial markets (see e.g. Barberis and Shleifer [2003], Shleifer and Vishny [1997]). 
Therefore, we conduct a study of aggregate money flows by decomposing the 
allocation process of hedge fund investors between style allocation and fund 
selectivity. We first estimate a model of money flows from a number of fund specific 
features and style-adjusted performance. From this model we obtain an estimate of 
expected money flows driven by fund selectivity while we link the aggregate residuals 
to the performance of style indices. On the one hand, we find evidence that investors 
chase the winning styles in the previous one to three quarters. However, we do not 
find evidence of style-timing abilities, nor indications of momentum in style index 
performance at quarterly horizons. This suggests that momentum investing among 
styles is the result of a biased perception of relative performance of style indices and 
reflects correlated sentiment. Overall, our study raises concerns about the efficiency 
of investors’ allocations across hedge funds. 
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“I know of no way of judging of the future but by the past” 
Patrick Henry, Virginia Convention Speech, March 23, 1775 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Survival, Look-Ahead Bias and the 
Persistence in Hedge Fund Performance4 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
During the last decade, hedge funds have gained tremendous popularity, particularly 
in the U.S. Hedge funds are similar to mutual funds in that they provide actively 
managed portfolios in publicly traded assets. Unlike mutual funds, however, they have 
broad flexibility in the type of securities they hold and the type of positions they take. 
For instance, hedge funds can invest in international and domestic equities and debt, 
and the entire array of derivative securities, and they can take undiversified positions, 
sell short or lever up the portfolio (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh [1997], Liang [2000]). 
According to Brown and Goetzmann [2003], hedge funds are best defined by their 
freedom from regulatory controls stipulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
These non-standard features of hedge funds make them an interesting investment 
alternative given the potential diversification benefits they offer an existing portfolio. 
 
The question of whether mutual funds and hedge funds show persistence in their 
performance receives much attention in the literature (see, e.g. Gruber [1996], Carhart 
[1997], Agarwal and Naik [2000], Boyson [2003], and Bollen and Busse [2005]). The 
underlying idea behind these studies is that investors usually invest more in funds that 
recently performed well with the expectation that these funds will continue to do so in 
                                                 
4 This chapter is based on Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]. I am grateful to Bing Liang, Stephen Brown, 
Narayan Naik and Theo Nijman for many helpful comments and suggestions. 
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the future. In the mutual fund literature it is common that the well-performing funds 
attract much larger money-flows than badly performing funds (see, e.g. Sirri and 
Tufano [1998]). Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2004] report similar findings for the 
hedge fund industry. Apparently, it is also the case in the hedge fund industry that 
money flows chase recent performance. Although the evidence is somewhat 
ambiguous, the majority of empirical studies concerning mutual funds show that 
active selection, on average, underperforms passive investment strategies. As Berk 
and Green [2004] argue, the absence of persistence in mutual fund returns might be 
due to the fact that persistence in returns is competed away by mutual fund investors 
rationally shifting their capital in search of superior investments. For hedge funds, 
however, there are substantial hurdles to the quick and cheap movements of capital. 
Hedge fund investors are often confronted with lockup periods, which may be as long 
as one year, during which the invested money cannot be withdrawn. Moreover, many 
funds apply a redemption notice period of up to 90 days. Therefore, one might expect 
to see more persistence for hedge funds than for mutual funds.  
 
A major problem in evaluating hedge fund performance and its persistence is the 
relatively high attrition rate of funds. For example, Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
[1999] report an attrition rate of about 14% per year from 1987-1996. If fund survival 
(directly or indirectly) depends upon historical performance, it is well known that 
standard methods of analysis may lead to biased results (see, e.g. Brown et al. [1992], 
Carpenter and Lynch [1999], or ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek [2001]). Spurious 
persistence patterns may arise, the form of which depends upon the survival process 
and the underlying heterogeneity in fund characteristics. While most studies attempt 
to eliminate survivorship bias by taking fund returns into account until the moment of 
disappearance, a second ex-post conditioning bias, the so-called look-ahead bias, is 
not usually taken into account. This bias develops because the employed methodology 
implicitly or explicitly conditions upon survival over a number of consecutive periods. 
When analyzing performance persistence, for example, the fact that funds dissolve in 
a non-random way during the ranking or evaluation period may cause a bias (see e.g. 
Brown et al. [1992], or Carhart [1997]). As ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek [2001] 
stress, the elimination of look-ahead bias requires that the methodology be adjusted. 
An essential step in the correction procedure (see Brown, Goetzmann and Ross 
[1995]) is to model the survival process of hedge funds and how it relates to their 
(historical) performance.  
 
As Fung and Hsieh [1997, 2000] and Liang [2000] note, practical problems may 
complicate this issue. Because the hedge fund industry is highly unregulated, and data 
sets may be subject to backfilling biases, a careful analysis is required. A wide range 
of empirical problems needs to be taken into account in order to prevent biased results 
23
Survival, Look-Ahead Bias and Persistence 
 
11 
 
 
(see, e.g. Fung and Hsieh [1997], Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft [1999], 
Agarwal and Naik [2000]). One of these potential biases is a self-selection bias that 
arises because  hedge funds voluntarily report to a data vendor. Since hedge funds are 
not allowed to advertise publicly, these data vendors serve as an important distribution 
channel. Thus, self-selection bias exists either because underperformers do not wish to 
make their performance known, because funds that performed well have less incentive 
to report to data vendors to attract potential investors, or because funds do not wish 
intervention in case SEC interprets reporting as illegal advertising. In contrast to 
mutual funds, where fund attrition is usually related to bad performance, hedge funds 
disappear from a database because the fund is liquidated, is closed to new 
investments, or the manager voluntarily decides to stop reporting. Of these reasons, 
liquidation is the relevant event related to the issue of survival. In our analysis, we 
focus on the case where death is due to liquidation, as opposed to the case where the 
fund continues to exist but stops reporting to the database vendor. Empirically, about 
two thirds of hedge fund attrition can be attributed to liquidation.  
 
In this paper we study liquidation, look-ahead bias and the performance persistence of 
hedge funds that report returns in U.S.$ over the period 1994-2000. The contributions 
of this paper are threefold. First, and most importantly, we find that, compared to the 
mutual fund literature, look-ahead bias for hedge funds is quite severe, especially at 
one-year horizons and for funds with high attrition rates. Ignoring look-ahead bias, 
average returns may be overestimated by as much as 3.8% per year. In contrast, ter 
Horst, Nijman and Verbeek [2001], studying performance persistence of “growth” and 
“income” mutual funds, report only slightly different estimates after correcting for 
look-ahead bias. These findings show that the impact of look-ahead bias in persistence 
estimates is much greater for hedge funds than for mutual funds. Apparently, due to 
the greater total risk of hedge funds over their mutual fund counterparts, look-ahead 
bias is exacerbated. This is consistent with Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] who 
document the precise relation between total volatility and return in a survival 
conditioned sample. Second, we extend the previous literature on hedge fund attrition, 
by modelling the liquidation process allowing for a flexible impact of historical 
returns, by incorporating fund size as well as aggregate time effects to capture 
economy-wide shocks that affect liquidation rates of all hedge funds, and by testing 
for potential sources of misspecification. Our model for hedge fund liquidation 
provides an alternative for Brown, Goetzmann, and Park’s [2001] model, which 
explains survival from style-adjusted returns, the age of the fund, a measure for 
relative performance (i.e. the alpha), absolute performance, style-adjusted return risk 
and a time trend. Finally, we investigate performance persistence in hedge funds both 
with and without correcting for look-ahead bias using the methodology of ter Horst, 
Nijman and Verbeek [2001]. We conclude that correcting for look-ahead bias 
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increases the difference in average returns of the top and bottom deciles at the annual 
horizon. Nevertheless, we only find a statistically significant positive persistence 
pattern at the quarterly horizon, no matter whether we use the corrected or uncorrected 
method. This corresponds to the findings of Agarwal and Naik [2000]. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the 
sample of hedge funds that we employ and describe the potential biases that could 
arise. In Section 2.3 we model the liquidation process of hedge funds. Section 2.4 
examines performance persistence for a sample of hedge funds over the period 1994 - 
2000, taking into account potential biases that might be present, and discusses the 
robustness of our results. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2   Hedge fund data 
 
Hedge funds seek to deliver high absolute returns. They typically have features such 
as hurdle rates and incentive fees with high watermark provision, and investors in 
hedge funds are often confronted with lockup periods and redemption notice periods. 
Such withdrawal restrictions imply smaller cash fluctuations, which give fund 
managers more freedom in setting up long-term or illiquid positions. However, 
investors that follow an active selection strategy of investing in funds that recently 
performed well might be negatively affected by this lockup period.  
 
As mentioned, U.S.-based (onshore) hedge funds are free from regulatory controls 
stipulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940. Since 1996 the number of U.S. 
investors allowed in unregulated funds is 500. Moreover, domestic hedge funds can 
accept money from “qualified investors”, who have at least $5 million to invest and 
have “sophisticated understanding” of financial markets. In addition they can accept 
money from pension funds that have at least $25 million in capital. A distinction is 
made between onshore and offshore funds, where the latter type is typically developed 
to raise capital from non-U.S. investors. Offshore hedge funds are non-U.S. 
corporations, typically registered in a tax-haven and, as such, they are not regulated by 
the SEC. While the number of net worth investors is unlimited, participation from 
U.S. investors is still restricted.  
 
These distinctive features, particularly the low level of regulation and the long lockup 
periods, give hedge funds large flexibility in the types of positions they can take, by 
using short selling, leverage and derivatives. It allows them to have a dynamic 
position by holding diverse asset categories and moving quickly across them. Strong 
managerial incentives constitute a second important feature characterizing this 
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industry. Such incentives are largely based on performance. On average, fund 
managers receive around 20% of annual profits, as well as an annual management fee 
of about 1%. There is no incentive fee until the fund has recovered past losses (i.e. 
returns have to surpass a threshold or “high watermark”). This incentive structure can 
lead to excessive risk taking, although this is often dampened by a substantial 
managerial investment in the fund and the fact that managers may incur in liabilities 
as general partners.  
 
We use hedge fund data from TASS Management Limited. While the TASS database 
goes back to 1979, the initial years typically contain very few funds. By the beginning 
of the 1990s, however, about 200 funds were in the database, and by 1998 more than 
1400 active funds were available, illustrating the increased importance of the hedge 
fund industry. Information on defunct funds is available only for funds that left the 
database in 1994 or later. For the empirical results, we therefore concentrate on the 
period 1994-2000. Because our interest lies in persistence at horizons of at least one 
quarter, we aggregate all information into quarterly levels, which has the advantage of 
reducing the impact of return smoothing due to the possibility that a hedge fund 
invests in securities that are not actively traded (see Getmansky, Lo and Makarov 
[2004]). 
 
During the sample period, 612 hedge funds disappear from the sample. Using 
additional information provided from the TASS database, we classify these cases into 
“liquidation” and “self-selection” categories. The latter category refers to cases where 
the fund continues to exist but stops reporting to TASS. When the fund stops 
reporting because it is closed to new investors, at fund manager request, or fund 
matured, we consider it as evidence of self-selection. This is the case for 219 hedge 
funds. For 316 funds TASS reports that the fund is liquidated. For 77 hedge funds the 
reason is unknown. To make an assessment of the death reason for the funds where 
the disappearance reason is unknown, we estimate quarterly money flows according to 
the procedure mentioned in Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2004]. We aggregate these 
money flows over the four quarters preceding the disappearance. If the final year 
money flow is negative, we classify the fund as liquidated, otherwise we consider it as 
self-selected. We classify 49 of the remaining cases as liquidated, and 28 funds as 
self-selected. 
 
We now focus on hedge funds reporting returns in U.S.$., which results in a total of 
1797 funds of which 1185 are active in the first quarter of 2000. This corresponds to 
an average annual attrition rate of 8.6% from 1994 to 20005, which is very close to the 
                                                 
5 The average annual attrition rate is computed as four times the (unweighted) average quarterly attrition rate. 
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rate of 8.3% reported for 1994-1998 by Liang [2000] (using a similar data set). 
However, recall that while attrition is caused by both self-selection and fund 
liquidation, liquidation is the relevant event related to the issue of survival. Table I 
provides detailed information on the numbers of funds that enter, are liquidated or are 
self-selected in our data set in each quarter. For example, in the first quarter of 1997, 
69 funds enter the sample, while 20 funds liquidate and 10 funds self-selected out. 
Given that 1069 funds were present at the beginning of the quarter, this corresponds to 
an attrition rate of 2.81% and a liquidation rate of 1.87%. 
 
Table II provides average quarterly returns for different subsets of funds, as well as 
the returns on the S&P 500 index. The column labelled “all funds” refers to all funds 
that were present in a given quarter, the column labelled “active” refers to funds still 
active in the first quarter of 2000, and the column labelled “non-liquidated” refers to 
all funds that are present in a certain quarter and have not been liquidated (but may 
have stopped reporting) during the sample period. Finally, the column labelled 
“liquidated” refers to funds that had left the database by the end of the sample period 
due to liquidation. Clearly, Table II indicates that average returns of liquidated funds 
are substantially below those of non-liquidated funds. For example, the average return 
in the first quarter of 1995 for non-liquidated funds is 4.0%, while the average return 
is only 2.0% for funds that have been liquidated by 2000. Combining both subsets 
produces an average quarterly return of 3.4% in the first quarter of 1995. A striking 
result is that the difference in mean over the entire sample period between non-
liquidated and liquidated funds is about 3.2% per quarter with a t-value of 2.89. Over 
the entire sample period, average returns of active funds are about 2.11% (per annum) 
above the average returns of all funds, a number that Malkiel [1995], Liang [2000] 
and others refer to as the “survivorship bias”. Note that the average returns of non-
liquidated funds (the combination of the subset of active funds with the funds that 
have been self-selected during the sample period) are about 1.52% (per annum) above 
the average of all funds, a number we can refer to as “liquidation bias”. Both 
estimates are between the 1.5% of Fung and Hsieh [2000] and the numbers presented 
by Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson [1999] (3%) and Liang [2000] (2.24%). There is 
no clear indication of a “self-selection bias” in average returns. 
 
While it is commonly accepted that funds with a relatively bad performance are more 
likely to be dissolved, it is not clear a priori over which period historical returns are 
important to explain liquidation. To obtain some insight into this question, Figure 1 
presents conditional liquidation rates (hazard rates) by performance decile over the 
next eight quarters. That is,  in each quarter funds  are  ranked  on  the basis of  (gross, 
raw) returns and divided into 10 deciles. Next, for each decile, the average liquidation  
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Table I 
 Quarterly Numbers of U.S. Hedge Funds in the  
TASS database (1994-2000) 
Table I reports the quarterly numbers of U.S. hedge funds in the TASS database that enter, liquidate, or self-
select (stop reporting) during the sample period 1994-2000. 
 
Quarter 
Funds 
Entering Existing Liquidated Self Selected Attrition Rate 
Liquidation 
Rate 
1994 Q1 50 577 0 0 0.00 0.00 
1994 Q2 38 627 0 0 0.00 0.00 
1994 Q3 60 665 0 2 0.30 0.00 
1994 Q4 55 723 4 1 0.69 0.55 
1995 Q1 64 773 3 0 0.39 0.39 
1995 Q2 47 834 3 11 1.68 0.36 
1995 Q3 52 867 10 4 1.61 1.15 
1995 Q4 53 905 9 1 1.10 0.99 
1996 Q1 67 948 15 3 1.90 1.58 
1996 Q2 51 997 17 6 2.31 1.71 
1996 Q3 63 1025 17 17 3.32 1.66 
1996 Q4 44 1054 21 8 2.75 1.99 
1997 Q1 69 1069 20 10 2.81 1.87 
1997 Q2 56 1108 16 10 2.35 1.44 
1997 Q3 65 1138 15 13 2.46 1.32 
1997 Q4 46 1175 11 6 1.45 0.94 
1998 Q1 68 1204 12 15 2.24 1.00 
1998 Q2 41 1245 20 11 2.49 1.61 
1998 Q3 57 1255 24 34 4.62 1.91 
1998 Q4 32 1254 19 19 3.03 1.52 
1999 Q1 49 1248 15 12 2.16 1.20 
1999 Q2 26 1270 17 23 3.15 1.34 
1999 Q3 34 1256 25 20 3.58 1.99 
1999 Q4 13 1245 39 13 4.18 3.13 
2000 Q1 20 1206 33 8 3.40 2.74 
       
Overall 1797   365  247 2.16 1.30 
 
rate is determined for one up to eight quarters after the ranking period6. Figure 1 
clearly shows that in the first four quarters conditional liquidation rates for loser funds 
(decile 1) are much higher than for winner funds (decile 10); for the last two or three 
quarters the relationship is almost flat. This indicates that quarterly returns are 
important determinants of subsequent liquidation rates over the next four or so 
quarters, while at eight quarters conditional liquidation rates are basically the same, 
independent of initial returns. 
                                                 
6 The conditional attrition rate (hazard rate) corresponds to the probability of attrition in quarter t+S 
conditional upon not being dissolved in the preceding quarters t + 1 to t + S-1, and conditional upon its 
performance rank in quarter t. 
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Table II 
Average Quarterly Returns of U.S. Hedge Funds (1994-2000) 
Table II reports the average quarterly returns of U.S. hedge funds from 1994-2000. The All Funds column 
refers to all funds present in a certain quarter; the Active column refers to funds still active in the first quarter 
of 2000; Non-Liquidated refers to all funds present in a certain quarter that had not been liquidated during the 
sample period; and Liquidated refers to funds that left the database by the end of the sample period due to 
liquidation.  
Quarter All Funds Active Funds Non- Liquidated Liquidated S&P500 
1994 Q1 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.024 -0.035 
1994 Q2 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.018 0.008 
1994 Q3 0.017 0.026 0.024 -0.004 0.042 
1994 Q4 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.013 0.002 
1995 Q1 0.034 0.040 0.038 0.020 0.100 
1995 Q2 0.041 0.054 0.050 0.010 0.097 
1995 Q3 0.039 0.049 0.047 0.014 0.069 
1995 Q4 0.041 0.042 0.039 0.050 0.065 
1996 Q1 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.014 0.067 
1996 Q2 0.060 0.063 0.067 0.033 0.040 
1996 Q3 0.019 0.024 0.022 0.007 0.025 
1996 Q4 0.057 0.066 0.063 0.032 0.081 
1997 Q1 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.030 
1997 Q2 0.051 0.054 0.055 0.033 0.178 
1997 Q3 0.075 0.080 0.077 0.065 0.077 
1997 Q4 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 -0.024 0.020 
1998 Q1 0.048 0.058 0.055 0.010 0.146 
1998 Q2 -0.012 -0.006 -0.011 -0.020 0.040 
1998 Q3 -0.049 -0.049 -0.048 -0.059 -0.138 
1998 Q4 0.051 0.061 0.057 0.000 0.251 
1999 Q1 0.031 0.039 0.037 -0.022 0.056 
1999 Q2 0.078 0.086 0.084 0.015 0.071 
1999 Q3 0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.007 -0.068 
1999 Q4 0.129 0.136 0.135 0.002 0.138 
2000 Q1 0.060 0.063 0.063 -0.065 0.038 
      
Overall 0.033 0.038 0.037 0.005 0.056 
 
Data vendors commonly use a number of classification methods for hedge funds’ 
investment styles, but none appears to be universally accepted. The TASS database 
employs two different classifications. The classification we use initially contains 17 
styles which are mutually exclusive and closely correspond to the commonly used 
Tremont hedge fund style indices, simultaneously taking into account different 
dimensions such as asset class, geographical focus, and investment bias (i.e. U.S. 
equity hedge funds; European equity hedge funds; Asian equity hedge funds; pure 
leveraged currency; fixed income directional; and convertible fund (long only)). 
However, this investment style is not available for 269 funds (of which 242 are dead 
funds).  This represents a  major drawback since we  intend  to  study survival-related  
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Figure 1 
Conditional Liquidation Rates 
 from One to Eight Quarters after Initial Rank 
In each quarter from 1994Q2 to 2000Q1, funds are ranked into decile portfolios 
based on their previous one-quarter raw returns. For the quarter subsequent to initial 
ranking and for each of the next 8 quarters after formation, the rate of liquidated 
funds as a percentage of the total number of funds still existing at the beginning of 
each period is determined. Thus, the bar in cell (i,j) represents the conditional 
probability of being liquidated in the post-formation period i given an initial ranking 
of decile j. 
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biases by investment style. To determine the style of this subsample of funds, we 
apply multiple discriminant analysis. 
 
For all funds in the TASS database, we observe indications of their investment style 
through a set of 15 overlapping style indicators (e.g. bottom up, market neutral, 
fundamental). On average, each fund is characterized by at least four of these styles. 
The subsample of funds for which we also observe a unique style classification 
according to the 17 styles distinguished above, is used to determine a set of 
discriminant functions. These discriminant functions provide a set of scores for each 
of the 17 styles7. The discriminant functions are then used to determine the scores for 
the subsample of funds for which the appropriate style classification is missing. We 
                                                 
7 One of these 17 style categories, pure property, contained only one fund and was not used in the discriminant 
analysis.  
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then allocate each fund to its most likely style. While such a procedure is necessarily 
subject to classification error, its within sample performance is rather good, with 
52.3% of the funds correctly classified in one of the 17 investment styles.  
 
Table III 
Liquidated and Non-Liquidated  U.S. Hedge Funds per Investment Style 
Table III reports the numbers of liquidated and non-liquidated U.S. hedge funds from the TASS database by 
investment style. 
 Onshore Offshore 
Investment Style 
Non-
Liquidated Liquidated Total 
Non-
Liquidated Liquidated Total 
Convertible Arbitrage 5 0 5 4 2 6 
Dedicated Short Bias 6 0 6 6 0 6 
Emerging Markets 23 9 32 139 43 182 
Equity Market Neutral 46 15 61 76 23 99 
Event Driven 65 5 70 78 8 86 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  7 1 8 14 6 20 
Global Macro 3 1 4 21 6 27 
Long/Short Equity 158 19 177 154 33 187 
Managed Futures 100 41 141 123 92 215 
Hedge Fund Index 118 15 133 263 69 332 
All Styles 531 106 637 878 282 1160 
 
As previously mentioned, these 17 styles closely correspond to the Tremont hedge 
fund benchmarks. Tremont offers a series of nine hedge fund indices, computed on a 
monthly basis and constructed from hedge funds that have at least $10 million under 
management and provide audited financial statements (see, e.g. Lhabitant [2001]). In 
Table III, we report the number of non-liquidated and liquidated funds assigned to a 
Tremont index. The investment style “Hedge Fund Index” is a general hedge fund 
index and does not refer to a particular investment style. We assign funds without a 
clear investment style, such as fund-of-funds, to this category. In addition, we 
distinguish between offshore and onshore funds. 
 
From Table III, it appears that “Long/Short Equity” and “Managed Futures” are the 
most popular investment styles, with 364 and 356 funds, respectively. Furthermore, 
the majority of the funds can be classified as offshore. A large proportion of about 
37,4% of the funds with the investment style “Managed Futures” have been liquidated 
by 2000. For “Emerging Markets” this percentage is about 24.3%, while for 
“Dedicated Short Bias” this percentage is 0%. Clearly, these results indicate that 
investment style might be a significant factor in explaining fund survival. We do not 
observe striking differences between the liquidation rates of offshore and onshore 
funds, although the first group has a somewhat larger proportion of dissolved funds. 
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In the next section, we present a model that explains hedge fund liquidation as a 
function of historical returns as well as a number of fund characteristics, including 
investment style. 
 
2.3   Modelling the liquidation process 
 
Variables that are likely to affect liquidation rates of hedge funds are historical returns 
over a number of previous quarters, fund size, fund age, fund risk, an underwater 
indicator reflecting negative returns over a predetermined period, and the fund’s 
investment style. To describe our liquidation model, let yit be an indicator variable that 
indicates whether fund i liquidates in quarter t. Our specification describes the 
probability of fund liquidation (yit = 0) using a longitudinal probit model, such that a 
fund does not liquidate if an underlying latent variable, y*it,  is positive. That is, 
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where ri,t-j is the return of fund i in quarter t-j, xi,t-1  is a vector of fund-specific 
characteristics, including a set of style dummies, and λt denotes fixed time effects 
describing economy-wide effects. The coefficients γij indicate how non-liquidation 
(survival) is affected by the funds’ returns, lagged j quarters. Compared to Liang 
[2000], who includes the average monthly return over the fund’s history, this allows 
us to analyze the dynamic impact of historical returns upon fund survival. For the 
moment, we fix the maximum lag J at six. The γij  coefficients are assumed to be equal 
across funds, with the exception of those cases in which fewer than J historical returns 
are available -in this  case, the γij  coefficients are set to zero if the corresponding 
return is unobserved (which is typical for funds with a recent inception date). To 
reduce the effect of a potential backfill bias on our estimates, information on a fund is 
only taken into account in the estimation of (1) the moment its age exceeds four 
quarters. 
 
In Table IV we present some summary statistics of the fund-specific variables (xi,t-1) 
that are included in the liquidation model (1). These descriptive statistics are based on 
19245 fund/period observations. Note that 10 of the fund-specific variables are 
dummies. It appears that 59% of the observations are from offshore hedge funds, 
which, while reporting in US$, are located in tax-havens like the Virgin Islands. The 
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average incentive fee of the fund manager is about 16%, but can be as high as 50% of 
realized performance. Note that these incentive fees are only obtained when the fund 
has recovered past losses (high water-mark). The annual management fee varies from 
0% to 8% (of net asset value) and has an average of 1.6%. The age of the funds varies 
between 13 months and 275 months (about 23 years), with the average age of about 
45 months. The average size of the hedge funds, measured by their log net asset value 
is 16.72, corresponding to about 18.3 million US$. Total risk is measured by the 
standard deviation of the previous six quarterly returns. The underwater indicator is 
 
Table IV 
Summary Statistics of Fund-Specific Variables 
Table IV presents summary statistics of the fund-specific variables included in liquidation model (1). These 
descriptions are based on 19245 final period observations; 10 of the fund-specific variables are dummies. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OffShore 0.593 0.491 0.000 1.000 
Incentive fees 15.925 7.902 0.000 50.000 
Management fees 1.617 1.064 0.000 8.000 
ln(NAV) 16.720 1.772 7.578 23.297 
ln(Age) 3.808 0.659 2.565 5.617 
ln(Age)2 14.937 5.087 6.579 31.548 
St.dev 0.084 0.083 0.001 2.189 
Underwater 0.170 0.375 0.000 1.000 
Emerging Markets 0.103 0.304 0.000 1.000 
Equity Market Neutral 0.073 0.260 0.000 1.000 
Event Driven 0.100 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.011 0.107 0.000 1.000 
Global Macro 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000 
Long/Short Equity 0.185 0.388 0.000 1.000 
Managed Futures 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000 
Fund-of-funds 0.203 0.403 0.000 1.000 
 
equal to one if a fund has a negative cumulative return over the past eight quarters8, 
which occurs in 17% of the cases. About 20% of the observations belong to so-called 
funds-of-funds, while only 1% corresponds to hedge funds with a fixed income 
arbitrage investment style. We estimate (1) using all investment styles, while 
including style dummies to capture the possibility, as suggested by the summary 
statistics in Table III, that different investment styles are associated with different 
overall liquidation rates. Given the limited number of funds with “convertible 
arbitrage” or “dedicated short bias” investment styles, no dummies are included for 
these styles and the funds are allocated to the general hedge fund index (reference 
category). In addition, the model includes time dummies to capture aggregate shocks 
to the liquidation rates. Because fund size (NAV) is not available in each period for all 
funds in our sample, we use the most recent observation of net asset value available 
                                                 
8 The cumulative return is determined over at least five quarters with a maximum of eight quarters. 
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from the TASS database. However, in 7% of the cases some observations remain for 
which NAV is missing and cannot be imputed. Because we do not want to eliminate 
these observations from our persistence analysis in Section 2.4, we also estimate a 
second liquidation model in which ln(NAV) is excluded. This model, based on a 
smaller information set, is used to correct for look-ahead bias whenever information 
on net asset value is missing. The estimation results, based on either 19245 or 20413 
fund/period observations, are presented in Table V and Table VI, respectively9. 
 
 
Table V 
Estimation Results of the Liquidation Model Including NAV 
Table V reports the estimation results of the liquidation model, including net asset value (size). Coefficient 
estimates for the time dummies are not reported. 
Parameters Estimate Std. Error  Parameters Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 2.171 0.857  St.dev 1.676 0.404 
r1 0.913 0.229  Underwater -0.387 0.070 
r2 0.820 0.246  ln(Age) -1.001 0.438 
r3 1.153 0.252  ln(Age)2 0.142 0.058 
r4 0.290 0.252  Emerging Markets -0.137 0.090 
r5 0.101 0.234  Equity Market Neutral -0.219 0.101 
r6 -0.384 0.203  Event Driven 0.165 0.131 
OffShore -0.136 0.057  Fixed Income Arbitrage -0.194 0.223 
Incentive Fees -0.007 0.004  Global Macro -0.145 0.206 
Management Fees -0.021 0.026  Long/Short Equity -0.083 0.088 
ln(NAV) 0.171 0.017  Managed Futures -0.076 0.078 
     
Observations:  19245    
Log likelihood: -1358.2194   χ2  test:  548.25  (DF =42) 
Pseudo R2: 0.1679   (p=0.0000) 
 
Table VI 
Estimation Results of the Liquidation Model Excluding NAV 
Table VI presents estimation results of the liquidation model, excluding net asset value (size). Coefficient 
estimates for the time dummies are not reported. 
Parameters Estimate Std. Error  Parameters Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 4.189 0.797  St.dev 0.735 0.377 
r1 1.052 0.218  Underwater -0.453 0.068 
r2 1.044 0.236  ln(Age) -0.599 0.414 
r3 1.374 0.243  ln(Age)2 0.098 0.055 
r4 0.447 0.235  Emerging Markets 0.031 0.086 
r5 0.307 0.225  Equity Market Neutral -0.184 0.096 
r6 -0.065 0.194  Event Driven 0.245 0.126 
OffShore -0.104 0.055  Fixed Income Arbitrage -0.066 0.219 
Incentive Fees -0.008 0.003  Global Macro 0.089 0.208 
Management Fees -0.031 0.025  Long/Short Equity -0.054 0.084 
    Managed Futures -0.284 0.073 
     
Observations: 20413    
Log likelihood: -1452.3809   χ2  test:  455.82  (DF =41) 
Pseudo R2: 0.1356   (p=0.0000) 
                                                 
9 The estimates for the time dummies are available from the authors.  
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The results show that the impact of historical returns upon fund survival is positive 
and significant: funds with high returns are much less likely to liquidate than funds 
with low returns. The impact of the individual quarters decreases with each lag. 
Consistent with Brown, Goetzmann and Park [2001], the underwater indicator has a 
highly significant and negative impact upon survival, indicating that a negative 
aggregated return over the previous two years increases the probability that a fund 
will liquidate. A comparison with the results for mutual funds in ter Horst, Nijman 
and Verbeek [2001] suggests that hedge fund survival is more strongly related to 
historical performance, both economically, as measured by the coefficient 
magnitudes, and statistically, as reflected by the corresponding t-ratios. As the χ2 test 
indicates, the variables in the models are jointly highly significant, while many of the 
variables are also individually significant. For example, fund size has a strong 
negative impact upon liquidation: smaller funds are, ceteris paribus, much more likely 
to be liquidated than large funds. Surprisingly, the magnitude of the incentive fee for a 
manager affects the probability of survival in a negative and significant way, i.e. the 
higher the incentive fee, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that the fund will 
liquidate in the next quarter. Age has a significant nonlinear effect: young hedge funds 
have a high probability of disappearance, but as funds become more mature, the 
liquidation probability decreases. Most investment style dummies have a significant 
impact on survival probabilities. The funds with an “event driven” style have, ceteris 
paribus, the highest probability to survive, while funds classified as “equity market 
neutral” have the lowest survival probability. Interestingly, no significant effect is 
found for the “managed futures” style when fund size is included in the specification, 
whereas it is highly significant and negative when size is dropped. 
 
The results of Brown, Goetzmann and Park [2001], who estimate several alternative 
models for hedge fund failure, indicate a positive and statistically significant impact 
of style-adjusted return risk upon fund failure, which is consistent with the idea that 
high risk funds are more likely to experience extreme returns and therefore are more 
likely to terminate (Brown et al [1992]). However, in the current specifications 
explaining fund liquidation, standard deviation is statistically insignificant when fund 
size is excluded (Table VI), but becomes significant and positive when fund size is 
added (Table V), suggesting that with a given return history and fund size, high risk 
funds experience a somewhat lower liquidation probability10. This is not inconsistent 
with the finding that high-risk funds are more likely to liquidate,  but  it  does  indicate  
 
 
                                                 
10 The results in Tables V and VI are not driven by outliers. Moreover, the results are similar if alternative 
measures for standard deviation are used (e.g. based on monthly returns). 
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that high-risk funds are allowed to have more extreme negative returns than low-risk 
funds before they decide to liquidate.  
 
The specification reported in Table V is tested against a number of more general 
alternatives. For example, we test whether the model is significantly improved when 
returns lagged seven, eight and nine quarters are added. The value of the likelihood 
ratio test statistic is 4.82, which is insignificant at the 10% level11. Furthermore we 
test the logarithmic specification in size against a more general alternative. The 
likelihood ratio test on the inclusion of ln(NAV)2 produces an insignificant value of 
0.09. In summary, the results of these tests do not indicate serious shortcomings of the 
current specification.  
 
To obtain an indication of the probability that an arbitrary hedge fund will liquidate in 
the next quarter given its past record of returns and its age, we use the estimates of (1) 
to compute the liquidation probability. In Figure 2 we report the liquidation 
probabilities for funds with different ages, with a minimum of 5 quarters, where 
historical returns vary from -10% to +10% for each of the last six quarters. The 
underwater indicator is set equal to one if the cumulative return over the previous six 
quarters is negative. All other variables are fixed at their sample average. It appears 
that for a fund with an age of 12 quarters and a return record of -10% for each of the 
last six quarters, the probability of liquidation in the next quarter is about 4.6%, while 
for a fund with the same age but a return record of +10% for each of the last six 
quarters, the liquidation probability is only 0.5%. Note that the underwater indicator 
has a strong impact on the probability of liquidation. If a fund is underwater, implying 
that the manager will not receive the incentive fee, the probability that a fund will 
disappear increases from almost 1% to about 2.5% for a 12-quarter old fund with past 
average returns around 0%.  Clearly, fund age affects liquidation nonlinearly. 
Apparently, liquidation rates of young funds are less affected by poor historical 
performance than those of funds that have been around for several years, however, 
relatively older and established funds are also less likely to liquidate. These results are 
consistent with Boyson [2003], who investigates the relation between survival, past 
performance and manager tenure. According to her results, young managers are much 
more likely than old managers to be terminated for poor performance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11  The asymptotic distribution is χ2 with 3 degrees of freedom. 
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Figure 2 
Liquidation Probabilities Implied by Estimated Survival Model 
Figure 2 shows liquidation probabilities by fund age and the previous six quarters’ returns as 
implied by the estimated liquidation model.  
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2.4  Estimating Persistence in Performance 
 
The question whether hedge funds exhibit performance persistence has received much 
attention in the recent literature. For example, Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson 
[1999] use annual returns of offshore hedge funds and do not find persistence in their 
sample. Agarwal and Naik [2000] use quarterly, half-yearly and annual (post-fee and 
pre-fee) returns and examine short- as well as long-term persistence. They find that 
persistence is highest at the quarterly horizon and decreases when moving towards a 
yearly horizon. However, persistence in quarterly returns can be affected by the fact 
that most hedge funds only report on an annual basis. The investment style of hedge 
funds is not relevant for the persistence pattern that Agarwal and Naik [2000] find. 
 
In this section, we first examine whether there is performance persistence in raw 
returns. Basically, we examine whether winning funds are more likely to be winners 
in the next period. To obtain an indication of the probabilities that hedge funds from 
the top deciles will remain in the top deciles, Figure 3 reports a contingency table of 
quarterly performance. Each quarter all funds are ranked in ten deciles, and this is 
compared with their rank in the previous quarter. The table also incorporates 
liquidated funds and new funds that enter the database (after a backfill period of four 
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quarters) and is, therefore, not affected by look-ahead bias. Funds that are in the top 
decile (decile 10) have a probability of about 20% of being a top performer in the next 
quarter again, and have a probability of about 17% of ending up in the loser decile 
(decile 1). The funds that performed worst (decile 1) in the ranking period, have the 
highest probability of being a loser again (about 24%), and a probability of about 4% 
of being liquidated in the next quarter. Moreover, these funds have a high probability 
(more than 16%) of ending up in the winner decile. The most likely explanation for 
this finding is that funds in the extreme deciles (deciles 1 and 10) are more risky than 
those in the other deciles, as more risk is associated with higher average returns, but 
also with greater chances of extremely good and extremely poor outcomes. Such 
funds are more likely to move from the winner to the loser decile or vice versa. We 
observe that funds from the middle deciles are more likely to remain in the middle 
deciles than to move to one of the extreme deciles. The probability of being liquidated 
in the next quarter is relatively high for the lower deciles. 
 
Figure 3 
Contingency of Quarterly Performance 
(ranking criterion: past one-quarter raw returns) 
Hedge funds are sorted each quarter from 1994Q1 to 2000Q1 into ten rank portfolios 
based on their previous one-quarter net raw returns, provided they have a return history 
of at least 4 quarters to correct for backfilling bias.  This initial ranking is compared to 
the fund's subsequent one-quarter return ranking. The bar in cell (i,j) represents the 
conditional probability of achieving a subsequent ranking of decile j given an initial 
ranking of decile i. New funds are placed in a separate category. In this case bar in cell 
(i,j) represents the conditional probability of achieving a ranking of decile j in the quarter 
subsequent to the starting-operations quarter. 
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The previous analysis does not provide information about the levels of average returns 
across the different deciles. To investigate this, we rank the funds in the so-called 
ranking period on the basis of past average returns over the previous quarter, the 
previous year or the previous two years. This ranking is broken down into 10 deciles. 
To avoid double counting, fund-of-funds are excluded from this exercise. In the 
subsequent evaluation period we calculate the average returns for each of these 
deciles. For instance, for the one-year ranking period this implies that the first ranking 
is based on returns over the year 1994 (i.e. the first year of our sample), while the 
evaluation period is the year 1995. The procedure is repeated over the entire sample 
period, moving forward by one quarter at the time and adjusting the sample to include 
those funds that have a sufficiently long return history. As a result, these rankings are 
conditional upon survival over the ranking and evaluation periods, and thus, multi-
period selection bias or look-ahead bias may distort the empirical results. As before, 
we take account of potential backfill biases by only using information on a fund once 
its age exceeds four quarters. 
 
As is well known, spurious performance persistence patterns that are due to look-
ahead bias might arise (Carpenter and Lynch [1999]). Following the correction 
procedure introduced by ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek [2001], we present 
persistence results that are corrected for look-ahead bias. Basically, the correction 
method implies a multiplication of the performance measure (e.g. the average return 
over the ranking period) with a weight factor, which is the ratio of an unconditional 
non-liquidation probability in the numerator and a conditional non-liquidation 
probability in the denominator. The latter one can be obtained from the estimated 
liquidation process that is reported in Section 2.3, while the unconditional probability 
can be estimated by the ratio of the funds that were not liquidated during the ranking 
period to the number of funds present in the sample at the beginning of the ranking 
period. The correction for the average returns over the evaluation period is similar, 
except that the unconditional probabilities are conditional upon the fund’s decile 
during the ranking period (but not upon the entire return history)12. 
 
 
Consider the case of interest here, namely persistence in raw returns at the annual 
horizon. This implies that we can only use information on funds that have reported 
returns for at least four consecutive quarters. Let Yit = 1 if fund i has survived during 
quarters t to t + 3 (Yit = 0 otherwise) and let Ri denote the entire vector of fund returns. 
The probability that a fund is observed in quarters t to t + 3, after a backfill period of 
                                                 
12 The correction assumes that self-selection is determined exogenously.  
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four quarters, and given both its returns and characteristics Xit (age, management fees, 
investment style, net asset value), can be obtained from the liquidation model. 
Assuming that liquidation is independent of current or future returns, this probability 
is 
 { } { }∏+
=
−−===
3
1,1,, .,...,|1,|1
t
ts
sisisiitiit xryPXRYP                                       (2)   
 
Estimates for the probabilities at the right-hand side are directly obtained from the 
probit model. The unconditional non-liquidation probability can easily be estimated 
by the ratio of the appropriate number of funds that did not liquidate between quarter t 
and t + 3 and the number of funds that were in the sample in quarter t-1. As ter Horst, 
Nijman and Verbeek [2001] show, multiplying the returns for funds used in the 
analysis by the resulting weight factors provides the unconditional distribution of 
returns of interest to us. 
 
In Table VII we report the empirical persistence of raw returns at quarterly and annual 
horizons, both with and without correcting for look-ahead bias. The results for the 
annual horizon are also represented graphically in Figure 4. All estimates are based on 
the full sample of hedge funds, excluding fund-of-funds. The results in Table VII 
show some interesting patterns. At the annual level, we see that the persistence pattern 
without corrections is slightly J-shaped. Given the results of Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser [1997], Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross [1997], and ter Horst, 
Nijman and Verbeek [2001], a pattern like this may be attributable to look-ahead bias. 
Correcting for look-ahead bias flattens the J-shaped pattern. Without corrections, 
average returns may be overestimated by as much as 3.8% (decile 1), which is 
statistically significant with a t-value of 2.59. This shows that the impact of look-
ahead bias upon persistence measures may be quite severe.  In contrast,  ter Horst, 
Nijman and Verbeek [2001], studying persistence in performance of “growth” and 
“income” mutual funds, report only slightly different estimates after correcting for 
look-ahead bias. These findings show that the impact of look-ahead bias in persistence 
estimates is much larger for hedge funds than for mutual funds. The most likely 
explanation for this is the stronger relation between hedge fund survival and historical 
performance. The corrections for look-ahead bias are most pronounced for the 
extreme deciles, which is to be expected given that these deciles typically contain the 
more risky funds. The finding that look-ahead bias has a U-shaped pattern is due to 
the cross-sectional dispersion in fund specific risk: funds ranked in one of the extreme 
deciles are more likely to be high risk funds and thus are less likely to survive. 
Conditional upon the fact that a fund has not been liquidated during the evaluation 
period, it will make better returns than average (see ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek 
[2001] for additional discussion). 
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Table VII 
Persistence Estimates for One-Quarter and Four-Quarter Raw Returns 
Each quarter funds are sorted into 10 rank portfolios based on their previous one- or four-quarter returns, 
respectively. Next, average returns over the next one or four quarters are computed for each decile. Using 
returns from 1994-2000, this produces a time series for each decile of  22 average one-quarter returns and 16 
(overlapping) average four-quarter returns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-series averages 
and their standard errors are in parenthesis. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation based on the 
Newey-West approach. The corrected figures employ a weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias. 
 Average Performance (Raw Returns) 
 One-Quarter  Four-Quarter 
Decile Non-corrected  Corrected  Non-corrected  Corrected 
1 (losers) 0.092  0.083  0.159  0.121 
 (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.097)  (0.099) 
2 0.116  0.117  0.164  0.143 
 (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.064)  (0.056) 
3 0.124  0.124  0.146  0.131 
 (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.048)  (0.045) 
4 0.118  0.116  0.142  0.131 
 (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.041)  (0.037) 
5 0.121  0.124  0.141  0.143 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
6 0.130  0.126  0.134  0.131 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
7 0.143  0.141  0.139  0.135 
 (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.041)  (0.042) 
8 0.165  0.168  0.159  0.159 
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
9 0.197  0.197  0.192  0.191 
 (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.051) 
10 (winners) 0.206  0.204  0.208  0.203 
 (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.109)  (0.109) 
        
Winners-
Losers 0.115  0.121  0.049  0.082 
 (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.080) 
 
At the quarterly horizon, we clearly observe positive persistence in hedge fund 
returns, particularly for the four best deciles. For example, the top decile provides an 
average return over the next quarter of 20.4% (annualized) while the bottom decile 
provides only about 8.3%. This corresponds to the findings of Agarwal and Naik 
[2000], who also find strong persistence at a quarterly horizon over the period 1982-
1998. However, in their study the issue of look-ahead bias is not taken into account. 
The corrections for look-ahead bias reduce most of the averages somewhat, although 
the bias is much less than in the case of an annual horizon. Because these estimates 
refer to only one quarter, it is not surprising that the look-ahead bias is less severe. 
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Figure 4 
Annual Persistence in Raw Returns 
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The results for a two-year horizon are reported in Table VIII. Compared to Table VII, 
the number of funds that can be used to estimate persistence is substantially reduced. 
Both the corrected and uncorrected persistence estimates show an increasing pattern 
over the deciles, with the exception of the top decile. Nevertheless, the winners 
outperform the losers by a statistically insignificant 7%. To investigate the impact of 
the extreme observations, we also compute average returns in the evaluation period 
giving zero weight to the 1% lowest and 1% highest returns. We anticipate this to 
result in more robust estimates for the expected returns during the evaluation period. 
The results are reported in the last column of Table VIII and reduce the performance 
of the winner-loser portfolio to 4.4%. 
 
One explanation for positive persistence in raw returns, after correcting for look-ahead 
bias, is the presence of cross-sectional variation in expected fund returns due to 
heterogeneous style or (systematic) risk characteristics. As Boyson [2003] argues, 
controlling for style is important in an analysis of performance persistence among 
hedge funds. Therefore, we also examine persistence in risk-adjusted returns. For 
hedge funds this is somewhat more complicated than for mutual funds. Hedge fund 
returns typically have low correlations with returns on standard asset pricing factors 
like the return on the market portfolio. This is an important feature of hedge funds and 
makes them an interesting investment vehicle for diversification opportunities. The 
reason  for  the  low correlation  is  that  hedge funds often  follow  highly  dynamic  
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Table VIII 
Persistence Estimates for Eight-Quarter Raw Returns 
Each quarter funds are sorted into 10 rank portfolios based on their previous eight-quarter returns. Next, 
average returns over the next eight quarters are computed for each decile. Using returns from 1994-2000, this 
produces a time series for each decile of  8 (overlapping) average eight-quarter returns. The numbers in the 
table are the annualized time-series average returns and their standard errors are in parenthesis. The standard 
errors are corrected for autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The corrected figures employ a 
weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias. The robust estimates give zero weight to the 1% lowest and 
1% highest returns. 
 Average Performance (Raw Returns) 
 Eight Quarter 
Decile Non-corrected  Corrected  Corrected (Robust Estimates) 
1 (losers) 0.039  -0.021  0.020 
 (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.024) 
2 0.076  0.050  0.044 
 (0.096)  (0.093)  (0.059) 
3 0.116  0.113  0.102 
 (0.059)  (0.063)  (0.045) 
4 0.110  0.107  0.105 
 (0.021)  (0.029)  (0.030) 
5 0.121  0.116  0.113 
 (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.040) 
6 0.131  0.115  0.115 
 (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.044) 
7 0.159  0.159  0.145 
 (0.057)  (0.052)  (0.041) 
8 0.174  0.162  0.153 
 (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.033) 
9 0.152  0.155  0.156 
 (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.049) 
10 (winners) 0.083  0.050  0.064 
 (0.082)  (0.100)  (0.082) 
      
Winners-Losers 0.044  0.070  0.044 
 (0.095)  (0.104)  (0.079) 
 
investment styles, and are allowed to invest in derivatives, to take short positions or to 
make use of leverage. The question of how to obtain risk-adjusted hedge fund returns 
receives a lot of attention in the current literature. Basically, two approaches can be 
found, the first approach makes use of indices that have option like pay-off structures 
(see, e.g. Fung and Hsieh [1997], [2001], and Agarwal and Naik [2004]), while the 
second approach uses peer group hedge fund indices (see, e.g. Lhabitant [2001]). The 
idea behind the first approach is that hedge fund strategies generate option-like returns 
that should be reflected in the benchmark indices. The second approach avoids the 
problem and simply makes use of indices constructed out of other hedge funds with 
the same reported style as the funds under consideration. The first approach is only 
suitable for very specific trading strategies, while the second approach is much more 
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general. However, it is more appropriate to denote the obtained returns generated from 
the second approach as style-adjusted or relative returns instead of risk-adjusted 
returns. Given that in our study the focus is on persistence in hedge fund returns in 
general, and not for a specific investment style, we decided to follow the second 
approach, and examine whether hedge funds show persistence in style-adjusted or 
relative returns. The style benchmarks we employ are the Tremont hedge fund style 
indices, which correspond to the investment styles of the hedge funds in our sample 
(see Table III). Basically, we subtract from the raw return of a hedge fund the return 
on the style benchmark the fund belongs to. Similarly to the procedure followed in 
case of raw returns, we examine whether there is persistence in relative returns. 
 
In Table IX we report persistence of relative returns at quarterly and annual horizons, 
with and without corrections for look-ahead bias. Figure 5 presents a visual 
representation of the results at the annual frequency. Results for the biannual horizon 
are reported in Table X. At the annual horizon we find that the top three deciles 
(decile 8, 9 and 10) outperform their style benchmark. The outperformance, although 
statistically insignificant, increases from about 1% (decile 8) to somewhat more than 
6% for decile 10 at an  annual  basis  (corrected relative returns).  For the remaining 
deciles we find underperformance and insignificant persistence of negative relative 
returns. The effect of look-ahead bias is most severe for decile 1, where the bias is 
about 3%. At a quarterly horizon the persistence of relative returns is stronger. For 
decile 7 this outperformance is about 2% and increases to about 6.7% for decile 10. 
Similar to the results of the raw returns, the effect of look-ahead bias is much smaller 
at a quarterly horizon than at an annual horizon. At a biannual horizon, reported in 
Table X, we do not observe any persistence of relative returns. Almost all funds show, 
on average, underperformance with respect to their corresponding style benchmark. 
When the 1% highest and lowest observations are omitted from the evaluation period, 
we find qualitatively similar results. 
 
A major explanation for the fact that we observe more persistence in hedge fund 
returns than what is usually found for mutual fund returns, is that liquidity in the 
hedge fund industry is severely restricted. While Berk and Green [2004] argue that 
past performance is unable to predict future returns of mutual funds due to the fact 
that mutual fund investors chase performance by investing more in funds that recently 
performed well (see, e.g. Chevalier and Ellison [1997], Sirri and Tufano [1998]), 
hedge funds are characterized by lockup periods and redemption notice periods. 
Moreover, regulatory restrictions may limit the growth of (onshore) hedge funds. 
When investment strategies employed by hedge fund managers cannot be scaled up 
without limit, performance fees and high watermark contracts provide incentives to 
the manager to close the fund for new investors or otherwise limit the inflow of new 
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money (see Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross [2001]). However, the persistence found 
above may not be exploitable if the funds in the top deciles are closed for new 
investments. To address this issue13, we analyze the subsequent performance of the 
top three deciles, while concentrating only on those funds that are actually taking new 
money. While our database provides information about whether or not a fund is closed  
 
 
 
Table IX 
Persistence Estimates for One-Quarter  
and Four-Quarter Style-Adjusted Returns 
Each quarter funds are sorted into 10 rank portfolios based on their previous one- or four-quarter style-adjusted 
returns, respectively, where style-adjusted returns are raw returns in deviation of the returns on an appropriate 
style index. Next, average style-adjusted returns over the next one or four quarters are computed for each 
decile. Using returns from 1994-2000, this produces a time series for each decile of  22 average one-quarter 
returns and 16 (overlapping) average four-quarter returns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-
series averages and their standard errors are in parenthesis. The standard errors are corrected for 
autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The corrected figures employ a weighting procedure to 
eliminate look-ahead bias. 
 Average Performance (Style-Adjusted Returns) 
 One-Quarter  Four-Quarter 
Decile Non-corrected  Corrected  Non-corrected  Corrected 
1 (losers) -0.029  -0.033  -0.007  -0.036 
 (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.069)  (0.063) 
2 -0.021  -0.018  -0.019  -0.028 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.043)  (0.042) 
3 -0.034  -0.036  -0.010  -0.010 
 (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
4 -0.022  -0.021  -0.014  -0.018 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
5 -0.001  -0.003  -0.015  -0.020 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
6 -0.002  -0.002  -0.010  -0.012 
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
7 0.019  0.019  -0.006  -0.007 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
8 0.038  0.040  0.016  0.010 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
9 0.052  0.047  0.018  0.014 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
10 (winners) 0.065  0.067  0.066  0.062 
 (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.053)  (0.054) 
        
Winners-Losers 0.094  0.100  0.073  0.099 
 (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.090)  (0.083) 
 
 
                                                 
13 I am grateful to Narayan Naik for this suggestion.  
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to investment, this applies only at the time the data were purchased. To solve this 
problem, we use money flows during the evaluation period to classify funds as closed 
or open to investment. In particular, we define funds as being closed to investment if 
average cash flows during the four quarters before the end of the evaluation period are 
less than 1% 14. 
 
 
Figure 5 
Annual Persistence of Style-Adjusted Returns 
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Table XI presents the estimated average returns for the top three deciles when we 
exclude funds that are classified as closed for investment and contrasts them with the 
corresponding figures based on the entire sample of funds. In the case of decile 10, the 
average return increases from 20.4% to 22.2% at the quarterly horizon, while at the 
annual horizon, the average return increases from 20.2% to 21.7% (corrected returns). 
From Table XI we conclude that the persistence results are robust for excluding funds 
that are classified as closed for new investments. Apparently, the persistence is not 
driven by well performing funds that are closed for new money, suggesting that it 
might be exploitable for investors. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Experimenting with alternative cut-off rates leads to very similar results. 
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Table X 
Persistence Estimates for Eight-Quarter Style-Adjusted Returns 
Each quarter funds are sorted into 10 rank portfolios based on their previous eight-quarter style-adjusted 
returns. Next, average returns over the next eight quarters are computed for each decile. Using returns from 
1994-2000, this produces a time series for each decile of  8 (overlapping) average eight-quarter returns. The 
numbers in the table are the annualized time-series average returns and their standard errors are in parenthesis. 
The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation based on the Newey-West approach. The corrected 
figures employ a weighting procedure to eliminate look-ahead bias. The robust estimates give zero weight to 
the 1% lowest and 1% highest returns. 
 Average Performance (Style-Adjusted Returns) 
 Eight Quarter 
Decile Non-corrected  Corrected  Corrected (Robust Estimates) 
1 (losers) -0.039  -0.116  -0.050 
 (0.099)  (0.095)  (0.068) 
2 0.008  0.004  -0.013 
 (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.040) 
3 0.001  -0.007  -0.014 
 (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.040) 
4 -0.005  -0.009  -0.007 
 (0.034)  (0.028)  (0.026) 
5 -0.009  -0.015  -0.012 
 (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.039) 
6 -0.016  -0.016  -0.016 
 (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
7 0.005  -0.002  -0.004 
 (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.025) 
8 0.025  0.025  0.017 
 (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.019) 
9 0.017  0.005  0.002 
 (0.030)  (0.041)  (0.036) 
10 (winners) -0.027  -0.047  -0.053 
 (0.040)  (0.052)  (0.036) 
      
Winners-Losers 0.012  0.069  -0.003 
 (0.136)  (0.138)  (0.102) 
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Table XI 
Persistence Estimates of Top Three Deciles in Raw Returns 
Each quarter funds are sorted into 10 rank portfolios based on their previous one- or four-quarter returns, 
respectively. Next, average returns over the next one or four quarters are computed for each decile. Using 
returns from 1994-2000, this produces a time series for each decile of  22 average one-quarter returns and 16 
(overlapping) average four-quarter returns. The numbers in the table are the annualized time-series averages 
and their standard errors are in parenthesis. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation based on the 
Newey-West approach. The columns labelled Open Funds are based on average returns across the subset of 
funds in that decile that are classified as open for investment. The figures employ a weighting procedure to 
eliminate look-ahead bias. 
 Average Performance (raw returns) 
 One-Quarter  Four-Quarter 
Decile All Funds  Open Funds  All Funds  Open Funds 
8 0.168  0.177  0.159  0.154 
 (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.038) 
9 0.197  0.219  0.191  0.190 
 (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.049) 
10 (winners) 0.204  0.218  0.203  0.217 
 (0.066)  (0.073)  (0.109)  (0.116) 
        
Winners-Losers 0.121  0.135  0.082  0.096 
 (0.079)  (0.083)  (0.080)  (0.079) 
 
 
2.5   Concluding remarks 
 
Empirical studies analyzing the performance of hedge funds are hampered by high 
attrition rates, due to fund liquidation and the possibility that funds stop reporting to 
the database vendor. The results in this paper clearly indicate that fund liquidation is 
driven by historical returns, with attrition rates being higher for funds that perform 
poorly. Given endogenous liquidation, standard ways of analyzing performance 
persistence are affected by look-ahead bias, as one implicitly conditions upon the fund 
having observed returns for a number of consecutive quarters. To eliminate such 
biases, it is possible to use a weighting procedure, which requires an appropriate 
model that relates fund survival to fund performance and other observables. 
 
The empirical model for hedge fund liquidation estimated in this paper indicates that 
historical performance is an important factor explaining fund liquidation, where 
performance in the more distant past is of less importance. Moreover, if the 
aggregated return over a previous predetermined period is negative, implying that it is 
unlikely for the manager to receive the incentive fee, a hedge fund has a much higher 
probability of liquidation. Other significant factors explaining survival are fund age, 
net asset value, investment style and the magnitude of the incentive fee. The impact of 
age is nonlinear, with lower attrition rates for both young and mature funds. Using the 
empirical liquidation model, we determine fund return persistence with and without 
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correcting for look-ahead bias, using a simple weighting procedure. The results 
indicate that look-ahead bias is quite severe. While ter Horst, Nijman and Verbeek 
[2001] find that look-ahead bias is of minor importance for mutual funds, this paper 
finds that it can be quite important for hedge funds, whose attrition rates are higher. 
For example, without correcting for look-ahead bias, expected future returns of poorly 
performing funds may be overestimated by as much as 3.8% per year, a number that is 
statistically significant and higher than the typical 2% per year that is associated with 
survivorship bias. This stresses the importance in empirical studies of correcting for 
look-ahead bias in addition to survivorship bias. The finding that the greater total risk 
of hedge funds over their mutual fund counterparts exacerbates look-ahead bias 
confirms the results in Brown et al. [1992] who introduce the idea that look-ahead 
bias is a theoretical result of the cross-sectional dispersion of volatility across funds. 
 
For the one quarter horizon, the corrected results indicate a clear pattern of positive 
persistence in raw fund returns. That is, the best performing 20 to 30% of the funds 
are expected to provide above average returns in the subsequent evaluation period. 
For the annual horizon, the pattern is also consistent with positive persistence, though 
statistically insignificantly so. To check whether the presence of cross-sectional 
variation in expected returns due to style or risk characteristics explains the observed 
persistence patterns in raw returns, we also examine persistence in style-adjusted 
returns. By subtracting from the raw hedge fund returns the return of the 
corresponding style benchmark, and following the same procedure as in case of raw 
returns, we determine the persistence in relative returns both with and without 
correcting for look-ahead bias. At the quarterly and annual horizon we show that on 
average the top deciles outperform their style benchmark. For the top 10% of the 
hedge funds this outperformance is around a statistically insignificant 6% at the 
annual horizon, and around 6.7% (annualized) at the a quarterly horizon. At the 
biannual horizon we mainly find underperformance of the hedge funds with respect to 
their style benchmarks. Interestingly, persistence in hedge fund performance seems to 
be located in both the top and bottom parts of the distribution. That is, poorly 
performing funds tend to underperform during the next 12 months, while the best 
performing funds tend to outperform. 
 
The average excess returns on a winner-loser strategy at the annual horizon during the 
period 1994-2000 are 8.2% and 9.9%, based on raw and style-adjusted returns, 
respectively. Despite a lack of statistical significance, these numbers are potentially 
economically important. A major explanation for the fact that we observe more 
persistence in hedge fund returns than what is usually found for mutual fund returns, 
is that liquidity in the hedge fund industry is severely restricted. While Berk and 
Green [2004], argue that much of the persistence in mutual fund returns is competed 
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away by mutual fund investors rationally shifting their capital in search of superior 
investments, hedge funds are characterized by lockup periods and redemption notice 
periods. Moreover, regulatory restrictions may limit the growth of (onshore) hedge 
funds. Further, when investment strategies employed by hedge fund managers cannot 
be scaled up without limit, performance fees and high-water mark contracts provide 
incentives for the manager to close the fund to new investors or otherwise limit the 
inflow of new money (see Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross [2003]). In a robustness 
check, where we consider funds with very low or negative cash flows as closed for 
investment, we find very similar returns for the top three deciles, suggesting that the 
persistence results are robust, and thus might be exploitable for investors. 
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“Please note that investing in hedge funds is speculative, not suitable for all clients, and 
intended only for financially sophisticated investors who are capable of evaluating the merits 
and risks of such investment, who do not require immediate liquidity for their investment and 
who have sufficient resources to bear any loss which might result from such investment”.  
(Common disclaimer of companies managing funds of hedge funds) 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
A Portrait of Hedge Fund Investors: 
Flows, Performance and Smart Money15  
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
A number of recent studies have focused on the evaluation of performance persistence 
of hedge funds (see e.g. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson [1999], Agarwal and Naik 
[2000], Boyson [2003], Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]). Their results 
indicate that persistence is particularly strong at quarterly horizons and somewhat less 
pronounced at annual horizons. This is relevant for investors, as they tend to allocate 
their money across funds by inferring managerial skill from past performance. 
However, the issue of the responsiveness of money flows to past performance has 
been addressed by two conflicting theories. On the one hand, persistence is an 
indication that past performance plays a role in signalling quality to investors, which 
supports the hypothesis that past performance influences the market shares of hedge 
funds (see Ippolito [1992], Lynch and Musto [2003]). On the other hand, it has been 
recently argued (see Berk and Green [2004]) that persistence is evidence of a lack of 
competition in the provision of capital and therefore of a weak response of flows to 
past performance. If this is the case, we should expect a less pronounced flow-
performance relation with quarterly data than with annual data in hedge funds. This 
paper tests this hypothesis by empirically exploring the short-term dynamics of hedge 
fund flows and performance and their interrelationship.  
                                                 
15 This chapter is based on Baquero and Verbeek [2005]. I am grateful to Chester Spatt, Melvyn Teo and Bas 
Werker for their valuable insights and suggestions. 
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For the mutual fund industry, Berk and Green’s argument is supported by empirical 
evidence of a positive correlation between flows and past performance (see e.g. Sirri 
and Tufano [1998]) 16, together with the general finding that performance of mutual 
funds is to a great extent unpredictable using past relative performance (see e.g. 
Carhart [1997]). However, little attention has been paid to the responsiveness of flows 
of capital to past performance of hedge funds. An important issue in the hedge fund 
industry that might affect the relation between asset flows and performance is that 
flows of money into and out of hedge funds are restricted. There are typically lock-up 
periods (i.e. minimum initial investment periods) and redemption notice periods 
restricting withdrawals. There are also subscription periods limiting inflows. 
Additionally, if a fund has reached the maximum limit of 500 investors it might be 
closed to new investors, while it may also be the case that given diminishing returns to 
scale in this industry, hedge fund managers are unwilling to accept new money before 
reaching the critical size. Thus, while in the mutual fund industry investors’ decisions 
in supplying capital ultimately drive the flow-performance relationship, in the hedge 
fund industry liquidity restrictions and other organizational aspects on the demand 
side for capital are likely to have some influence on the shape of the relation.  
 
Hedge fund investors also face high searching costs along their allocation process. 
Given advertising restrictions imposed by many countries and the little transparency 
characterizing the hedge fund industry, investors engage in a long and complex 
process of information gathering and evaluation, through hedge fund conferences, 
hedge fund databases, industry newsletters, consultants, prime broker capital 
introduction groups and direct contact with managers. Hedge fund selection includes 
quantitative and qualitative screening, followed by a thorough manager due diligence 
process, where manager attributes are especially taken into consideration. This 
selection procedure is likely to lengthen the decision of purchasing shares in hedge 
funds. Furthermore, while the decision to hire a hedge fund manager for the first time 
may take place at relatively low frequencies compared to other investment pools as 
mutual funds, the post-investment behaviour of hedge fund investors is instead 
characterized by a regular monitoring, especially for style drift, on a monthly or a 
                                                 
16 For mutual funds, the relation between money flows and past performance has been widely documented, 
using different methodologies, data, flows measures and performance measures. Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser [1994], Ippolito [1992], Chevalier and Ellison [1997], and Sirri and Tufano [1998] find that the 
relationship is highly convex, meaning that money flows tend to go to funds that recently performed well. In 
addition, Ippolito [1992], Warther [1995], and Chevalier and Ellison [1997] find that managers lose funds 
under management when they perform poorly. In the hedge fund industry, Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross 
[2003], document that money tends to flow out of the recent top performing funds, while Agarwal, Daniel and 
Naik [2003] find a positive and convex relationship but cannot identify outflows from top performers. All 
studies mentioned above have focused their attention on the long-run (i.e. annual flows and one to 5-year 
aggregate past performance).  
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quarterly basis17. Searching costs and active monitoring are also likely to have an 
impact on the response of money flows to past performance.18 
 
All together these functional aspects of the hedge fund industry motivate the main 
argument of this paper: the organizational structure of hedge funds creates multiple 
asymmetries between the decisions to invest and divest of hedge fund investors, most 
notably concerning the evaluation horizons. First, liquidity restrictions affect 
differently money inflows and outflows. Further, an extended procedure to select 
managers slows down the investment decision, while an active post-investment 
monitoring allows a swift divestment decision. Accordingly, studying the mutual 
effects between money flows and the performance and persistence of hedge funds 
requires explicitly separating these two decisions and an understanding of their 
specific determinants. 
 
Our paper extends the existing literature in several directions and makes a number of 
empirical contributions. First, our results indicate that the shape of the flow-
performance relation depends on the time horizon being analyzed. Specifically, with 
quarterly data, flows and performance appear to be related in a more or less linear 
fashion, which contrasts with the convex relation found at annual horizons (see 
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003]), where investors display a higher sensitivity to 
good performance and almost no sensitivity to poor performance. Further, the 
response of flows to quarterly past performance, especially outflows, occurs most 
significantly during the first quarter and disappears gradually over the subsequent 
three or four quarters. Our model incorporates the effect of liquidity restrictions upon 
the flow-performance relationship, which can only be captured at short horizons since 
most restrictions are defined on a monthly or quarterly basis. 
 
Second, unlike previous papers, we separately model positive and negative cash 
flows, using a switching regression model that allows for a differential impact of past 
performance measures and other characteristics. Our model provides a likely 
                                                 
17 The limited regulation of the hedge fund industry gives a great flexibility to hedge fund managers to employ 
a variety of trading strategies, which raises the need of a permanent monitoring to reduce the incentives for 
managers to deviate from their stated investment style. According to Bekier [1996]’s survey and L’Habitant 
[2002], style drift is the most important reason for investors to terminate a hedge fund manager.  
18 In this respect, investing in hedge funds has some of the features documented by Del Guercio and Tkac 
[2002] for the pension fund industry, although the underlying motives are different. Del Guercio and Tkac 
document that pension fund investors engage in screening procedures that evaluate first quantitative 
performance and subsequently non-performance characteristics such as manager’s reputation and credibility. 
The process involves often face-to-face meetings, written questionnaires and hiring of consultants.  They 
interpret these evaluation procedures as the result of agency problems faced by pension fund sponsors as 
argued by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny [1992]. They also document that pension fund investors perform 
high levels of monitoring of hired managers. Del Guercio and Tkac suggest that these features determine the 
linear shape of the flow-performance relation they find for pension funds.  
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explanation for the different shape of the flow-performance relation between time 
horizons, by revealing that the purchasing decision is more sensitive to a consistent 
long-term good performance, while the decision to divest or not is highly sensitive to 
short-term poor performance and cannot be captured at annual horizons. Our results 
support Berk and Green [2004]’s argument by showing that capital inflows are slow 
in chasing short-term performance and thus would be unable to compete away the 
patterns of short-run persistence. Further, we show that if the investment and 
divestment decisions are not modelled separately, important asymmetries between 
both regimes remain hidden due to an improper estimation of the impact of size, age, 
incentive fees and other variables upon cash flows. 
 
Third, in light of our previous results, our paper explores several implications of Berk 
and Green’s intuition concerning the mutual effects between money flows and 
performance. Specifically, by looking into detail at the actual investment and 
divestment allocations of money flows across hedge funds, we provide an assessment 
of the performance of the investors’ portfolio and the extent of investors’ ability to 
exploit persistence patterns. Our evidence indicates that investors are indeed limited in 
identifying and directing their capital towards the best performers in the short run. 
Consequently, most investors are unable to exploit the persistence of the winners. In 
fact, they fail in their investment allocation by investing mostly in funds that 
subsequently perform poorly, especially large funds experiencing limits to scale. But 
they also fail to discriminate expected performance among small and young funds 
growing at fast rates. On the other hand, hedge fund investors appear to be successful 
in their divestment strategies, responding fast and appropriately by de-allocating from 
the persistent losers. In terms of Ippolito [1992], this immediate response has the 
effect of a disciplining mechanism for low-quality funds, characterized by high 
liquidation rates subsequently. Our results do not support the existence of smart 
money as defined by Gruber [1996] and Zheng [1999] for mutual funds. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our 
sample of hedge funds, variables and hypotheses. The first part of our investigation 
consists of two sections exploring the determinants of money flows to hedge funds. 
Section 3.3 presents the base specification of our model of flows and demonstrates the 
existence of a linear short-run flow-performance relation, while Section 3.4 provides a 
switching-regression model to explain positive and negative cash flows that also 
incorporates liquidity restrictions. The second part of our study corresponds to Section 
3.5 and is devoted to the implications of our previous findings for investors’ wealth 
and for the persistence and survival of hedge funds. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.  
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3.2   Data, variables and hypotheses 
 
We use hedge fund data from TASS Management Limited, a private advisory 
company and provider of information services. The TASS database goes back to 1979 
and is primarily created to help potential investors to evaluate, select and monitor 
hedge funds. Hedge-fund participation in any database is voluntary, given the lack of 
disclosure requirements and restrictions that are in place for public advertising. 
Therefore, a self-selection bias might arise either because poor performers do not wish 
to make their performance known, because funds that performed well and reached a 
critical size have less incentive to report to data vendors to attract additional investors, 
or because funds fear intervention in case reporting is interpreted as illegal 
advertising. Also, different databases have different criteria for including or 
maintaining funds, which can lead to a further selection bias. On the other hand, 
active monitoring of managers by database vendors gives an incentive to hedge funds 
to provide complete and accurate data to avoid being deleted from a database. 
 
For each individual fund, our dataset provides raw returns and total net assets under 
management (TNA) on a monthly basis until September 2004. Returns are net of all 
management and incentive fees, but do not reflect front-end and back-end loads (i.e. 
sales commissions, subscription and redemption fees)19. We concentrate on the period 
between the fourth quarter of 1994 and the third quarter of 2004 since asset 
information prior to 1994 is too sporadic. Moreover, information on defunct funds is 
available only from 1994 onwards, although several studies suggest that estimation of 
the flow-performance relationship is not affected by survivorship biases.20 We focus 
on hedge funds reporting returns in $. We exclude 1352 closed-end funds that are 
present in our database, since subscriptions in these funds are only possible during the 
initial issuing period, although rare exceptions allow for additional subscriptions at a 
premium. Further, we exclude 836 fund-of-funds, which have a different treatment of 
incentive fees and may have different performance characteristics. Clients of funds-
of-funds may follow a different decision making process than investors allocating 
their money to individual hedge funds. While a single-manager selection process may 
                                                 
19 Investing in hedge funds is costly. There are multiple and varied fees and costs involved when subscribing 
and redeeming shares, as well as along the period of shareholding. Performance fees are deducted from the 
fund’s asset value before a monthly rate of return is reported. This is usually a time consuming procedure since 
incentive fees are client specific which implies that almost every share has a different value and requires a 
separate accounting. Moreover, incentive fee periods do not necessarily correspond to subscription and 
redemption periods. There are several methods accepted in the non-traditional sector to deduct fees and 
calculate total net assets (TNA) and rates of returns. Given the complexity of this process, many funds report 
returns and TNA with some delay after the end of the month or report some estimates that may be revised and 
adapted subsequently.  
20 See Sirri and Tufano [1998], Chevalier and Ellison [1997], Goetzmann and Peles [1997], Del Guercio and 
Tkac [2002]. We also performed robustness checks estimating our model only for a sub-sample of survivors. 
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be time consuming and costly, requiring both quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
and personal contacts with managers, an investment in a fund-of-funds does not 
require the same amount of expertise and time, since funds-of-funds already provide 
investors with a number of benefits, including diversification across several types of 
hedge funds.  
 
We use quarterly data, which allows us to explore the short-term dynamics of 
investment and redemption behaviour. Previous studies typically make use of annual 
data (e.g. Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003]). However, in the case of hedge funds, 
liquidity restrictions are likely to affect the relationship between asset flows and 
performance. Most subscription and redemption restrictions are defined on a monthly 
or quarterly basis, and only few on an annual basis. Furthermore, quarterly and 
monthly horizons seem to be the typical monitoring frequencies among hedge fund 
investors21. These facts together with the findings of patterns of quarterly performance 
persistence (see for example Agarwal and Naik [2000], Baquero, Ter Horst and 
Verbeek [2005]), suggest we can expect an important amount of buying and selling 
transactions of hedge fund shares taking place within a year.22  
 
Since we consider quarterly horizons, we take into account the most recently available 
value of total net assets (TNA) in each quarter.23 We only consider funds with an 
uninterrupted series of quarterly TNA to be able to compute flows of money as the 
difference between consecutive TNA correcting for reinvestments. Further, we restrict 
attention to funds with a minimum of 6 quarters of return history and with quarterly 
cash flows available at least for one year. While the last two selections impose a 
survival condition, they ensure that a sufficient number of lagged returns and lagged 
cash flows is available to estimate our model and reduce at the same time the effect of 
a potential instant-history bias.24 Moreover, in this way we do not take into account 
extreme cash inflow rates commonly observed during the first quarters after a fund 
has started operations. Our final sample contains 1543 funds and a total of 21841 
fund-period observations. The graveyard consists of 714 funds, from which 425 
                                                 
21 In his study about marketing of hedge funds, Bekier [1996] conducted a survey among institutional investors 
and found that 50% of them prefer to receive quarterly monitoring information about their non traditional 
investments, around 30% prefer monthly (or between quarterly and monthly) monitoring information, and only 
15% monitor less frequently than quarterly.  
22 A further advantage of using quarterly data is the reduction of the impact on the flow-performance relation 
of a potential return smoothing in a monthly basis. Getmansky, Lo and Makarov [2004], argue that the patterns 
of serial correlation found in hedge fund data are induced by return smoothing, which results from a number of 
sources, most importantly hedge funds’ exposure to illiquid securities.  
23 When TNA is not available at the end of a quarter, we take the most recent value of TNA, up to two months 
ago.  
24 Instant-history bias (or backfilling bias) has been documented by Park [1995], Ackermann et al. [1999] and 
Fung and Hsieh [2002], and refers to the possibility that hedge funds participate in a database conditional on 
having performed well over a number of periods prior to inception.  
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actually liquidated, while the remaining 289 funds self-selected out of the database for 
different reasons (e.g. at the fund manager’s request or closed to new investors).  
 
Table I provides an overview of the number of funds in our dataset per quarter, 
aggregate growth rates and aggregate net assets under management. Our sample 
contains 231 funds at the end of the fourth quarter of 1994, accounting for about $ 18 
billion in net assets, and 692 funds at the end of the third quarter of 2004, accounting 
for about $ 165 billion. This represents around 15% of the total for the entire industry 
estimated by TASS of about $ 1 trillion of assets under management by the end of 
2004.  
 
Flows are measured as the growth rate in total net assets under management (TNA) of 
a fund between the start and end of quarter t+1 in excess of internal growth rt+1 of the 
quarter, had all dividends been reinvested. Alternatively, a measure of cash flows in 
dollars is computed as a net change in assets minus internal growth. These definitions 
assume that flows take place at the end of period t+1. 25  
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We refer to the first definition as normalized cash flows or growth rates and to the 
second as absolute or dollar cash flows. The definition of flows in dollar terms 
presents a drawback in case inflows or outflows are proportional to the size of the 
fund, irrespective of performance. This concern has made the first definition of 
normalized cash flows the preferred one in several studies about mutual funds (see 
e.g. Gruber [1996] and Chevalier and Ellison [1997]). For the pension fund industry, 
however, Del Guercio and Tkac [2002] document that size and flows are not 
positively correlated, and they use both definitions of cash flows in their study. 
Similarly, in the case of hedge funds we might expect outflows from large funds 
because of decreasing returns to scale. On the other hand, the use of normalized cash 
flows tends to magnify inflow rates of small funds while minimizing outflow rates of 
large funds, as this measure is constructed as a growth rate with respect to total net 
assets (TNA) at the start of a period (see, e.g., Gruber [1996] and Zheng [1999]). 
Therefore, we use the two definitions of flows, while controlling for any size effect. 
As will become clear below, especially in Section 3.5, both definitions contribute with 
different information regarding the investments in hedge funds. 
 
                                                 
25 See Ippolito [1992] for a discussion about the assumptions underlying these definitions of flows. 
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Table I 
Aggregate Cash Flows and Total Net Assets from a 
Sample of Hedge Funds from TASS Database 
This table gives the total number of hedge funds in the sample per quarter, aggregate cash flows, total net 
assets under management and average return. The sample consists of 1543 open-end hedge funds from TASS 
database, with a minimum of 6 quarters of quarterly returns history and with quarterly cash flows available at 
least for one year. Funds of funds are not included. The sample period has 40 quarters from 1994Q4 till 
2004Q3. Cash flows are computed as the change in total net assets between consecutive quarters corrected for 
reinvestments. A growth rate is calculated as relative cash flows with respect to TNA of previous period. 
 
Number of 
funds 
Aggregate Cash Flows 
 (million dollars) 
Cash flows 
 (growth rate) 
Aggregate TNA 
(million dollars) 
 
Average Return 
1994 Q4 231 -437.44 -0.0235 17861.15 -0.0077 
1995 Q1 258 -1312.14 -0.0646 19387.67 0.0524 
1995 Q2 279 -461.56 -0.0228 20469.12 0.0370 
1995 Q3 315 -317.83 -0.0146 22972.14 0.0459 
1995 Q4 326 -757.99 -0.0327 23215.81 0.0345 
1996 Q1 348 148.85 0.0050 30969.63 0.0244 
1996 Q2 360 -334.21 -0.0107 33047.34 0.0596 
1996 Q3 364 377.79 0.0112 34275.64 0.0164 
1996 Q4 371 945.09 0.0260 40431.19 0.0603 
1997 Q1 379 2277.90 0.0561 45255.20 0.0427 
1997 Q2 392 301.99 0.0066 48434.29 0.0467 
1997 Q3 414 2353.93 0.0471 56745.53 0.0742 
1997 Q4 438 675.00 0.0115 59948.61 -0.0136 
1998 Q1 470 1821.63 0.0295 66989.86 0.0484 
1998 Q2 482 1107.31 0.0167 68556.61 -0.0240 
1998 Q3 496 -268.07 -0.0041 60234.29 -0.0502 
1998 Q4 528 -3822.72 -0.0615 56650.24 0.0518 
1999 Q1 571 -2845.61 -0.0490 55262.50 0.0324 
1999 Q2 582 -850.49 -0.0152 58979.19 0.0832 
1999 Q3 598 -1289.20 -0.0219 56682.70 -0.0006 
1999 Q4 597 -703.00 -0.0124 63413.15 0.1177 
2000 Q1 626 670.00 0.0101 69948.90 0.0607 
2000 Q2 629 -2299.42 -0.0336 63643.12 -0.0139 
2000 Q3 658 697.77 0.0108 67016.20 0.0185 
2000 Q4 667 734.74 0.0109 68463.32 -0.0020 
2001 Q1 670 3382.16 0.0456 78678.59 0.0086 
2001 Q2 697 3380.75 0.0403 89049.14 0.0257 
2001 Q3 699 3145.77 0.0355 89959.58 -0.0250 
2001 Q4 702 -5713.63 -0.0574 97069.95 0.0482 
2002 Q1 702 1533.24 0.0157 100359.61 0.0184 
2002 Q2 700 2279.75 0.0222 105192.95 0.0057 
2002 Q3 702 67.69 0.0006 104609.51 -0.0212 
2002 Q4 697 -1099.04 -0.0104 106726.81 0.0219 
2003 Q1 685 2431.55 0.0255 99383.00 0.0116 
2003 Q2 687 5628.85 0.0560 112169.77 0.0775 
2003 Q3 703 6970.84 0.0607 124438.64 0.0376 
2003 Q4 711 6722.30 0.0539 137685.21 0.0541 
2004 Q1 703 16056.57 0.1207 154496.43 0.0409 
2004 Q2 712 10330.84 0.0659 163689.45 -0.0244 
2004 Q3 692 2730.60 0.0170 164632.56 0.0090 
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Table II shows some descriptive statistics for assets under management and the two 
alternative measures of cash flows. Interestingly, the distribution appears to be 
relatively symmetric, similar to findings in the pension fund industry and in sharp 
contrast with the distributions found for mutual funds. For example, Del Guercio and 
Tkac [2002] find that the top 5% of dollar inflows in mutual funds are nearly three 
times larger than the outflows at the bottom 5%. This suggests that the flow-
performance relationship in mutual funds and hedge funds may also have different 
characteristics.  
Table II 
Distributions of Flows and Assets under Management 
in the Hedge Fund Industry 
This table shows the cross-sectional distribution of cash flows and total net assets under management in our 
sample of 1543 open-end hedge funds from 1994Q4 till 2004Q3. Cash flows are computed as the change in 
total net assets between consecutive quarters corrected for reinvestments. A growth rate is calculated as 
relative cash flows with respect to the fund’s TNA of the previous quarter. 
Percentile 
 
Cash Flows 
(growth rate) 
 
Cash Flows (dollars) 
 
Total Net Assets 
(million dollars) 
 
99% 1.0389 134000000 1680.0000 
95% 0.3904 38600000 543.0000 
90% 0.2217 16400000 296.0000 
75% 0.0689 2541022 106.0000 
50% 0.0000 130.3989 32.0000 
25% -0.0503 -1225081 8.5138 
10% -0.1701 -9006655 2.4467 
5% -0.2870 -21600000 1.2000 
1% -0.5758 -79000000 0.2801 
 
In selecting which performance measure to use, we look at the information that is 
available to investors through different channels. Although some of these risk and 
performance metrics might not be the most appropriate to characterize hedge funds 
from a theoretical perspective, they might be underlying investor’s decisions. We use 
the simple performance measures offered by most databases, that is raw returns, return 
rankings relative to other funds and Sharpe ratios. In a similar way, a fund’s riskiness 
is usually reported in terms of its total risk (standard deviation of historical returns) 
and measures of downside risk.26 Measures of downside and upside variation with 
respect to a target have gained popularity among investors given that hedge fund 
return distributions are not normal and are often multi-modal. Professionals in the 
hedge fund and pension fund industries advocate the use of such risk measures while 
they discourage the use of standard deviation. The reason is that a higher standard 
deviation might be desirable if the entire distribution is shifted upwards in a way that 
                                                 
26 Downside risk is a popular term for what is referred to as lower partial moment, a probability weighted 
function of deviations below a specified target return, as developed by Fishburn [1977]. Among pension fund 
managers, the term “target return” is rather known as “minimal accepted return” (MAR). Upside potential is 
instead the probability-weighted function of returns in excess of the MAR.  
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guarantees a minimum target return. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that 
investors prefer a variation above a minimum target return while minimizing variation 
below.27 A popular measure that captures aversion for negative skewness is the 
downside-upside potential ratio, which combines downward variation as the 
numerator and upside potential as the denominator.28 We measure downside 
deviations and upside potential with respect to the return of 3-month Treasury bills 
over the entire past history of the fund.   
 
Besides monthly raw returns and total net assets, the TASS database provides fund 
specific characteristics that may be important determinants of money flows. Table III 
shows descriptive statistics for fees, ownership structure, styles and several other 
variables. Below we give a brief explanation of each of these variables and 
hypothesize their impact on flows of money.  
 
Incentive fees constitute one of the mechanisms in place in the hedge fund industry to 
mitigate principal-agent problems and align investors’ goals with fund managers’ 
incentives.29 The typical incentive contract aims at enhancing managerial effort by 
paying hedge fund managers a percentage of annual profits if returns surpass some 
benchmark and in case past losses have been recovered. According to Table III, 
managers receive on average an incentive fee of about 18% of profits, a bonus that 
varies substantially across funds with a range between zero and 50%. A higher fee 
would be more attractive for an investor since it should translate into higher 
performance, but possibly with the trade-off of inducing greater risk.30 Additionally, 
an investor pays an annual management fee, defined as a percentage of total assets 
under management. In our dataset the average management fee is around 1.5% and 
varies between zero and 8%. Management fees may imply an indirect performance 
incentive in case an increase on size is related to an increase in performance. 
                                                 
27 The idea that investors favor variation in the upside but not in the downside has been supported empirically 
and theoretically (as recently documented by Harvey and Siddique [2000] and first analyzed theoretically by 
Bawa and Lindenberg [1977] and Fishburn [1977]). Preference for positive skewness has also been stressed in 
the behavioral finance literature (e.g. Olsen [1998], Shefrin [1999]) and by practitioners (e.g. Sortino and van 
der Meer [1991], Sortino et al [1999]).  
28 We use the following definition of downside-upside potential ratio: 
∑
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where  ι− = 1  if Ri,t ≤ Rmar , otherwise ι− = 0 
  and  ι+ = 1  if Ri,t> Rmar  , otherwise ι+ = 0 
(Ri,t is the return of a fund i at time t while Rmar refers to the minimal acceptable rate of return or 
the investor’s target return ) 
29 See Ackermann et al [1999] for a discussion of principal-agent issues in the hedge fund industry 
30 See Starks [1987] for a theoretical approach of incentive fees. 
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However, Goetzmann et al [2003] find evidence of diminishing returns to scale in this 
industry, in contrast to mutual funds.  
 
A joint ownership structure is a second mechanism in place to mitigate principal-agent 
problems in the hedge fund industry. Intuitively, a fund that requires a substantial 
managerial investment should enhance manager effort but possibly at the cost that 
managers take-on less risk compared to the investor’s preferred risk level. Therefore, 
as noted by Ackermann et al [1999], a fund that combines substantial investment of a 
manager’s personal capital together with high incentive fees might be the most 
attractive option from an investor’s perspective, as managerial effort is greatly 
enhanced while managerial risk-taking of both approaches counterbalance. Nearly 
62% of managers in our sample are required to invest their own capital.  
 
We define age of a fund as the number of months the fund has been in existence from 
the time of its inception. From Table III, the mean is 55 months (ln(Age) = 4.007). As 
indicated above, age is truncated at 18 months (6 quarters). Investors might perceive 
older funds as more experienced in identifying and exploiting mispricing 
opportunities. However, the effect of age on money flows is difficult to predict in case 
age is correlated with size and in case diseconomies of scale are present.  
 
The TASS database distinguishes between onshore and offshore funds. Offshore 
hedge funds are typically corporations. The number of investors is not limited and 
therefore offshore funds tend to be larger. They represent 62% of all funds in our 
dataset. Onshore funds are generally limited partnerships with less than 500 investors 
and therefore more restricted to new investors, while imposing more extended 
redemption periods than offshore funds. 
 
Hedge funds invest in different asset classes, with different geographical focus and 
using a variety of investment techniques and trading strategies. Brown and 
Goetzmann [2003] find that differences in style account for 20% of the cross-sectional 
variation in performance as well as for a significant proportion of cross-sectional 
differences in risk. This suggests that, from an investor’s perspective, a careful 
assessment of style is crucial. There is no consensus in the hedge fund industry, 
however, on the use of a unique style classification. TASS provides a style 
classification of mutually exclusive styles based on manager survey responses and 
information from fund disclosure documents. Although self-reported styles may suffer 
from a self-selection bias, they constitute the most readily available source of 
information concerning styles for any investor. Therefore, we expect they are an 
important determinant of hedge fund investors’ preferences, which is the focus of our 
study. Furthermore the TASS classification closely matches the definitions of 
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CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Indices, a set of 10 indices increasingly used as a point of 
reference to track fund performance and to compare funds. Based on this TASS 
classification, we assigned each fund to one only index category. The more general 
“hedge fund index” category includes funds without a clear investment style (for 
further details, see Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]). 
 
Table III  
Cross-Sectional Characteristics of the Hedge Fund Sample  
This table presents summary statistics on cross-sectional characteristics of our sample of 1543 hedge funds for 
the period 1994Q4 till 2004Q3. Cash flows are the change in total net assets between consecutive quarters 
corrected for reinvestments. Returns are net of all management and incentive fees. Age is the number of 
months a fund has been in operation since its inception. In each quarter, the historical standard deviation of 
monthly returns, semi deviation and upside potential have been computed based on the entire past history of 
the fund. Semi deviation and upside potential are calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill 
taken as the minimum investor’s target. Offshore is a dummy variable with value one for non U.S. domiciled 
funds. Incentive fee is a percentage of profits above a hurdle rate that is given as a reward to managers. 
Management fee is a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management that is paid annually to managers 
for administering a fund. Personal capital is a dummy variable indicating that the manager invests from her 
own wealth in the fund. We include 10 dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of the 
CSFB/Tremont indices. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Cash Flows (growth rate) 0.0287 0.2734 -0.9107 4.3656 
     Cash Flows>0 (10876 obs) 0.1639 0.3052 0.0001 4.3656 
     Cash Flows<0 (10367 obs) -0.1115 0.1444 -0.9107 -0.0001 
     Cash Flows=0 (598 obs)     
Cash Flows (dollars) 2484343 6.80E+07 -7.23E+09 1.12E+09 
Ln(TNA) 17.1746 1.8491 8.1050 23.2959 
Ln(AGE) 4.0070 0.6189 2.8904 5.8171 
Quarterly Returns 0.0255 0.1175 -0.9763 1.7449 
Historical St.Dev. 0.0513 0.0407 0.0004 0.8318 
Semi Deviation 0.0299 0.0245 0 0.3326 
Upside Potential 0.0236 0.0169 0.0002 0.2797 
Downside-Upside Potential Ratio 1.2862 0.8600 0 19.2076 
Offshore 0.6236 0.4845 0 1 
Incentive Fee 18.4599 5.8253 0 50 
Management Fees 1.4632 0.8832 0 8 
Personal Capital 0.6197 0.4855 0 1 
Leverage 0.7579 0.4283 0 1 
Convertible Arbitrage 0.0525 0.2231 0 1 
Dedicated Short Bias 0.0160 0.1256 0 1 
Emerging Markets 0.1036 0.3047 0 1 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0463 0.2102 0 1 
Event Driven 0.1222 0.3275 0 1 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.0490 0.2159 0 1 
Global Macro 0.0691 0.2536 0 1 
Long/Short Equity 0.3468 0.4760 0 1 
Managed Futures 0.1576 0.3644 0 1 
Hedge Fund Index 0.0368 0.1883 0 1 
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3.3   The flow-performance relationship for hedge funds 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the interrelationship between flows and 
performance in the hedge fund industry, based on our sample of funds for the period 
1994Q4 – 2004Q3. Flows are measured as the quarterly growth rate in total assets 
under management of a fund, corrected for the return realized during the quarter.  
 
Figure 1 
Flow-Performance Interrelation for Hedge Funds 
(Decile 10: best performers) 
Hedge funds are sorted every quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3 into ten rank 
portfolios based on their raw returns in previous quarter. This initial ranking is 
compared to the fund’s ranking in the subsequent quarter. The bar in cell (i,j) 
represents the average growth rate (net of reinvestments) of all funds achieving a 
subsequent ranking of decile j given an initial ranking of decile i. 
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In each quarter, funds are ranked on the basis of raw returns and divided into 10 
deciles. If a fund is ranked in decile S10, this indicates that the fund performed in the 
top 10 percent of all existing funds in that quarter. This initial ranking is compared to 
the ranking in the subsequent quarter. Each bar in Figure 1 represents the average 
growth in the subsequent quarter. It is clear from the graph that the funds that 
performed relatively well (decile S6 to S10) attracted high inflows, while hedge funds 
that performed worse in the past experienced negative or small positive cash flows 
(deciles S1 to S5). This suggests that, to some extent, investors consider historical 
performance as an argument for determining their hedge fund investments. 
Interestingly, we also observe a positive relationship between inflows and 
contemporaneous performance. Apparently, most of the net cash flows are directed to 
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those funds that perform well in the same quarter (deciles 6 to 10). This may indicate 
that larger cash flows experienced in a given quarter actually enhance performance 
towards the end of the quarter, while for those funds that experienced few flows or 
even outflows it was more difficult to make up for their bad performance. It may also 
indicate that performance persists and is not competed away by investors rationally 
shifting their investments in search of superior performance. An intriguing question is 
why some good performers in the initial period experiencing huge inflows perform 
very poorly in the subsequent period. For example, funds ranked in decile S10 that 
subsequently reached decile 2, had a growth of 7.5% in assets under management. A 
likely explanation for this finding is that funds in the extreme deciles are more risky 
than those in the other deciles. More risk is associated with higher average returns, but 
also with bigger chances of extremely good and extremely poor outcomes. Such funds 
are more likely to move from the winner to the loser decile or vice versa. 
 
To further examine the dynamics of the relationship between past performance and 
cash flows, we use a linear regression model, controlling for other factors like fund 
age, size, incentive fees and investment styles. Consider the following model:  
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where Flowi,t represents the net percentage growth in fund i in period t, and rnki,t-j is 
the jth lagged relative performance as measured by a fund’s cross-sectional rank. We 
include the size and age of the fund in the previous period, ln(TNAi,t-1) and ln(AGEi,t-1). 
Flowi,t-j is the jth lagged flow. Xi,t is a vector of fund specific characteristics like 
management fees, incentive fees, managerial ownership and style. The style dummies 
capture the possibility that funds in a particular style may experience average flows 
significantly different from other styles. We control for time effects by including time 
dummies, denoted by λt, to capture economy wide shocks conducing to different 
average flows across quarters, as suggested by Table I.  
 
Previous research on the flow-performance relationship uses annual data and studies 
the impact of previous year performance upon current year flows. Here we use 
quarterly data and we should determine the (maximum) time horizon over which 
historical performance has an impact on quarterly flows of money. To obtain an 
insight into this question, we compute the average cash flows over several subsequent 
quarters after the ranking period, for each initial decile in Figure 1. The results are 
shown in Figure 2. The top panel presents averages for growth rates; the bottom panel 
presents averages for dollar flows. In both panels, a clear flow-performance 
relationship exists for the first four quarters or so after the ranking period, while 
average flows seem to be unrelated to initial rank after six quarters. This suggests that  
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Figure 2 
Average Flows across Deciles 
Over Subsequent Quarters after Ranking 
In each quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3 funds are ranked into decile portfolios 
based on their past quarter raw returns. For the quarter subsequent to initial 
ranking and for each of the next 6 quarters after formation, we compute the 
average growth rate (Panel A) and the average dollar flows (Panel B) of all funds 
in each decile portfolio. Thus, the bar in cell (i,j) represents average flows (net of 
reinvestments) in the jth quarter after initial ranking of funds ranked in decile i. 
Decile 10 corresponds to the best performers. 
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historical performance may be an important determinant of money flows over a 
horizon of six quarters or less. Notice in Panel B that poor performers experience 
important dollar outflows, comparable in magnitude to the level of inflows 
experienced by the top deciles. In Panel A, these same cash outflows averaged in 
terms of growth rates appear smaller in magnitude compared to the large growth rates 
enjoyed by the best performers. This indicates that poor performers might be over-
represented among funds managing large amounts of assets. Obviously, size is a 
necessary control variable to take into account. Figure 2 also highlights the 
importance of considering both measures of cash flows in the analysis, as each of 
them may reveal distinctive features of flows behaviour. 
 
We estimate our model by pooling the entire dataset, considering each fund-period 
observation as an independent observation (as in e.g. Gruber [1996], Del Guercio and 
Tkac [2002]).31 Results, explaining both normalized and absolute flows, are presented 
in Table IV. All t-statistics reported are based on robust standard errors. Our estimates 
confirm that hedge fund flows are sensitive to historical relative performance and the 
relation appears to be linear. If a fund’s ranking improves from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile in the previous quarter, this is associated with an economically and 
statistically significant 6.2% quarterly growth (column A). This accounts for nearly 
31% of the total long-run impact. The effect gradually disappears but is an important 
determinant of growth rates even up to 6 lagged quarters. In the long-run, an 
improvement in relative performance from the 25th to the 75th percentile corresponds 
to a growth rate of about 23% over the next 6 quarters. The effect of past performance 
is also confirmed when we use absolute flows as the dependent variable (column B). 
The significant impact on dollar flows also decreases over time and is mostly 
concentrated over the next 3 quarters. Our results clearly indicate that investors 
respond most strongly to the most recent quarterly fund history.  
 
We tested for non-linearities in the response of flows to performance in the previous 
quarter using different alternative specifications. We divided the first lagged rank in 
ten deciles and we estimated our model allowing for kinks at each decile. We found 
no evidence of significant differences between the slopes in the 10 segments. We also 
allowed for kinks in the top 10% and 20% of funds and 10% bottom, isolating the 
middle deciles, and again linearity was not rejected. When we divide lagged rank 
between winners and losers and we test a two segment piecewise linear regression, we 
do not reject linearity either. Finally, we added the square of each lagged rank to our 
base  specification,  but  we  did  not  find  significant  coefficients  for  the  additional  
                                                 
31 Our results are robust to a different estimation procedure based on Fama-McBeth [1973] as implemented by 
Sirri and Tufano [1998] and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003]. Estimates of these regressions are available 
upon request. 
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Table IV  
The Effect of Relative Performance and Fund Specific Characteristics 
 Upon Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports OLS coefficients estimates using cash flows as the dependent variable. The sample includes 
1543 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2004 Q3. In column B we measure cash flows in dollar 
terms as the change in total net assets between consecutive quarters corrected for reinvestments. In column A 
we measure cash flows as a growth rate relative to the fund’s total net assets of previous quarter. The 
independent variables that account for relative performance include six lagged fractional ranks. The fractional 
rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all the funds existing in 
the sample in a given period, based on the fund’s raw return at the end of the period. Independent variables 
accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the 
log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, downside-upside potential ratio 
based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, 
a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a 
reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy 
taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and 7 dummies for investment styles 
defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The general hedge fund index is taken as reference category. 
The model also includes 39 time dummies (estimates not reported). We estimate our model by pooling all 
fund-period observations. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Parameters 
OLS estimates, model of 
cash flows as growth rates 
(A) 
 OLS estimates, model of 
 dollar flows 
(B) 
Intercept 0.1221 (3.85)  -27400000 (-1.77) 
Rank lag 1 0.1240 (19.42)  13400000 (7.58) 
Rank lag 2 0.0945 (14.55)  11300000 (3.04) 
Rank lag 3 0.0800 (12.07)  6736293 (2.28) 
Rank lag 4 0.0571 (8.54)  4506515 (2.43) 
Rank lag 5 0.0288 (4.52)  2277394 (1.41) 
Rank lag 6 0.0154 (2.37)  -97838.64 (-0.08) 
ln(TNA) -0.0135 (-9.32)  942539.4 (1.08) 
ln(AGE) -0.0157 (-4.56)  -2353853 (-1.50) 
Flows lag 1 0.0507 (4.44)  -0.2349 (-0.77) 
Flows lag 2 0.0472 (5.70)  0.0477 (0.38) 
Flows lag 3 0.0106 (1.60)  0.0957 (1.78) 
Flows lag 4 0.0133 (2.18)  0.0626 (1.57) 
Offshore 0.0091 (2.20)  298604.4 (0.49) 
Incentive Fees -0.0006 (-2.32)  -141126.4 (-1.41) 
Management Fees -0.0047 (-1.83)  1339276 (1.82) 
Personal Capital  -0.0070 (-1.71)  -1577176 (-2.42) 
Leverage 0.0131 (3.34)  43903.05 (0.07) 
Downside-Upside Pot. Ratio -0.0139 (-5.85)  -434606.4 (-1.09) 
Emerging Markets -0.0223 (-2.98)  -774879.8 (-0.34) 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0068 (0.61)  349546.5 (0.13) 
Event Driven -0.0033 (-0.48)  841935.4 (0.32) 
Fixed Income Arbitrage. 0.0116 (1.17)  1078473 (0.37) 
Global Macro -0.0092 (-0.95)  -2813528 (-0.80) 
Long/Short Equity -0.0248 (-4.21)  -1302199 (-0.62) 
Managed Futures -0.0190 (-2.17)  3902279 (1.09) 
      
R2 0.0937   0.1122  
Number of observations 21841   21841  
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variables.32 In conclusion, all of our specifications show a robust linear relationship 
between quarterly cash flows and past relative performance, in contrast to the more 
convex relationship found in previous studies for mutual funds, or as documented by 
Agarwal et al [2003] for hedge funds using annual data.  
 
It is unclear, however, what particular measure of performance is pre-eminent for 
hedge fund investors. This issue has not been addressed in previous studies.33 In an 
alternative specification  we  use  raw  returns  instead  of  ranks  as  a measure of 
performance.  Both absolute and relative performance are measures available to 
investors. Given the structure of incentives in the industry and the high watermarks in 
place, managers seek for absolute returns and their investors expect managers to 
depart from benchmarks to the upside. Our regressions (not reported) show a similar 
pattern as with relative performance, that is, historical returns have a positive and 
linear impact on flows up to five lags and investors’ responses are stronger for the 
most recent quarterly raw returns. A difference of 1% in raw returns in the previous 
quarter represents 0.23% difference in expected growth rates. Interestingly, however, 
when we include both raw returns and ranks in our model, ranks appear to capture all 
the effect of performance on flows. Individually, the coefficients for raw returns are 
not significant, while the impact of ranks on cash flows remains economically and 
statistically significant.34  
 
Several of the control variables in our model have a statistically significant impact. 
First, investors appear to prefer funds with lower fees, ceteris paribus. Incentive fee 
differences of 1% between funds are associated with differences in flows rates of 
0.06% per quarter. It is evident that in spite of the presumably higher managerial 
                                                 
32 Results of our tests for non-linearities are available upon request.  
33 For the mutual fund industry, Gruber [1996] analysed the impact of different predictors of performance on 
cash flows, specifically the alphas from one- and four-index models and the excess returns over the S&P500 
index. He finds that both the individual and the joint impact of these performance measures are significant. 
Sirri and Tufano [1998] find that ranks based on simple measures like one to five year raw returns have a 
significant effect on flows besides that of more sophisticated rankings based on excess returns of a market 
model or Jensen’s alpha. For the pension fund industry, Del Guercio and Tkac [2002] also test the impact of 
excess raw returns relative to the S&P500, style adjusted performance, tracking error and Jensen’s alpha from 
a one-factor model. They find that flows are strongly positively related to Jensen’s alpha and negatively related 
to tracking error. For the hedge fund industry, Goetzmann et al. [2001] analyze separately the impact of raw 
returns and ranks, but not their joint effect.  
34 An F-test on the inclusion of the six lagged raw returns in our model gives the value of 3.60 (the 1% critical 
value being 2.80 for an F-distribution with 6 and 21770 degrees of freedom), leading to a marginal rejection of 
the joint hypothesis that the six additional variables have zero coefficients. Although the inclusion of lagged 
raw returns slightly improves the explanatory power of the model, it leads to an erratic pattern of the 
coefficients on returns, which is difficult to interpret economically. In addition, we also tried other 
specifications using more sophisticated performance measures popular in the industry, like Sharpe ratios, and 
style adjusted returns scaled by the standard deviation of historical returns. The patterns remain the same, i.e. 
flows are related in a linear way to past performance. However, performance relative to the peers appears to 
have the strongest explanatory power for money flows.  
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effort due to higher fees and a possible increase in return, as a consequence, investors 
are more sensitive to the level of costs involved and the concomitant increase in risk. 
Several investment styles have a significant and negative effect on cash flow rates. 
Funds with style “emerging markets”, “long short equity” and “managed futures” tend 
to experience, ceteris paribus, lower growth rates than the other styles. Smaller and 
younger funds enjoy larger percentage flows than larger and older funds, in line with 
the findings of Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003]. The coefficients on asset size are 
negative, significant and highly robust to alternative specifications. This indicates that 
hedge funds managing large amounts of assets grow less quickly. One explanation 
might be that hedge fund strategies seeking mispricing opportunities are not scalable, 
as pointed out by Goetzmann et al [2003]. Interestingly, however, the size effect 
disappears when our model explains dollar flows. This is an important point that will 
be discussed in Section 3.4, where we show that the impact of size cannot be 
appropriately captured if the investment and divestment decisions are not modelled 
separately. The size effect is probably more apparent with growth rates due to the fact 
that flows are magnified for small funds compared to large funds.  
 
Persistence in money flows appears to be economically significant and highly robust 
to the alternative specifications discussed above. Funds that have experienced 
increased levels of inflows (outflows) will, ceteris paribus, continue growing 
(shrinking) over the next two or three quarters. The effect dies out at longer time 
horizons, suggesting once again the existence of short-run factors conditioning money 
flows. We defer the discussion of this issue to Section 3.4, which provides further 
insights into the impact of lagged flows.  
 
There is strong evidence that investors in hedge funds look for upside potential with 
minimum downside risk, given the highly significant coefficient for the downside-
upside potential ratio. In alternative specifications we experimented with other risk 
metrics that are popular in the industry, like downside deviation, upside potential, 
standard deviation, either based on the entire past history of the fund or based on the 
preceding six months. Downside deviations and upside potential with respect to the 
return of 3-month Treasury bill and with respect to the return on the S&P 500 were 
not significant. In the current model, however, the ratio of downside deviation to 
upside potential measured with respect to Treasury bills has a highly significant 
impact on flows.  
 
Our main results appear to be robust when we estimate our model separately for the 
sub-samples of survivors and dead funds. Although by not including funds that 
disappeared, the impact of last quarter performance upon flows reduces slightly by 
3% and the total long-run impact of historical performance reduces by 2%, linearity is 
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still not rejected, while the coefficients remain significant and follow the same 
previously identified patterns. Thus, also at short horizons, the shape of the flow-
performance relation does not seem to be affected by survivorship biases.35  
Summarizing, in all of our regressions, we find a strong quarterly relationship among 
poor performers as much as among good performers. This result is in sharp contrast 
with the relatively weak relationship found among poor performers at annual horizons 
in the mutual fund industry or as found by Agarwal et al. [2003] for hedge funds. 
Furthermore, unlike previous papers (see e.g. Goetzmann and Peles [1997], Sirri and 
Tufano [1998], Goetzmann et al. [2003], Agarwal et al. [2003]) we did not assign a 
flow rate of –100% when a fund drops out from the database, which might be justified 
in studies of mutual funds and horizons of one year or more. However, for hedge 
funds this is a perilous exercise particularly at short horizons, as the date at which a 
fund stops reporting is not necessarily the date of liquidation (see Ackermann et al. 
[1999]). Further, a flow rate of –100% does not reflect a conscious decision of 
investors but the decision of a manager to liquidate the fund.  
 
In conclusion, hedge fund investors appear to make their investment and divestment 
decisions based on the most recent quarterly performance information. This evidence 
suggests that investors are frequently monitoring hedge funds. Interestingly, their 
allocation is proportional among bad and good performers. This result differs from the 
general findings at annual horizons for both the hedge fund and mutual fund 
industries, where flows of money are directed mostly to the best performers the prior 
year. Instead, in short horizons hedge fund investors are equally sensitive to good 
performance and poor performance. We interpret our findings partly as a result of 
active monitoring, mostly through audited reports and personal interviews, which 
makes investors better able to assess poor performers on time. But hedge fund 
investors also face high searching costs along their allocation process, which creates 
conditions that may weaken the sensitivity of inflows of money to funds that 
performed well in the past, as argued by Sirri and Tufano [1998].36 Hedge funds face 
advertising restrictions and furthermore their activities lack transparency. As a 
consequence, hedge fund investors, both private and institutional, engage in a time-
consuming process of gathering and evaluating information, which implies substantial 
costs.37 The result might be a slow reaction of hedge fund investors to hire managers 
                                                 
35 Using annual data, Goetzmann and Peles [1997], Chevalier and Ellison [1997] and Sirri and Tufano [1998] 
all document that the convexity of the flow-performance relation in mutual funds is not affected by 
survivorship biases. Del Guercio and Tkac [2002] and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003] find the same result 
for pension funds and hedge funds, respectively. 
36 One of the main results from Sirri and Tufano [1998] is that marketing effort of mutual funds emphasizes 
good performance and by this means reduces searching costs for investors. These are conditions that enhance 
the sensitivity of investors to good past performance. 
37 See Bekier [1996] for evidence and for a detailed description of the buying process and the post-investment 
behaviour of hedge fund investors. Bekier quotes a hedge fund institutional investor who acknowledges that 
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that performed well in the recent past. However, this also suggests that inflows of 
money from new investors are likely to be more sensitive to measures of long-run 
performance (i.e. annual horizons), while outflows of money, which are the result of 
frequent monitoring, are therefore more sensitive to short-run performance. This 
explanation is consistent with the results of Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003], who 
find a high sensitivity of flows to good performance in the previous year, while they 
fail to capture the response of outflows to bad performance. In light of our 
interpretation, we study in the next section inflows and outflows separately and look 
into more detail at potential differences in their sensitivity to past performance.  
 
3.4 Money inflows and outflows and the effect of 
liquidity restrictions 
 
Hedge funds present several of the distinctive features that characterize any 
alternative investment. One of them is illiquidity. Lock-up periods are common and 
redemptions and subscriptions are limited to certain dates, typically the end of a 
month or a quarter. In rare exceptions, investors may obtain more frequent 
redemptions at a premium. Additionally, as limited partnerships, U.S. domiciled 
hedge funds are generally not registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and therefore cannot freely trade their shares in the public market.  
 
Restricted flows enable a hedge fund to minimize cash holdings and reduce 
administrative work. Subscription periods generally match the redemption periods of 
a fund or are somewhat shorter, depending on the trading strategies, i.e. the liquidity 
of the markets and instruments traded. Nearly 75% of the funds in our dataset have 
monthly subscription periods and 15% have subscription periods of 90 days. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of redemption frequencies for our sample. Nearly 40% of funds 
have redemption periods of one quarter or more, of which onshore funds account for 
almost 60%.  
 
A written notice to the manager of the fund is often required prior to redemption in 
order to simplify cash flow management. The combination of redemption periods and 
notice periods may have an adverse effect on investor’s liquidity. For example, 
consider a fund with quarterly redemptions and 90 days of notice period. If an 
investor decides to redeem her shares on July 2nd based on last quarter performance, 
                                                                                                                                                             
their standard process of investment may take up to 18 months, from the identification of potential alternatives 
until the final decision to hire a manager. Also several alternative investment advisors acknowledge often in 
hedge fund conferences that the manager due diligence process may take from two to six months to be 
completed.  
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the earliest possible redemption date is only at the end of December. Most typically, 
funds have monthly or quarterly redemption periods with minimum notice periods of 
15 to 90 days. The possible combinations found in our sample are shown in Table V.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Hedge Funds Redemption Frequencies 
Redemptions in hedge funds are limited to certain dates. The figure represents 
the distribution of redemption frequencies for the cross-section of funds from 
TASS database.  
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
%
 o
f f
un
ds
Da
ily
We
ek
ly
Fo
rtn
igh
tly
Mo
nth
ly
Qu
art
erl
y
Se
mi
-an
nu
all
y
An
nu
all
y
No
 lo
ck
-in
 pe
rio
ds
Offshore
Onshore
 
 
 
Table V 
Percentage of Funds for Different Combinations of  
Redemption Periods and Notice Periods in TASS database 
 
 
Redemption Notice Periods 
 
Redemption 
periods 
No notice 
 Period 1day 
2 to 7  
days  
8 to 15  
days  
16 to 30 
days  
31 to 90  
days  
91 to 180 
days 
 
1 0.13 0.19 0.39  0.06 0.06   
7 2.33 0.19 1.69 0.13 0.19    
15 0.39 0.13 0.65 0.19 0.13    
30 10.69 0.52 4.54 10.82 18.54 5.38 0.19 
90 4.21 0.13 0.19 1.62 13.87 11.86 0.13 
183 0.52    0.45 2.33   
365 0.58   0.06   1.69 2.33 0.19 
 
 
 
73
A Portrait of Hedge Fund Investors 
 
61 
 
 
Put differently, the decision of an investor to subscribe or redeem in response to past 
performance may not become effective immediately, but with a substantial delay. 
News about fund performance released at the end of a quarter may not necessarily 
have an impact on flows during the next quarter, depending on redemption, 
subscription and notice periods. Therefore, we explore the response of flows to past 
performance subject to liquidity restrictions. We focus for the moment on restrictions 
to withdrawals, since subscription periods are shorter and their effects are difficult to 
capture at a quarterly horizon. For each fund and each quarter we compute the 
maximum delay that an investor responding to past monthly performance would have 
to face to see her decision of withdrawing her money made effective. For 10% of 
funds, the maximum delay is 2 quarters or more. In a few cases it is as long as five 
quarters. Given this delay, we can identify  in  our  model  those lags that could have 
an effective impact on flows.  For each quarter and for every fund, we construct five 
dummy variables corresponding to each of the five lagged quarters, taking the value 1 
if liquidity restrictions do not prevent outflows in response to the lagged performance 
measure.  
 
We modify our model of flows to allow for interactions between lagged ranks and 
dummies accounting for limits to liquidity.38 Estimates of our modified model are 
shown in Table VI. Unrestricted ranks have an impact on growth rates with higher 
levels of significance than restricted ranks (column A). The impact of the first lag is 
18% higher for unrestricted ranks while the effects of the control variables remain 
basically unchanged. Nearly 75% of the long-run impact is still concentrated over the 
next three quarters. This effect is enhanced when our model explains dollar flows 
(column B). In this case, when restrictions are present, almost all coefficients for 
lagged ranks are even insignificant. Thus, our estimates provide conclusive evidence 
that quarterly net cash flows are less sensitive to past performance for funds imposing 
extended redemption periods compared to less restricted funds.  
 
However, given differences between redemption and subscription periods, it is not 
clear whether inflows and outflows respond with equal sensitivity to good and bad 
performance, respectively.39 Also the sensitivity of inflows and outflows might be  
                                                 
38 In each quarter t, we define for each j-lagged rank and for each fund i :  
 
                      Rank Unrestrictedi,t-j = Ranki,t-j (REDRi,t-j )  
               and    Rank Restrictedi,t-j  = Ranki,t-j (1-REDRi,t-j) 
 
  where REDRi,t-j is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if redemption restrictions do not prevent outflows 
  in quarter t in response to j-lagged performance given by Ranki,t-j.   
39 From our dataset we cannot extract information relative to outflows and inflows per fund and per period. For 
each fund, we can only distinguish between periods in which outflows outweigh inflows (negative net cash 
flows) and periods in which inflows outweigh outflows (positive net cash flows).  
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Table VI  
The Effect of Relative Performance Subject to Liquidity Restrictions 
 Upon Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports OLS estimates of a model of flows subject to liquidity restrictions. The sample includes 1543 
open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2004 Q3. We measure dollar cash flows as the change in total 
net assets between consecutive quarters corrected for reinvestments. Alternatively, we measure cash flows as a 
growth rate relative to the fund’s total net assets of previous quarter. The independent variables that account 
for relative performance include six lagged fractional ranks interacting with dummies accounting for limits to 
liquidity. The fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to 
all the funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s raw return in previous quarter. 
Independent variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in 
the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, downside-
upside potential ratio based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on 
the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of 
profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under 
management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and 7 
dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The model also includes 39 
time dummies (estimates not reported). We estimate our model by pooling all fund-period observations.  
T-statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
Parameters 
OLS estimates 
Modelling growth rates 
(A) 
 OLS estimates  
Modelling dollar flows  
(B) 
Intercept 0.1180 (3.72)  -2.82E+07 (-1.81) 
Rank lag 1 Unrestricted  0.1255 (19.00)  1.31E+07 (7.58) 
Rank lag 2 Unrestricted 0.0952 (14.09)  1.11E+07 (2.96) 
Rank lag 3 Unrestricted  0.0811 (11.76)  7044145 (2.37) 
Rank lag 4 Unrestricted  0.0570 (8.20)  4389959 (2.41) 
Rank lag 5 Unrestricted  0.0276 (4.18)  3159295 (1.79) 
Rank lag 6 0.0157 (2.41)  -167517.2 (-0.13) 
Rank lag 1 Restricted  0.1061 (6.60)  1.97E+07 (2.29) 
Rank lag 2 Restricted 0.0846 (4.42)  1.49E+07 (2.73) 
Rank lag 3 Restricted  0.0661 (4.28)  2613660 (0.32) 
Rank lag 4 Restricted  0.0579 (3.52)  7531471 (1.69) 
Rank lag 5 Restricted  0.0499 (2.95)  -1.08E+07 (-1.22) 
ln(TNA) -0.0134 (-9.21)  968341.2 (1.10) 
ln(AGE) -0.0156 (-4.55)  -2351888 (-1.50) 
Flows lag 1 0.0506 (4.44)  -0.2351 (-0.78) 
Flows lag 2 0.0471 (5.70)  0.0475 (0.38) 
Flows lag 3 0.0106 (1.60)  0.0956 (1.78) 
Flows lag 4 0.0133 (2.18)  0.0626 (1.57) 
Offshore 0.0075 (1.74)  -45133.74 (-0.06) 
Incentive Fees -0.0006 (-2.29)  -141537.6 (-1.42) 
Management Fees -0.0047 (-1.82)  1346796 (1.82) 
Personal Capital  -0.0070 (-1.73)  -1566741 (-2.41) 
Leverage 0.0136 (3.44)  103305.8 (0.16) 
Downside-Upside Potential Ratio -0.0136 (-5.74)  -374809.2 (-0.98) 
Emerging Markets -0.0220 (-2.94)  -681122.1 (-0.29) 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0072 (0.64)  289951.3 (0.11) 
Event Driven -0.0022 (-0.33)  1005455 (0.38) 
Fixed Income Arbitrage. 0.0117 (1.18)  1085233 (0.37) 
Global Macro -0.0092 (-0.95)  -2780232 (-0.79) 
Long/Short Equity -0.0241 (-4.07)  -1115327 (-0.52) 
Managed Futures -0.0194 (-2.21)  3819735 (1.07) 
R2 0.0939   0.1125  
Number of observations 21841   21841  
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related to different time horizons, as discussed at the end of the previous section. 
Thus, it might be the case that  the  flow-performance  relationship  displays  two 
different regimes,  depending on whether outflows are more important than inflows 
(in which case we observe negative net cash flows) or vice versa. To investigate to 
what extent the flow-performance relationship is distinct for positive and negative net 
cash flows we extend our model to allow for a differential impact of the explanatory 
variables depending upon the sign of the cash flows.40 The resulting model consists of 
three equations. A first equation explains the sign of aggregate cash flows and reflects 
the decision of investors either to invest or divest in a particular fund. The two 
remaining equations describe the relation of positive cash flows to past performance 
and negative cash flows to past performance, respectively, controlling for other 
characteristics like fund age, size and style. The easiest way to interpret the model is 
by considering the last two equations as truncated regression models (truncated at 
zero), where a common binary choice model explains the appropriate regime. As a 
result, the two flow equations contain an additional term that captures the truncation. 
This term is based on the generalized residual of the binary choice model, while its 
coefficients depend upon the covariances between the equations’ error terms (see 
Maddala [1983] for an extensive treatment of such models).  
 
Let Flowsn,it and Flowsd,it be the observed rates of cash flows for an individual fund i, 
conditional upon an aggregate decision of investors either to invest or divest in the 
fund, respectively. Let Sit be a dummy variable capturing the aggregate investors’ 
decision, taking the value 1 if the observed sign of net cash flows is positive and 0 
otherwise. Thus, we observe either 
 
                     Flowsn,it  when  Sit =1, 
                   or       Flowsd,it  when  Sit=0,  but never both. 
 
The first stage consists of estimating a probit model explaining the sign of flows:  
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                where    Sit =1  if  S*it > 0,  and Sit =0 otherwise. 
 
The second stage is  estimation by ordinary least squares of the truncated variables 
Flowsn,i and Flowsd,i,  modelled as in equation (3) but incorporating the generalized 
                                                 
40 To the best of our knowledge, only Bergstresser and Poterba [2002] study separately inflows and outflows in 
mutual funds, and look at the impact of after-tax returns compared to pre-tax returns upon flows. However, 
contrary to our study, they could obtain data on gross outflows and inflows and therefore could treat both 
datasets separately.  
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residual from the probit model as an additional explanatory variable. This additional 
variable, captures E[εi,t | Sit =1] and E[εi,t | Sit=0], respectively, where  
 
E [εi,t | Sit=1] = cov(µi,t, εi,t).E[µi,t | Sit =1]. 
 
The latter expectation reflects the generalized residual of equation (4) (see e.g. 
Verbeek [2004], Chapter 7).41 We do not impose that the coefficients in any of the 
three equations are identical. 
 
Table VII provides the estimates of the probit model explaining the regime of cash 
flows (column A). For these results we do not take into account cash flows having 
value zero. The results show that the impact of historical relative performance upon 
the direction of the investment decision is positive and highly significant, both 
economically and statistically. Funds with a good track performance relative to their 
peers are very likely to experience positive net cash flows, while a bad past 
performance is more likely to determine a divestment decision. Moreover, for funds 
imposing lower restrictions to liquidity, the investors’ decision to invest or divest is 
strongly driven by the most recent quarterly performance. The effect attenuates 
progressively with each lag and dies away after the fifth lag. Instead, for more 
restricted funds the impact of historical performance on the investment decision is 
considerably reduced, particularly for the most recent quarter. This results in less 
dispersion of the impact across lagged ranks, although coefficients are highly 
significant up to the fourth lag. The control variables also capture some interesting 
and significant effects. Younger funds are, ceteris paribus, more likely to attract flows 
of money than older funds do. Offshore funds operating in tax heavens are, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to trigger a divestment decision from its investors compared to 
onshore funds. Also the dynamics of flows appear to be an important determinant of 
the regime of flows. Funds that experienced inflows in the past are, ceteris paribus, 
more likely to continue experiencing inflows over the next four quarters. Finally, 
several investment style dummies also have a significant impact. Long/short equity 
funds and funds operating in emerging markets have, ceteris paribus, the highest 
probability to induce a divestment decision from investors. 
 
Columns B and C in Table VII show the results of estimating the two equations for 
negative and positive cash flows respectively. The differences between both regimes 
are apparent. Surprisingly, the coefficients for the model of positive cash flows 
become statistically en economically insignificant in comparison with our previous 
results using the pooled model. The impact of past relative performance upon the rates  
 
                                                 
41 This analysis assumes joint normality of all unobservable error terms. 
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Table VII  
Switching Regression Model Explaining Positive and Negative Cash Flows 
Subject to Liquidity Restrictions in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports estimates of a switching regression model explaining positive and negative flows. Columns B 
and C report OLS coefficients estimates using cash flows as the dependent variable. The sample includes 1543 
open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2004 Q3. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate 
corrected for reinvestments. The independent variables that account for relative performance include six lagged 
fractional ranks interacting with dummies for liquidity restrictions. The fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is 
defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all the funds existing in the sample in the same period, 
based on the fund’s raw return in previous quarter. Independent variables accounting for fund specific 
characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since 
inception, four lagged measures of flows, downside-upside potential ratio based on the entire past history of the 
fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for 
offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a 
percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal 
capital is invested in the fund and seven dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont 
indices. The model also includes 39 time dummies (estimates not reported). The two models using the truncated 
samples also incorporate as explanatory variable the generalized residual obtained from a probit model 
explaining the regime of flows (loglikelihood estimates reported in column A. The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 if net cash flows are strictly positive). We estimate each model by pooling all fund-period observations. 
T-statistics based on robust standard errors as well as z-statistics for probit estimates are provided in parentheses.  
Parameters 
 
 
Probit model explaining 
positive and negative  
cash flows (A)  
Truncated sample for 
CFlows <0 
(B) 
Truncated sample for 
CFlows > 0 
( C ) 
Intercept -0.8208 (-5.37) -0.1519 (-4.78) 0.7944 (6.87) 
Rank lag 1 Unrestricted  0.7317 (22.06) 0.1885 (6.72) 0.0375 (0.97) 
Rank lag 2 Unrestricted 0.5720 (16.66) 0.1506 (6.73) 0.0179 (0.59) 
Rank lag 3 Unrestricted  0.4766 (13.76) 0.1124 (5.99) 0.0266 (1.02) 
Rank lag 4 Unrestricted  0.3287 (9.66) 0.0795 (5.92) 0.0149 (0.69) 
Rank lag 5 Unrestricted  0.1796 (5.29) 0.0457 (5.52) -0.0004 (-0.03) 
Rank lag 6 0.0720 (2.17) 0.0258 (4.53) -0.0015 (-0.13) 
Rank lag 1 Restricted  0.6762 (6.16) 0.1772 (5.87) 0.0371 (0.97) 
Rank lag 2 Restricted 0.5676 (4.75) 0.1778 (6.39) -0.0071 (-0.18) 
Rank lag 3 Restricted  0.4580 (3.79) 0.1211 (4.98) 0.0061 (0.21) 
Rank lag 4 Restricted  0.5511 (4.52) 0.1119 (3.86) -0.0164 (-0.48) 
Rank lag 5 Restricted  0.2734 (2.23) 0.0501 (2.70) 0.0368 (1.45) 
Ln(TNA) 0.0167 (2.67) 0.0033 (3.17) -0.0333(-11.63) 
Ln(AGE) -0.1606 (-9.18) -0.0043 (-0.66) -0.0122 (-1.12) 
Flows lag 1 0.3920 (4.75) 0.1055 (6.92) 0.0201 (1.48) 
Flows lag 2 0.2146 (4.65) 0.0684 (6.31) 0.0252 (2.02) 
Flows lag 3 0.0758 (2.57) 0.0103 (1.62) 0.0076 (1.03) 
Flows lag 4 0.0640 (2.90) 0.0234 (5.75) 0.0084 (0.98) 
Offshore -0.0980 (-4.58) -0.0471 (-9.36) 0.0686 (8.06) 
Incentive Fees -0.0023 (-1.36) -0.0013 (-5.23) 0.0001 (0.13) 
Management Fees -0.0200 (-1.57) -0.0047 (-2.25) 0.0014 (0.31) 
Personal Capital  -0.0553 (-2.82) -0.0055 (-1.46) -0.0138 (-2.01) 
Downside-Upside Potential Ratio -0.0504 (-3.91) -0.0054 (-2.06) -0.0188 (-3.36) 
Emerging Markets -0.1428 (-3.42) -0.0032 (-0.41) -0.0254 (-1.92) 
Event Driven -0.0118 (-0.31) -0.0004 (-0.07) -0.0039 (-0.41) 
Fixed Income Arbitrage. -0.0010 (-0.02) 0.0061 (0.75) 0.0136 (0.96) 
Long/Short Equity -0.1416 (-4.44) -0.0187 (-2.70) -0.0200 (-1.81) 
Managed Futures -0.0908 (-2.17) -0.0192 (-2.54) -0.0088 (-0.61) 
Gen.Residual from Probit Model  0.3340 (5.34) -0.1065 (-1.28) 
Chi2 (69) 2250.36    
Pseudo R2 0.1022  0.0700  0.0791  
Number of observations 21243  10367  10876  
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of cash flows is entirely captured by outflows of money in response to bad 
performance. The most recent quarterly performance has the strongest effect in less 
restricted funds, accounting for nearly 31% of the total long run impact. It gradually 
disappears with lags. Also for these funds, the response to previous quarter 
performance is more sensitive, implying 6% more outflows than restricted funds.  
 
The control variables also capture several significant asymmetries between the two 
regimes. Size has a significant impact in both regimes, but with opposite sign. On the 
one hand, smaller funds experience, ceteris paribus, larger outflows (i.e. lower 
negative growth rates) than bigger funds; on the other hand, smaller funds also 
experience larger inflows, conditional to the regime of positive money flows. In other 
words, small funds are subject to more extreme growth rates than large funds, a result 
that will be discussed more extensively in Section 3.5. In contrast, the impacts of the 
dynamics of flows, incentive fees and the offshore dummy variable are almost entirely 
captured by the regime of negative cash flows. In other words, only outflows tend to 
persist – over the next four quarters – while it is clear that investors penalize more 
heavily offshore funds as well as funds with higher levels of incentive fees by 
withdrawing their money42. It is noteworthy that in the pooled model, the offshore 
dummy is insignificant, while it is highly significant in the regime-specification 
model, with opposite signs. Clearly, more extreme rates of cash flows characterize 
offshore funds. Conditional to experiencing positive flows of money, these funds are 
more likely to have substantially higher growth rates than onshore funds. On the 
contrary, given a regime of negative flows, offshore funds are more likely to 
experience substantially larger withdrawals compared to onshore funds. This is 
consistent with the more extended redemption periods imposed by onshore funds, as 
indicated in Figure 3. Regarding the style dummies, it is interesting to notice the 
coefficient for style “emerging markets”, which becomes marginally significant but 
only for positive cash flows, while the impact of funds with styles “managed futures” 
and “long short equity” remains significant only for negative growth rates. Finally, the 
downside-upside potential ratio appears to affect both regimes negatively and 
significantly, although the impact upon positive cash flows is substantially larger.  
 
                                                 
42 An explanation for the momentum in outflows captured by our model lies in the fact that investors in a given 
hedge fund are few and large. As pointed out by Brown, Goetzmann and Park [2001], this poses a serious 
threat of withdrawals, not only because only one investor redeeming might represent a large money outflow, 
but also communication among few large investors might result in massive withdrawals. The sustained 
response of outflows over several quarters in our model could be the reflection of certain herd behavior among 
investors triggered by poor performance. Conversely, the lack of momentum in inflows over the short run is a 
further indication of the slow reaction of investors to past good performance, which contrasts with the 
momentum in flows found at annual horizons for mutual funds and hedge funds (see, e.g., Del Guercio and 
Tkac [2002] and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003]).  
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Estimating our truncated regression models with dollar flows as the dependent 
variable gives some additional insights (Table A1, appendix). The pattern of 
coefficients for ranks remains the same as with growth rates. However, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients for negative dollar flows are substantially larger than 
for positive dollar flows. In dollar terms, outflows are highly sensitive to changes in 
short-run relative performance but inflows change only slightly, as is also suggested 
by Panel B of Figure 2. On the other hand, it is remarkable that the coefficient for size 
becomes highly significant, while the sign is opposite in both regimes. Conditional to 
receiving inflows of money, large funds experience more important amounts of dollar 
flows compared to small funds. But also they experience considerably larger dollar 
outflows than small funds conditional to the regime of negative flows. In sum, large 
funds are subject to more extreme variations of flows of money in dollar terms. This 
important result remains hidden in Tables IV and VI, while Goetzmann et al. [2003] 
also did not find evidence that large funds experienced dollar flows as high as small 
funds. This emphasizes the need of separately modelling money inflows and outflows. 
Summing up, while our model explaining growth rates shows that large funds grow or 
shrink at lower rates than small funds, we also show that large funds may face 
important withdrawals in dollar terms, which gives further evidence in favour of 
diseconomies of scale playing a role. Section 3.5 will provide additional insights into 
the size issues. 
 
So far we have shown a clear response of negative flows to past performance in the 
short run, consistent with our interpretation that outflows of money are the result of 
frequent monitoring at a monthly or quarterly basis. At the same time, we cannot 
identify a clear response of positive flows at short horizons, while at annual horizons 
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003] find a positive and convex response of inflows 
towards the best performers. Therefore, we perform an additional estimation by 
aggregating both flows and relative performance over different time horizons. Table 
VIII shows estimates from a switching regression model explaining positive and 
negative cash flows, similar to (4).  However, in Panel 1 we regress quarterly cash 
flows upon yearly ranks constructed on the basis of the previous one-year raw return. 
We only report the coefficient estimates for past performance and size. 
 
Aggregating relative performance over longer horizons does not change our previous 
results; quarterly outflows remain strongly sensitive to past year performance, in 
contrast to quarterly inflows. In Panel 2 we regress annual cash flows upon yearly 
ranks of the previous year. In this case, observations of four-quarter cash flows are 
overlapping, which introduces an autocorrelation problem and we report t-statistics 
based on Newey-West standard errors. Our results are remarkably different from 
previous ones. The response of annual inflows to past year performance becomes 
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marginally significant while the estimated coefficient is substantially larger than the 
coefficient for outflows, suggesting a convex flow-performance relation.  In Panel 3 
we regress annual cash flows upon quarterly ranks in previous year. The response of 
annual outflows to previous quarter performance turns out to be insignificant, while 
inflows appear to be highly sensitive.   
 
 
Table VIII  
Switching Regression Model Explaining Positive and Negative Cash Flows to 
 Open-End Hedge Funds over Different Time Horizons 
The table reports estimates of a switching regression model explaining positive and negative flows. Columns B 
and C report OLS coefficients estimates using cash flows as the dependent variable. We measure cash flows as a 
growth rate corrected for reinvestments. In panel 1 we consider quarterly cash flows. In panel 2 and 3 we 
aggregate cash flows into annual horizons, while moving forward one quarter at the time. The sample includes 
1543 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2004Q3. The independent variables that account for 
relative performance are either the previous one-year rank, in Panels 1 and 2, or the lagged one-quarter rank, in 
Panel 3. The fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all 
the funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s raw return in previous year or in 
previous quarter. Independent variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s 
total net assets in the prior period, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, lagged measures of flows, 
downside-upside potential ratio based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the 
return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a 
percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets 
under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and 7 
dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The model also includes 39 time 
dummies. The two models using the truncated samples also incorporate as explanatory variable the generalized 
residual obtained from a probit model explaining the regime of flows (loglikelihood estimates reported in 
column A. The dependent variable takes value 1 if net cash flows are strictly positive). We estimate our models 
by pooling all fund-period observations. We only report estimates for past relative performance and size. T-
statistics based on Newey-West standard errors as well as z-statistics for probit estimates are provided in 
parentheses.  
Parameters 
 
 
Probit model explaining 
positive and negative  
cash flows 
(A) 
Estimation using a 
truncated sample for 
CFlows <0 
(B) 
Estimation using a 
truncated sample for 
CFlows > 0 
( C ) 
Panel 1 : Quarterly Flows (N=22265 obs., from which 10734 are negative cash flows) 
Previous one-year rank  1.1209 (31.97) 0.3302 (6.00) -0.0332 (-0.65) 
Ln(TNA) 0.0217 (3.57) 0.0050 (3.97) -0.0371(-12.84) 
Panel 2 : Annual Flows  (N=20106 obs., from which 9906 are negative cash flows) 
Previous one-year rank  1.2256 (34.87) 0.3174 (4.39) 1.3564 (1.92) 
Ln(TNA) -0.0424 (-6.76) -0.0147 (-4.92) -0.2778 (-9.04) 
Panel 3 : Annual Flows  (N=20106 obs., from which 9906 are negative cash flows) 
One-quarter rank lag 1 0.8774 (26.23) 0.0504 (1.29) 1.0657 (2.08) 
One-quarter rank lag 2 0.7282 (21.71) 0.0434 (1.33) 0.9281 (2.21) 
One-quarter rank lag 3 0.5137 (15.23) 0.0345 (1.46) 0.7883 (2.58) 
Ln(TNA) -0.0367 (-5.81) -0.0063 (-2.78) -0.2777 (-9.74) 
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These results confirm previous findings of a convex flow-performance relationship 
when the aggregate of flows over the year are considered. However, we have shown 
that looking at shorter horizons unmasks an immediate and sustained response of 
major withdrawals of money when funds perform poorly. Our results also reveal a 
slow reaction of inflows to short-term past performance of hedge funds, which can be 
attributable to both high searching costs for investors and infrequent subscription 
periods. Our claim that investors face different kinds of decisions that operate in 
different time horizons is clearly supported by our empirical results.  
 
Further, our findings are in line with the main argument of Berk and Green [2004] by 
showing that capital inflows are slow in chasing short-term performance and thus 
would be unable to compete away the predictability patterns in hedge fund returns 
found at quarterly horizons. This argument explicitly addresses the mutual effects 
between money flows and performance. Two questions arise. First, to what extent are 
investors able to exploit the predictability patterns of hedge funds returns as a result of 
their investment and divestment decisions? Second, to what extent do money flows 
have an impact upon performance? The next section explores the implications of our 
findings for both hedge funds and their investors.  
 
 
3.5 Economic implications: is money to hedge funds 
smart?  
 
This section relates money flows to subsequent performance. The recent literature on 
smart money has investigated the performance of the portfolios of mutual fund 
investors (see Gruber [1996], Zheng [1999] and Wermers [2003]). In the same line, 
we first provide an assessment of how successful hedge fund investors actually are in 
selecting funds as a result of their asymmetric response to good and bad performance. 
Second, given the slow response of inflows to past performance, a pertinent question 
is to what extent investors are able to exploit short-run predictability patterns in hedge 
fund returns. Finally, the swift response of outflows to bad performance suggests an 
effective punishing mechanism in place. Therefore, the last part of this section 
explores what the implications are for hedge funds and their survival. The analysis 
that follows looks into detail at the actual investors’ allocations across funds, 
providing in turn further insights into our previous results.  
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A. The Performance of Investors’ Allocations 
 
We intend to compare the performance of investors’ allocations, measured as a cash 
flow weighted return, to an equally weighted allocation as a benchmark. We first 
separate the investment from the divestment decision by ranking funds based on the 
cash flows they experienced in a given quarter. Then we separate funds with positive 
and negative money flows into two portfolios. We refer to them as the investment 
portfolio and the divestment portfolio, respectively 43.  Following Zheng [1999]’s 
approach, we look at the performance of both portfolios subsequent to ranking, by 
compounding funds’ returns over different holding periods, from one to eight quarters 
after the ranking period. We compute both an equally weighted average and a cash 
flow weighted average of compounded returns for the two portfolios. We repeat this 
procedure in each quarter. Finally we average the portfolios’ returns over time.44 
Table IX summarizes our results when we consider style-adjusted returns. Figure 4 
presents the results for both raw returns and style-adjusted returns. For comparison, 
we also include the time average of returns in the ranking period (averaged across 40 
quarters). Ranks are based upon growth rates, but our results differ only slightly when 
ranks are based upon dollar flows. 
 
In the ranking period, the cash flow weighted style-adjusted return significantly 
outperforms the equally weighted return for the investment portfolio by 0.67% (Panel 
A, in Table IX and Figure 4). Surprisingly, the situation reverses in the subsequent 
quarters. While the equally weighted return reduces by 0.40% in the quarter following 
the initial ranking, the cash flow weighted style-adjusted return on the investment 
portfolio falls by 1.5%, significantly underperforming the equally weighted return by 
nearly 46 basis points per quarter. We obtain comparable differences in terms of raw 
returns (as shown in Panel A of Figure 4). These differences are far greater than the 
nearly 0.07% per quarter, as reported by Zheng [1999], by which the equally weighted 
portfolio of mutual funds with positive cash flows outperforms the cash flow weighted 
portfolio, in terms of excess returns over the market.  
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Alternatively, we could use the above median and below median portfolios as a good approximation for the 
sets of investment and divestment targets, since the median of money flows, either in terms of growth rates or 
dollar flows, is very close to zero (see Table II).  
44 Recall that our sample period contains 40 quarters. Thus, for a holding period of one quarter, we can conduct 
this procedure (i.e. ranking in one period and evaluating holding periods over subsequent quarters) only for 39 
quarters, until 2004 Q2. Similarly, for a holding period of eight quarters, we can conduct this procedure along 
32 quarters only. We adjust for autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors. We implement a “follow 
the money” approach to control for a potential survival bias by assuming that investors place the money in the 
style index whenever a fund disappears from the dataset.  
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Table IX 
The Performance of Investors’ Portfolios  
Hedge funds are ranked every quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3 based on the net cash flows they experienced 
during that quarter. Cash flows are measured as growth rates (i.e. normalized cash flows). We assume that 
flows take place at the end of the period, although in reality they may take place along the quarter. We evaluate 
the compounded style-adjusted returns of each fund for different holding periods, from one to eight quarters 
after ranking. The table shows in Panels A and B the time-series averages of cross-sectional average returns for 
all funds with positive cash flows (the “investment portfolio”) and negative cash flows (the “divestment 
portfolio”). We adjust for autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors. Whenever a fund disappears 
from the dataset, we implement a “follow the money” approach by assuming that investors place the money in 
the style index. We obtain the cross-sectional average of compounded returns in each quarter either as an 
equally weighted return or as a cash flow weighted return that takes into account investors’ allocations. We 
also report the difference between both weighted averages. Panel C compares the return of the investment 
portfolio against the return of the divestment portfolio. Standard errors of the differences are reported in 
parentheses. We include the performance in the ranking period for comparison. 
 Panel A : Weighted average quarterly returns of the above-median portfolio (the “investment” set) 
  
 
Ranking 
period                    Holding period (quarters) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CashFlowWeighted 0.0132 -0.0021 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0023 
Equally Weighted 0.0065 0.0025 0.0011 0.0007 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0010 0.0009 
Difference 0.0067 -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0032 
Standard error (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Panel B : Weighted average quarterly returns of the below- median portfolio (the “divestment” set) 
 
 
Ranking 
period                    Holding period (quarters) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CashFlowWeighted -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0014 
Equally Weighted -0.0037 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0016 0.0023 0.0030 0.0033 0.0035 0.0039 
Difference -0.0008 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0050 -0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0053 
Standard error (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0043)
Panel C : Above-median minus below-median portfolios’ weighted average returns 
 
 
Ranking 
period                    Holding period (quarters)  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CashFlowWeighted 0.0177 0.0031 0.0010 0.0018 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 (0.0074) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0061) (0.0056)
Equally Weighted 0.0102 0.0027 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0030 
 (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0027)
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Figure 4 
Time-series Averages of Cash Flow Weighted Returns and  
Equally Weighted Returns for Different Holding Periods  
Hedge funds are ranked every quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3 based on the net cash flows they experienced 
during that quarter. Cash flows are measured as growth rates. We evaluate the compounded returns of each 
fund for different holding periods, from one to eight quarters after ranking. The figure shows time-series 
averages of cross-sectional average returns for all funds with positive cash flows (the “investment portfolio”) 
and negative cash flows (the “divestment portfolio”). Whenever a fund disappears from the dataset, we 
implement a “follow the money” approach by assuming that investors place the money in the style index. We 
obtain the cross-sectional average of compounded returns in each quarter either as an equally weighted return 
or as a cash flow weighted return that takes into account investors’ allocations. We use two definitions of a 
fund’s returns: a) raw returns, and b) style-adjusted returns. We include the performance in the ranking period 
for comparison. We adjust for autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors. 
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Manifestly, hedge fund investors’ allocations fail to appropriately discriminate funds’ 
expected returns. That is, they invest more in some funds than is justified by 
subsequent quarterly returns. As a result, the opportunity cost is substantial, had they 
equally allocated their money across all funds in the investment set45. Moreover, given 
liquidity restrictions, it seems unlikely that hedge fund investors can benefit from the 
short-lived high returns occurring contemporaneously to flows.  
 
On the other hand, Panel B in Table IX shows no significant differences between cash 
flow weighted and equally weighted returns for the divestment portfolio. However the 
magnitude of these differences is indicative that the divestment allocations work 
pretty well by allowing investors to reduce to some extent the return they give up by 
divesting. For example, in the quarter subsequent to ranking, the cash flow weighted 
style-adjusted return underperforms both the equally weighted return and the style 
index by more than 50 basis points. In terms of raw returns the difference is somewhat 
reduced, as shown in Panel B, Figure 4. Remarkably though, the actual investors’ 
(de)allocation strategy consistently underperforms the equally weighted strategy for 
holding periods up to 8 quarters.   
 
In Panel C, Table IX, we compare the performance of the investment and the 
divestment portfolios. Cash flows to hedge funds appear to have a strong sorting 
capacity of contemporaneous performance. In the ranking period, the equally 
weighted return for the investment portfolio significantly outperforms the divestment 
portfolio, by 1.02% and 1.31% in terms of style-adjusted returns and absolute returns 
respectively. Furthermore, if we look at cash flow weighted returns, this difference is 
considerably magnified, becoming 1.77% on a style-adjusted basis, and 1.91% in 
terms of raw returns (Figure 4). We find here the short-run equivalent of the result of 
Gruber [1996] for mutual funds at a one-year horizon: “high returns occur during the 
period of time when cash flows occur”46. 
 
However, we do not find evidence of smart money, defined by the extent to which 
returns of the investment portfolio outperform the divestment portfolio after the 
ranking period (see Gruber [1996] and Zheng [1999]). There are no significant 
differences between both portfolios in Panel C up to holding periods of four quarters, 
                                                 
45 A likely explanation is that fund managers cannot maintain those high returns for long periods of time, not 
even for one more quarter, as profitable investment opportunities are scarce. Thus, the huge inflows of money 
attracted by short-lived high returns end up allocated in less attractive investment opportunities. This enhances 
the fall in performance of those funds.  
46 This poses an obvious endogeneity problem. It could be that an improvement in performance within the 
quarter (e.g. inferred by reported monthly performance) induces higher concurrent flows of money, conditional 
to subscription and redemption restrictions. But it could also be the case that we are capturing a causal effect of 
contemporaneous flows upon performance. In the Appendix 2, we make an attempt to correct for endogeneity  
in a more formal model. 
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suggesting that hedge fund performance is unrelated to historical cash flows. 
Furthermore, for holding periods longer than four quarters, the divestment portfolio 
increasingly outperforms the investment portfolio.47 
 
B. Investors’ Allocations and the Persistence of the Winners 
 
The results presented above cast doubts about investors’ ability to exploit quarterly 
persistence patterns in hedge fund returns. One way to investigate this issue is by 
comparing the investors’ allocation with an allocation based on funds’ performance, 
in which funds are ranked and sorted on the basis of their raw returns in a given 
quarter. Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek [2005] showed that the top three deciles of 
this ranking are expected to again provide above average returns in the subsequent 
quarter, consistent with short-run persistence in raw returns. Table X compares both 
allocations. By ranking funds upon performance (Panel A), above-median funds 
receive on average 3.82 million U.S.$ while below-median funds experience outflows  
 
 
Table X 
A Comparison between the Repeat-Winner Strategy Allocation  
and the Investors’ Allocation  
This table compares two allocation strategies, one in which funds are ranked in terms of quarterly raw returns, 
another in which funds are ranked in terms of money flows experienced in a given quarter. Hedge funds are 
ranked every quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3. We evaluate the performance of all funds above the median and 
all funds below the median at the end of the ranking period and over the subsequent quarter. The table shows 
the time-series averages of cross-sectional average returns for both portfolios. For the allocation based on 
money flows, we obtain the cross-sectional average return in each quarter as a cash flow weighted return that 
takes into account investors’ allocations.  
 
Ranking of funds based upon  
raw returns 
(A) 
 Ranking of funds based upon 
 money flows (growth rates) 
(B) 
Portfolio 
 
 
Average 
dollar 
flow 
Returns 
Ranking 
period 
 
Returns in 
Subsequent 
quarter 
 
 Average 
dollar flow 
Returns  
Ranking 
period 
 
Returns in 
Subsequent 
quarter 
 
Above-median funds 
 
3824051 
 
0.0946 
 
0.0332 
 
 13898287 
 
0.0336 
 
0.0287 
 
 
Below-median funds 
 
-43847 
 
-0.0411 
 
0.0226 
 
 
-10300220 
 
0.0205 
 
0.0268 
 
 
Difference  0.1357 0.0106 
 
 0.0131 0.0019 
  (0.0070) (0.0063)   (0.0025) (0.0022) 
 
 
                                                 
47 Zheng [1999] also documents a mean-reversion phenomenon for mutual funds, but it takes place only after 
month 30.  
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of about –44000 U.S.$ on average. These figures are in absolute value far below the 
averages obtained in Panel B for the investment and divestment portfolios (of about 
13.9 and -10.3 million U.S.$, respectively), indicating that only few investors are able 
to exploit positive persistence. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the 
two strategies is on average 0.086, with some quarters exhibiting a negative 
correlation. Obviously, the two allocations are very different, while for mutual funds, 
Zheng [1999] documented that both allocations are somewhat related, with a rank 
correlation coefficient of 0.27. Zheng also reported that the investors’ allocation (the 
“smart money” strategy) predicts winners better than the allocation based on 
performance (the repeat-winner strategy). We find the opposite result for hedge funds: 
the investment portfolio performs substantially worse than above-median funds in the 
repeat-winner strategy (2.87% against 3.32%). Finally, the below median funds in 
Panel A underperform the divestment portfolio in Panel B (2.26% against 2.68%), 
meaning that the repeat-winner strategy also predicts losers somewhat better.   
 
Below we provide concrete evidence that most investors are indeed unable to exploit 
the persistence of the winners. To do so, we first characterize the funds in the 
investment and divestment sets more accurately. We consider again the ranking period 
and sort funds in ten deciles, where the top five deciles correspond to the investment 
set and the bottom five deciles are the divestment targets. Here, whether we rank upon 
growth rates or dollar flows becomes essential, as it provides two different 
perspectives on investors’ allocations. Table XI summarizes our results. 
 
Ranking upon dollar flows (Panel A) gives an average of 56 million U.S.$ of net 
inflows for the top decile, which is around 80% of the average dollar inflow to all 
above-median portfolios. Yet, it appears that most of investors’ money is not directed 
towards the very best in the ranking period. On average, funds in the top portfolio 
exhibit raw returns of 4.19% per quarter (fifth column), performing better than most 
of above-median portfolios and significantly outperforming the style index. However, 
in the first quarter after ranking (sixth column), the average raw return of funds in the 
top decile falls to 2.51%, underperforming almost all other deciles, which means that 
most dollars are invested in funds that do not persist. The fall of the top decile drives 
the fall of the entire investment portfolio, as documented in Table IX, given the 
enormous amounts of dollar flows concentrated in these funds. We observe a 
comparable fall in style-adjusted returns (last column).  
 
How to explain that hedge fund investors take disproportionate positions in the funds 
in their investment set that subsequently perform so poorly? The third column of 
Panel A reports the time series averages of the mean size of funds per decile. By 
ranking  upon  dollar  flows,  the  extreme  two  deciles  contain  the  largest  funds,  
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Table XI 
Results from Sorting Funds in Deciles Based on  
Cash Flow Information 
In each quarter, from 1994Q4 until 2004Q3, we rank funds based on the net cash flows they experienced 
during that quarter. We assume that flows take place at the end of the period. Then we sort funds in 10 
portfolios and we look at the performance of every decile at the end of the quarter and over the subsequent 
quarter. Decile 1 corresponds to those funds that experienced the highest cash flows. In panel A ranking of 
funds is based upon dollar flows. In panel B, ranking of funds is based upon normalized cash flows (i.e. 
growth rates). In each quarter, we compute an equally weighted return of all funds belonging to a given decile 
in that quarter. Then we average over 40 quarters when we evaluate the performance at the end of the ranking 
period. We average over 39 quarters when we evaluate the performance in the quarter subsequent to ranking. 
We use two definitions of a fund’s returns: a) raw returns and b) style-adjusted returns. We report in 
parentheses the standard error of the time series average for style-adjusted returns and for the high-minus-low 
portfolio.  
 Panel A: Ranking of funds based upon dollar flows 
    Raw return Style-adjusted return 
Decile 
Average 
Dollar 
Flow 
Average 
Size (TNA) 
Average 
StDev of 
returns 
Ranking
Period
Subsequent 
period 
Ranking 
 Period 
 
Subsequent 
 Period 
 High 1 55900930 465657768 0.0343 0.0419 0.0251 0.0139 (0.0027)  0.0005 (0.0019)
      2 9564762 138455918 0.0392 0.0398 0.0299 0.0109 (0.0029)  0.0040 (0.0025)
      3 3017546 80184704 0.0472 0.0368 0.0326 0.0091 (0.0027)  0.0054 (0.0030)
      4 848498 39688887 0.0555 0.0281 0.0254 0.0003 (0.0035)  -0.0005 (0.0028)
      5 159699 25429502 0.0651 0.0214 0.0271 -0.0012 (0.0045)  0.0025 (0.0044)
      6 -48760 17783877 0.0660 0.0178 0.0337 -0.0064 (0.0047)  0.0072 (0.0050)
      7 -369890 23234202 0.0631 0.0220 0.0274 -0.0007 (0.0043)  0.0001 (0.0045)
      8 -1407583 47167102 0.0555 0.0226 0.0305 -0.0027 (0.0040)  0.0004 (0.0043)
      9 -5000210 90379421 0.0466 0.0215 0.0216 -0.0020 (0.0031)  -0.0050 (0.0030)
 Low 10 -44674655 339522152 0.0418 0.0186 0.0262 -0.0066 (0.0031)  -0.0018 (0.0028)
High-Low 100575586 126135616 -0.0075 0.0232 -0.0012 0.0205 (0.0042)  0.0022 (0.0038)
   (0.0014) (0.0046) (0.0043)    
 Panel B: Ranking of funds based upon growth rates 
    Raw return Style-adjusted return 
Decile 
Average 
 Growth Rate 
Average 
Size( TNA) 
Average 
StDev of 
returns 
Ranking
Period
Subsequent 
period Ranking period 
 
Subsequent 
period 
 High 1 0.5471 105797406 0.0466 0.0503 0.0286 0.0215 (0.0035)  0.0033 (0.0034)
      2 0.1481 158078935 0.0438 0.0368 0.0311 0.0084 (0.0024)  0.0059 (0.0023)
      3 0.0714 181324888 0.0466 0.0299 0.0274 0.0040 (0.0033)  0.0012 (0.0025)
      4 0.0297 175868652 0.0482 0.0280 0.0298 0.0019 (0.0034)  0.0034 (0.0034)
      5 0.0076 125604661 0.0565 0.0229 0.0265 -0.0016 (0.0038)  0.0006 (0.0042)
      6 -0.0047 94129139 0.0588 0.0140 0.0293 -0.0115 (0.0043)  -0.0007 (0.0043)
      7 -0.0230 141629053 0.0566 0.0149 0.0236 -0.0062 (0.0038)  -0.0020 (0.0038)
      8 -0.0549 112913438 0.0545 0.0172 0.0268 -0.0061 (0.0040)  -0.0002 (0.0037)
      9 -0.1190 112703657 0.0523 0.0232 0.0267 -0.0031 (0.0034)  -0.0010 (0.0038)
 Low 10 -0.3384 59550927 0.0503 0.0335 0.0297 0.0071 (0.0041)  0.0023 (0.0035)
High-Low 0.8854 46246479 -0.0036 0.0169 -0.0011 0.0145 (0.0053)  0.0010 (0.0034)
   (0.0016) (0.0060) (0.0041)    
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experiencing proportionally larger dollar inflows and outflows. Funds in the top and 
bottom portfolios have on average 465 million and 340 million dollars in assets under 
management, respectively, together accounting for almost 64% of the total in the cross 
section. They also concentrate nearly 83% of dollars moved per quarter (both inflows 
and outflows). Understandably, hedge fund investors are attracted towards funds that 
are more easily and safely to assess, either because they are large, or because they are 
old and known with proven track records. Unfortunately, these funds are likely to 
experience serious limits to scale and to exhibit a very disappointing subsequent 
performance. Conversely, investors heavily divest an average of nearly 44.7 million 
U.S.$ from the bottom decile, corresponding to 87% of all net outflows on average in 
below-median portfolios. Funds in the bottom portfolio are significantly older than 
funds in the top decile (77 months vs. 66 months old, not reported), although both 
figures are above the average life of a hedge fund in our sample (around 55 months). 
Our evidence suggests that these big and relatively old funds have reached a maturity 
phase, and they are presumably closed to new investors while distributing only 
dividends or returning back the shares. These funds experience important negative 
growth rates of –21% (not reported).48  
 
The above results help to improve our understanding of one of the main conclusions 
from the switching regression model in Section 3.4. Let us state again our findings. 
Large funds experience more extreme variations of money flows in dollar terms than 
small funds (see Table A1). Conditional to receiving inflows of money, large funds 
experience more important amounts of dollar flows than small funds, while 
conditional upon the regime of negative flows, they also experience considerably 
larger dollar outflows. This section has displayed both regimes at work, confirming in 
both cases the importance of limits to growth in the hedge fund industry. On the one 
hand, the largest dollar outflows take place at large, old and mature funds, which are 
likely to be closed to new investors, as was also reported by Goetzmann, Ingersoll and 
Ross [2003] for annual horizons. On the other hand, our evidence also indicates that at 
quarterly horizons, many large funds with good enough and consistent performance 
are willing to accept new money, but –while attracting the bulk of all money inflows – 
on average perform very poorly in the subsequent quarters.  
 
                                                 
48 It is worthwhile to emphasize that these large funds in the bottom decile have reached a maturity phase and 
start declining. In other words, they are not the funds most likely to liquidate soon because of bad performance. 
In fact, the pattern of liquidation rates across deciles over subsequent quarters after ranking shows that the 
highest liquidation rates take place in the middle deciles, which correspond to small and young funds, reaching 
more than 20% for some of the below-median portfolios after 8 quarters, while only 9.5% of funds in the 
bottom decile and 2.6% in the top decile close down. This is consistent with the results reported by Boyson 
[2003] and Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]: young funds are much more likely than old to be 
terminated for poor performance.  
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We turn our attention to Panel B in Table XI, where we used a different ranking 
criterion, based on growth rates. A comparison with our previous results shows an 
opposite picture concerning the size distribution across deciles (third column of Panel 
B). Ranking upon growth rates is likely to assemble small funds in the extreme 
deciles. Instead, the middle deciles assemble large funds, with assets under 
management of 125 million dollars or more on average49. Funds in the top decile 
experience huge average growth rates of nearly 55% and exhibit the highest rates of 
return in the ranking period, of about 5% (2.15% on a style-adjusted basis). However, 
in the quarter subsequent to ranking (sixth column), the equally weighted raw return 
on the top portfolio falls by 2.14% towards levels around 2.86%, underperforming 
several other above-median deciles. Results not reported reveal that the cash flow 
weighted return underperforms the equal allocation strategy by 0.82% and also the 
style index by about 0.46%. Thus, also among the subset of young, small and 
successful funds, most of the money flows are not directed to funds that persist, 
failing to discriminate funds’ expected returns and incurring in important opportunity 
costs.  
 
We can conclude that most of hedge fund investors are unable to chase the winners at 
short horizons. This is consistent with our findings in Section 3.4 that money inflows 
are not sensitive to short-term past performance. By the same token, investors are 
unable to exploit persistence, which is largely a feature in the short run, while 
Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek [2005] showed that the persistent winners are not 
closed to new investors, meaning that persistence is susceptible of exploitation. 
Therefore, it can also be argued that persistence among the winners remains precisely 
because investors cannot actively direct their capital to the best performers, as 
proposed by Berk and Green [2004]. 
 
C. Investors’ Allocations and Liquidation Rates of Hedge Funds 
 
The performance of the bottom portfolio in Panel B, Table XI, deserves a separate 
analysis. Funds in the bottom portfolio shrink at an average rate of nearly –34%. 
Notice in the fifth column, however, that the bottom portfolio is not the worst 
performer in terms of raw returns in the ranking period. Moreover, it does not 
underperform the style index, contrary to the rest of below median portfolios. The 
distribution reported in the fifth column is depicted in Figure 5, which shows a J-
shape distribution of average raw returns across deciles. In fact, the quarterly average 
                                                 
49 Extreme growth rates are likely to be associated with small funds. Both positive and negative growth rates 
tend to be magnified when the total net assets at the beginning of a quarter – the denominator in equation (1) – 
is small. Conversely, large funds in the middle deciles experience very small positive or negative growth rates. 
They are either expanding slowly or contracting slowly, while performing poorly. 
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raw return on the portfolio that received the highest cash flows exceeds the return on 
the bottom portfolio by only 1.69%, while it exceeds the return on any other below-
median portfolio by at least 2.71%, which is economically and statistically significant. 
The results are similar in terms of style adjusted returns.50 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
The Contemporaneous Relation between Raw Returns  
and Ranks Based on Growth Rates 
This figure shows the distribution of returns across 10 rank portfolios formed on the basis 
of funds net cash flows. Funds are ranked in each quarter, from 1994Q4 until 2004Q3. 
Cash flows are assumed to take place at the end of the period and are measured as growth 
rates. We compute an equally weighted raw return for each decile at the end of the quarter. 
Then we average over 40 quarters. Decile 1 corresponds to those funds that experienced the 
highest cash flows.  
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The portfolio with the lowest cash flows has markedly different performance 
characteristics than other below-median portfolios. A closer examination of the 
average age and size suggests that funds in the bottom portfolio have not reached a 
maturity phase and are declining prematurely. They are somewhat older and bigger 
than funds in the top portfolio, but they have not reached the magnitude in size of the 
old and large funds in the middle deciles51. The extreme outflow rates of funds in the 
                                                 
50 Along our entire investigation we have excluded the very young funds, with less than 6 quarters of historical 
returns, as explained in Section 2. However, if we do take them into account in our ranking exercise based 
upon growth rates, most of them end up allocated in the top decile. The return on the top decile increases 
significantly towards 5.61% (2.68% style adjusted) and the average growth rate becomes 137%. The 
corresponding figures in other deciles change somewhat, but in general not significantly. As a result, the 
difference between the top and bottom decile becomes a significant 2.11% (1.83% style adjusted).  
51 A comparison between funds in the top and bottom deciles reveals several common features but also 
significant differences between the two groups. It appears that the bottom 10% of funds manage around 59 
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bottom 10% are the result of persistent poor performance. If managers of these funds 
cannot make up losses to surpass the watermark threshold, they are likely to become 
reluctant to accept new investors, and eventually, will close down the fund.52 This 
may explain the J-shape distribution of returns across deciles. If these funds in 
decline, experiencing important outflows, did survive until the end of the quarter, they 
are likely to have over-performed. In fact, if we follow each rank portfolio over time 
after the ranking period, we find that liquidation rates differ significantly across 
deciles, as shown by Figure 6. For example, in the subsequent quarter after ranking, 
around 3.9% of funds in the bottom decile liquidate compared to 0.3% in the top 
decile. Over an eight-quarter period more than 22% of funds initially present in the 
bottom decile close down, while less than 15% of funds liquidate from any above-
median decile.53 Here the crucial role of survival issues becomes evident and also the 
need to correct for look-ahead bias in the evaluation of hedge fund performance, as 
emphasized by Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]. Investors appear to 
successfully discriminate between funds with high liquidation probabilities and funds 
that are likely to survive. Our results may also indicate that by divesting heavily from 
funds in the bottom decile, hedge fund investors enhance liquidation even further. Put 
differently, the investors’ reaction has a disciplining effect for low-quality funds, an 
idea put forward by Ippolito [1992]. The divestment behaviour of investors poses a 
credible threat for managers, who, as discussed by Fung and Hsieh [1997], are 
concerned by reputation costs. The threat of termination is reinforced by the 
momentum in money outflows in response to bad performance captured by our model 
in Section 3.4. Thus, the quick and sustained response of investors penalizing poor 
performing funds seems to be the mechanism that ensures the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                                                             
million dollars on total net assets, significantly lower than the 105.8 million dollars on average managed by the 
top 10%. Both are, however, small amounts compared to funds in other portfolios that are at least twice as 
large on average. On the other hand, the bottom portfolio consists of significantly older funds, nearly 62 
months old on average, compared to 53 months old for the top decile (not reported), while still considerably 
young compared to funds in the middle deciles (ages between 59 and 76 months). Funds in the top decile have 
not even reached the average life of a hedge fund in our sample, of about 55 months (see Table III). Thus, 
while the funds in the top decile seem to be very young and successful, growing at fast rates, it appears that 
their counterparts in the bottom decile have been operating unsuccessfully for some time without reaching a 
maturity phase. These funds have been increasingly underperforming the style index over the previous 5 
quarters and as a consequence have faced important outflows and a substantial reduction in their asset base.  
52 This was shown by the models of hedge fund liquidation of Brown, Goetzmann and Park [2001] and 
Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]. The probability of liquidation is much higher when the aggregated 
return over the previous two years is negative, implying that it is unlikely for the manager to receive the 
incentive fee. Under this scenario of impending liquidation, managers may have the incentive to increase the 
risk of their portfolios, as suggested by e.g. Carpenter [2000]. However, Brown, Goetzmann and Park [2001] 
find little or no evidence in the hedge fund industry that poor performers increase volatility to meet their high-
watermark, which they interpret in terms of reputation concerns of managers and the threat of termination. In 
the same line, we find that the average standard deviation of historical returns is only somewhat higher for the 
bottom portfolio compared to the top portfolio (a significant difference of nearly 0.36%, in column 4, Panel B). 
53 We find less dispersion in cross-sectional differences over time for self-selection rates. For example, after 8 
quarters after ranking upon growth rates, 10% of funds self-select out of the bottom portfolio while 7.2% self-
select out of the top portfolio.  
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reputation costs in mitigating the gambling behaviour of hedge fund managers when 
their option contract is out of the money (see Brown, Goetzmann and Park [2001]). 
 
 
Figure 6 
Liquidation Rates across Deciles 
over Subsequent Quarters after Ranking 
Hedge funds are sorted every quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3 into ten rank portfolios based 
on the net cash flows they experienced during that quarter. Then we look at the liquidation 
rates of every decile over the subsequent 8 quarters after formation. Liquidation rates in a 
given quarter are obtained as the total number of funds liquidated until that quarter with 
respect to the initial number of funds in the formation period. Ranking of funds is based upon 
normalized cash flows.  
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Ranking upon dollar flows and growth rates has provided us with two markedly 
different but complementary pictures concerning the investment and the divestment in 
hedge funds. Ranking upon dollar flows emphasized the interaction between 
investors’ decisions and the performance of large funds, making plain clear the 
importance of diseconomies of scale in the hedge fund industry. By using growth rates 
as ranking criterion, the emphasis shifted towards the interaction between investors’ 
decisions and the performance of small funds, making manifest the crucial role of 
survival issues. It remains clear that investors are limited in identifying and directing 
their capital towards the best performers in the short run. They are unable to exploit 
the persistence of the winners. Nor is persistence competed away. Furthermore, 
investors’ allocations in their investment set fail to appropriately discriminate between 
funds' expected performance, resulting in sizable opportunity costs. However, hedge 
fund investors appear to be successful in their divestment strategies, de-allocating 
both appropriately and on time from the persistent losers. 
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3.6   Concluding remarks  
 
Understanding the interrelation between money flows and performance in the hedge 
fund industry requires an explicit separation of the investment and divestment 
decisions of hedge fund investors. The results in this paper indicate that both decisions 
are driven by different determinants and operate over different time horizons. As a 
consequence, the shape of the flow-performance relation differs depending on the 
time horizon being analyzed.  
 
The first part of our investigation relates money flows to past performance. We have 
documented a positive linear relationship in the short run between lagged quarterly 
performance and flows, which contrasts with a convex relationship found in previous 
studies in mutual funds and hedge funds using annual data. A linear relationship 
implies that investors allocate their money proportionally across both good and bad 
performance. We interpret these results in terms of liquidity restrictions that limit 
investors from actively shifting their capital in search of superior performance. Also, 
an active monitoring characterizing the post-investment behaviour of hedge fund 
investors makes them better able to assess bad performance on time. On the other 
hand, the costly and time consuming manager due diligence process may result in a 
lower sensitivity of hedge fund investors to good recent performance. The weaker 
relationship we find between asset flows and past performance among good 
performers compared to annual horizons is an indication of a limited short-run 
competition in the provision of capital in the hedge fund industry that might explain 
the persistence found at quarterly horizons, following Berk and Green’s [2004] 
argument.  
 
Our interpretation of the short-run flow-performance relation suggests that divestment 
and investment decisions may be driven by different evaluation horizons. 
Accordingly, we separately model positive and negative net cash flows using a regime 
switching model with endogenous switching while incorporating the combined impact 
of redemption and notice periods. When funds perform poorly, we find an immediate 
and lasting response of money outflows that gradually disappears over four quarters or 
so. The response of outflows to previous quarter performance accounts for 31% of the 
total long run effect. This response, however, is substantially reduced by 14% when 
liquidity restrictions are present. We find instead a weaker statistical sensitivity of 
money inflows to past quarter performance, which gives further support to the main 
argument of Berk and Green [2004]. Indeed, capital inflows are slow in chasing short-
term good performance and thus would be unable to compete away the patterns of 
short-run persistence.  On the other hand, when we aggregate flows over the year, our 
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switching regression model captures a strong sensitivity of inflows to past annual 
performance while the response of outflows is very weak, suggesting a convex flow-
performance relation, similar to the findings of Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003]. 
Additionally, our model unmasks important asymmetries between the decisions of 
investing and divesting. The impact of several control variables upon money flows 
remains hidden if positive and negative flows are not modeled separately. 
 
The second part of our investigation relates money flows to subsequent performance. 
The asymmetric response time of investors’ purchasing and selling decisions has an 
impact on investors’ fund selection ability. In contrast to mutual fund studies on smart 
money, we do not find significant differences in performance between funds with 
positive and negative money flows. By looking into detail at the investment and 
divestment allocations across funds, we demonstrate that investors are limited in 
identifying and directing their capital towards the best performers in the short run. 
Their allocations are heavily concentrated in funds that subsequently perform poorly, 
significantly underperforming by nearly 50 basis points an equally weighted 
allocation. These results are consistent with our interpretation that searching costs 
slow down the response of investors to past good performance. As a consequence, 
most investors appear to be unable to exploit the persistence of the winners. It can also 
be argued that the market for capital provision is not competitive enough, which is 
precisely what ensures performance predictability at quarterly horizons. Conversely, 
hedge fund investors appear to be successful in their divestment strategies, responding 
fast and appropriately by de-allocating from the persistent losers, which exhibit high 
liquidation rates subsequently. This suggests that the efficacy of investors’ active 
monitoring ensures a disciplining mechanism for low-quality funds and poses a 
credible threat of termination that mitigates the incentives of hedge fund managers to 
increase volatility to meet their high-watermark. Summing up, our findings indicate 
that only few investors are able to exploit the persistence of the winners, that frequent 
monitoring of fund managers is indeed critical, and that extended redemption 
restrictions or extended holding periods may have an adverse effect on investors’ 
wealth. Short horizons indeed matter for hedge fund investors’ decisions.  
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APPENDIX A1 
Table A1  
Switching Regression Model Explaining Positive and Negative Dollar Flows 
Subject to Liquidity Restrictions in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports estimates of a switching regression model explaining positive and negative dollar flows. 
Columns B and C report OLS coefficients estimates using cash flows as the dependent variable. The sample 
includes 1543 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2004 Q3. We measure cash flows as a 
quarterly growth rate corrected for reinvestments. The independent variables that account for relative 
performance include six lagged fractional ranks interacting with dummies for liquidity restrictions. The 
fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all the funds 
existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s raw return in previous quarter. Independent 
variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior 
quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, downside-upside 
potential ratio based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. 
Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits 
given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a 
dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and 7 dummies for 
investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The model also includes 39 time dummies 
(estimates not reported). The two models using the truncated samples also incorporate as explanatory variable 
the generalized residual obtained from a probit model explaining the regime of flows (loglikelihood estimates 
reported in column A. The dependent variable takes value 1 if net cash flows are strictly positive). We estimate 
our models by pooling all fund-period observations. T-statistics based on robust standard errors as well as z-
statistics for probit estimates are provided in parentheses.  
Parameters 
 
 
Probit model explaining 
positive and negative  
Cash flows (A) 
Estimation using a truncated 
sample for CFlows <0 
(B) 
Estimation using a truncated 
sample for CFlows > 0 
( C ) 
Intercept -0.6799 (-4.45) 359000000 (6.23) -329000000  (-6.64) 
Rank lag 1 Unrestricted  0.7232 (21.89) 219000000 (4.00) 81800000 (5.06) 
Rank lag 2 Unrestricted 0.5972 (17.79) 182000000 (3.93) 64900000 (4.85) 
Rank lag 3 Unrestricted  0.5160 (15.43) 153000000 (3.91) 52800000 (4.54) 
Rank lag 4 Unrestricted  0.3724 (11.19) 110000000 (3.94) 36200000 (4.42) 
Rank lag 5 Unrestricted  0.2243 (6.70) 69200000 (4.07) 21400000 (4.14) 
Rank lag 6 0.0944 (2.88) 30100000 (3.84) 7966343 (3.51) 
Rank lag 1 Restricted  0.6841 (6.20) 225000000 (3.88) 75700000 (4.97) 
Rank lag 2 Restricted 0.5958 (4.99) 196000000 (4.06) 58500000 (4.53) 
Rank lag 3 Restricted  0.4741 (3.90) 135000000 (3.65) 44800000 (4.25) 
Rank lag 4 Restricted  0.5947 (4.87) 185000000 (3.94) 60000000 (4.56) 
Rank lag 5 Restricted  0.3077 (2.51) 64800000 (2.66) 31200000 (4.24) 
Ln(TNA) 0.0159 (2.52) -5674908 (-5.30) 8328081 (11.80) 
Ln(AGE) -0.1991 (-11.93) -61400000 (-4.05) -18000000 (-4.20) 
Flows lag 1 0.0000 (1.07) -0.3677 (-2.03) 0.3505 (11.19) 
Flows lag 2 0.0000 (2.31) 0.4439 (3.90) 0.3299 (10.04) 
Flows lag 3 0.0000 (2.58) 0.2914 (3.21) 0.1194 (2.38) 
Flows lag 4 0.0000 (2.51) 0.1436 (2.04) 0.1090 (2.32) 
Offshore -0.1034 (-4.87) -37100000 (-4.50) -5879398 (-2.66) 
Incentive Fees -0.0025 (-1.47) -602346.9 (-2.62) -349427.6 (-3.48) 
Management Fees -0.0279 (-2.22) -5670261 (-3.12) -4135592 (-4.59) 
Personal Capital  -0.0604 (-3.10) -19600000 (-4.23) -6031916 (-4.02) 
Downside-Upside Potential Ratio -0.0556 (-4.33) -15200000 (-3.99) -6305356 (-4.62) 
Emerging Markets -0.1537 (-3.67) -30600000 (-2.98) -24200000 (-5.48) 
Event Driven -0.0079 (-0.21) 6826724 (1.99) -6543611 (-4.28) 
Fixed Income Arbitrage. 0.0038 (0.08) 5837748 (1.46) -4223916 (-2.16) 
Long/Short Equity -0.1461 (-4.58) -34700000 (-3.29) -19700000 (-5.06) 
Managed Futures -0.0718 (-1.72) -24200000 (-3.95) -4532933 (-2.02) 
Generalized Residual from Probit Model   489000000 (3.90) 175000000 (4.73) 
R2 0.0944  0.5589  0.4219  
Number of observations 21243  10367  10876  
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APPENDIX A2 
The Impact of Money Flows on Hedge Fund Performance 
 
Our results in Section 3.5 indicate a strong contemporaneous relation between 
performance and cash flows, while performance seems unrelated to historical flows. It 
is not clear, however, whether the correlation we find reflects a causal effect of 
contemporaneous flows upon performance, or whether a change in relative 
performance within the quarter (e.g. inferred by reported monthly performance) 
induces concurrent flows of money, conditional to subscription and redemption 
restrictions. Below we attempt to give an answer to this endogeneity problem. 
Consider the following model explaining relative performance of a fund (relative to 
the peers) :  
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where Rnkit  is relative performance as measured by a fund’s cross sectional rank and 
Rnkit-j  is the jth  lagged rank. Flowit- and Flowit+ are negative and positive 
contemporaneous cash flows respectively, measured as growth rates54. Flowit-j is the 
jth lagged flow.  We include the size and age of the fund in the previous period , 
ln(TNAi,t-1) and ln(AGEi,t-1). StDevi,t-1 is the standard deviation of returns based on the 
entire past history of the fund. As in our previous models, Xit is a vector of fund 
specific characteristics like management fees, incentive fees, managerial ownership, 
and style. The style dummies capture the possibility that funds in a particular style 
may experience relative performance significantly different than for other styles.  We 
first present OLS estimates of our model in column B of Table A2. All t-statistics 
reported are based on robust standard errors.  An alternative specification that does 
not incorporate contemporaneous flows is presented in column A.  
 
The impact of both positive and negative contemporaneous flows upon relative 
performance is significant while the coefficients have opposite signs. This is 
reminiscent of the pattern shown in Figure 5, where raw returns decrease as 
contemporaneous positive growth rates decrease (from decile 1 to decile 5 ), while 
returns increase as negative growth rates decrease (from decile 6 to decile 10). 
Furthermore, the impact of negative cash flows is, in absolute terms, nearly twice as 
large as the impact of positive cash flows. The estimates for all other variables remain 
pretty much the same in both specifications. Particularly, the coefficients for lagged  
                                                 
54  Flowit- and Flowit+ are defined as follows : 
     If  Flowit>0  then  Flowit+= Flowit ,  otherwise  Flowit+=0 
         If  Flowit<0  then  Flowit-= Flowit ,  otherwise  Flowit-=0 
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Table A2   
A Model Explaining Relative Performance of  
 Open-End Hedge Funds  
The table reports estimates of a model explaining relative performance as measured by fractional ranks. The 
fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s  percentile performance relative to all the funds 
existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s quarterly raw return. The sample includes  1543 open-
end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2004 Q3. The independent variables include six lagged fractional ranks, 
the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged 
measures of positive flows and four lagged measures of negative flows computed as quarterly growth rates, standard 
deviation based on the entire past history of returns of the fund,  downside-upside potential ratio based on the entire 
past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking 
value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee 
as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal 
capital is invested in the fund and  10 dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices 
(not reported). Model specifications B and C also include contemporaneous measures of positive and negative flows. 
We estimate our model by pooling all fund-period observations. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses.  
Parameters  
OLS estimates excluding 
contemp. cash flows 
 (A) 
 OLS estimates including 
contemp. cash flows 
 (B) 
 Estimation by instrumental 
variables  
(C) 
Intercept 0.1391 (1.04)  0.1317 (0.98)  0.1947 (1.30) 
Negative Cash Flows (contemp.)     -0.0703 (-3.79)  -0.3516 (-1.79) 
Positive  Cash Flows (contemp.)    0.0818 (8.33)  0.1672 (1.69) 
Negative Cash Flows lag 1    -0.0147 (-0.78)  -0.0053 (-0.28)  0.0340 (1.01) 
Positive  Cash Flows lag 1 -0.0103 (-2.42)  -0.0137 (-3.04)  -0.0169 (-2.62) 
Negative Cash Flows lag 2   -0.0019 (-0.10)  0.0028 (0.15)  0.0253 (1.02) 
Positive  Cash Flows lag 2 -0.0029 (-0.55)  -0.0054 (-0.98)  -0.0067 (-1.01) 
Negative Cash Flows lag 3  0.0132 (0.67)  0.0193 (0.98)  0.0351 (1.54) 
Positive  Cash Flows lag 3 -0.0041 (-1.21)  -0.0055 (-1.48)  -0.0076 (-1.65) 
Negative Cash Flows lag 4  0.0239 (1.27)  0.0316 (1.67)  0.0533 (2.21) 
Positive  Cash Flows lag 4 -0.0057 (-2.33)  -0.0066 (-2.62)  -0.0073 (-2.57) 
Rnk lag 1 0.0750 (9.60)  0.0723 (9.16)  0.0797 (6.62) 
Rnk lag 2 0.0454 (5.73)  0.0437 (5.50)  0.0498 (4.69) 
Rnk lag 3 0.0709 (8.95)  0.0684 (8.61)  0.0704 (7.43) 
Rnk lag 4 -0.0171 (-2.15)  -0.0193 (-2.43)  -0.0187 (-2.11) 
Rnk lag 5 -0.0374 (-4.71)  -0.0388 (-4.88)  -0.0392 (-4.79) 
Rnk lag 6 0.0366 (4.65)  0.0360 (4.58)  0.0360 (4.53) 
Ln(TNA) 0.0296 (1.94)  0.0283 (1.85)  0.0164 (0.91) 
Ln(TNA)2 -0.0009 (-1.95)  -0.0008 (-1.80)  -0.0004 (-0.84) 
Ln(AGE) -0.0021 (-0.57)  -0.0002 (-0.06)  0.0032 (0.73) 
Offshore -0.0085 (-1.86)  -0.0112 (-2.44)  -0.0161 (-2.75) 
Incentive Fees 0.0009 (2.75)  0.0009 (2.67)  0.0008 (2.34) 
Management Fees 0.0037 (1.28)  0.0038 (1.31)  0.0035 (1.19) 
Personal Capital 0.0016 (0.39)  0.0024 (0.59)  0.0032 (0.74) 
Leverage 0.0110 (2.26)  0.0099 (2.02)  0.0087 (1.71) 
St.Dev. 0.1101 (0.96)  0.1351 (1.18)  0.1550 (1.32) 
St.Dev2 -0.4605 (-1.10)  -0.5014 (-1.21)  -0.5200 (-1.26) 
Upside Potential Ratio 0.0053 (1.37)  0.0067 (1.75)  0.0070 (1.61) 
(Upside Pot Ratio)2 -0.0012 (-3.75)  -0.0013 (-4.05)  -0.0013 (-3.68) 
R2 0.0244   0.0286     
Number of observations  21841   21841   21841  
Instrumented:  Positive Cash Flows (contemp.), Negative Cash Flows (contemp.) 
Instruments:   Neg.Flows1, Pos.Flows1, Neg. Flows2, Pos.Flows2, Neg. Flows3, Pos.Flows3, Neg. Flows4, Pos.Flows4,  Rnk1, Rnk2, Rnk3, 
Rnk4, Rnk5, Rnk6, ln(TNA), Ln(TNA)2 ,ln(AGE), Offshore, IncFees, Mng.Fees, PCapital, Leverage, Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, 
Event Driven, Fixed Income, Global Macro, Long/Short Equity, Managed  Futures, StDev, StDev2 ,Upside Potential Ratio, (UpPot.Ratio)2, 
Rnk1U, Rnk2U, Rnk3U, Rnk4U, Rnk5U, Rnk1R, Rnk2R, Rnk3R, Rnk4R,  Rnk5R, Time dummies (T2 till T22) 
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flows are not statistically significant, although they are overall negative, confirming 
our results in Section 3.5 that relative performance is unrelated to historical cash flow 
rates. These results are robust to alternative specifications, where we excluded 
historical performance, size or other control variables. Moreover, the results remain 
unchanged when using lagged dollar flows instead of growth rates.  
 
However, ranks and contemporaneous cash flows may be simultaneously determined, 
and OLS estimation of the current specification explaining relative performance might 
not provide consistent estimates for the causal impact of flows upon performance. To 
consistently estimate the causal effect of (endogenous) contemporaneous cash flows 
on performance, we rely upon instrumental variable estimators, reported in column C. 
The instrumented variables are both positive and negative contemporaneous cash 
flows and the instruments are the explanatory variables from our previous model 
explaining growth rates together with the additional exogenous variables included in 
the present model. This choice of instruments assumes that conditional upon 
investment style and other characteristics, trading restrictions only influence current 
performance  through their  impact on money flows. Surprisingly, after accounting for 
endogeneity, only the coefficient for negative contemporaneous cash flows remains 
marginally significant.55 In other words, money flowing out of a fund along a quarter 
and motivated by an exogenous shock appears to have some immediate positive 
impact on relative performance. For example, if a fund shrinks at a rate of -50%, it 
results in an expected gain of ranking position by nearly two deciles by the end of the 
quarter. A likely explanation is based on survivorship, in line with our previous 
interpretation of the J-shape distribution reported in Section 3.5. If a fund in decline 
which experiences substantial outflows does survive until the end of the quarter, it is 
likely that this fund has  outperformed. The OLS coefficient for positive cash flows 
captures mostly a reverse causality. It reflects differences across funds in some 
unobserved determinants of relative performance that induce in turn a concurrent 
response from investors. For example, our model does not account for monthly 
releases of performance information as an explanatory variable in order to avoid the 
potential return smoothing documented by Getmansky et al [2004] and explained 
earlier in this paper. However, if monthly performance is in some way related to 
future performance, and if investors respond to monthly performance along the 
quarter (conditional to liquidity restrictions), this would explain the positive 
                                                 
55  A Hausman specification test applied to equations (3) and (5) rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity. The test 
proceeds as follows. We first regressed Flows upon all exogenous variables in model (5). Then we estimated 
model (5) including endogenous Flows and the residuals obtained from the previous regression. The t-test on 
the coefficient of the residuals gives 2.52, suggesting that the error terms of both models explaining Ranks and 
Flows are correlated. 
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contemporaneous relation reflected in the OLS estimate.  Our estimates do not support 
the idea that a sudden amount of newly arrived money might have an immediate 
negative impact upon performance. Presumably, the less frequent subscription and 
redemption dates characterizing hedge funds in comparison to mutual funds reduce 
hidden costs associated to liquidity-motivated trading (see Edelen [1998]). 56 
                                                 
56 The coefficients of several control variables in our model are also significant. It is worthwhile to notice the 
impact of lagged performance. Our estimates indicate that relative performance is positively and significantly 
related to historical performance. Funds that performed well with respect to their peers are more likely to 
continue their superior ranking position over the next four quarters.  This is consistent with previous findings 
of performance persistence at quarterly and annual horizons (see e.g. Baquero, ter Horst, Verbeek [2005]). 
Remarkably, once we account explicitly for simultaneity, the estimates for the coefficients of lagged ranks 
become larger by 10% compared to the OLS coefficients. With OLS estimation, part of the impact of historical 
performance seems to have been taken away by the strong positive relation between relative performance and 
positive contemporaneous flows. Finally, in an attempt to capture the impact upon performance of skewness 
and non normal characteristics of hedge fund return distributions, we included in our specification the upside 
potential ratio measured with respect to the return on the 3-month Treasury bills. For most of the values of 
upside potential ratio in our sample, an increase in the variation above the Treasury bills’ return with respect to 
the variation below, will impact the ranking position of a fund significantly and positively. Only for very 
extreme values of this ratio, which occurs in a few cases in our sample, the impact is negative. Apparently, the 
upside potential ratio conveys some additional information besides standard deviation regarding the risk-return 
characteristics of a hedge fund, justifying to some extent the popularity of this measure among investors. 
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“[...] Performance numbers shown are records of past performance and as such do not 
guarantee future performance. The value of investments in the Company and income 
derived therefrom can decrease as well as increase. Before entering any transaction, 
you should ensure that  the transaction is appropriate for you, given  your objectives,  
experience, financial and operational resources, and other relevant circumstances..”  
(Disclaimer from a typical hedge fund prospectus) 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Do Sophisticated Investors 
Believe in the Law of Small Numbers?57  
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Empirical studies that focus on the response of investors to past performance of fund 
managers are clear in one point: investors chase the winners. A convex flow-
performance relationship has been documented at annual horizons for both mutual 
funds and hedge funds, meaning that flows of money are massively directed to the 
best performers in the previous year  (see e.g. Ippolito [1992], Sirri and Tufano 
[1998], Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2003])58. Chasing the winners, or momentum 
investing, is often seen as an expression of investors’ overreaction and has been 
attributed to the representativeness heuristic: people rely too much on recent past 
performance signals as representative of future performance59. The hypothesis that 
                                                 
57 This chapter is based on Baquero and Verbeek [2006]. I benefited from extensive discussions with Ben 
Jacobsen and Yaakov Kareev. I am also grateful to Alberta Di Giuli and Tomasso Gabrieli for very 
constructive comments. 
58 The convexity also implies little or no reaction of investors to poor performance. Other studies address the 
convexity of the flow-performance relationship in mutual funds from different perspectives, see Chevalier and 
Ellison [1997], Bergstresser and Poterba [2002], Lynch and Musto [2003], or Berk and Green [2004]. For the 
pension fund industry, Del Guercio and Tkac [2002] report instead a linear relationship.  
59 The assessment of how likely an observed pattern is replicable in the future is often evaluated by how 
stereotypical or how “representative” of a more general process is such a pattern (Tversky and Kahneman 
[1974, 1982]). Harless and Peterson [1998] investigate several implications of the representativeness heuristic 
in the response of investors to past performance of mutual funds, particularly to bad performance. Also Shefrin 
[2000, Chapter 12] describes the inadequacy of the probability heuristic of investors, who incorrectly frame the 
problem of picking a talented fund manager, attributing her past performance too much to skill rather than to 
luck, a bias enhanced by representativeness. A few studies have investigated other psychological biases  
potentially affecting mutual fund investors’ response to past performance, like the endowment effect, the 
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investors overreact has almost been taken for granted on the grounds that there is little 
or no evidence that fund managers’ performance can be predicted from past 
performance.  Recent theoretical developments based on rational choice (see Berk and 
Green [2004]) suggest, however, that chasing the winners is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the lack of predictability in managers’ performance60. Whether 
chasing the winners among fund managers is the result of a psychological bias and 
reflects investors’ overreaction or whether it is a rational response, remains an open 
question that has not been empirically addressed so far.  
 
In a recent paper, Rabin [2002] presents a theoretical model that shows how 
momentum investing could in fact be the result of a cognitive bias and the 
manifestation of investors’ overreaction. Further, he derives predictions concerning 
the behaviour of an investor who hires or fires a fund manager depending on her 
beliefs about dispersion in managerial talent, providing us with an attractive frame for 
an empirical test.  Rabin’s model is to a great extent motivated by the results of 
experiments in which subjects are asked to reproduce a series resembling a binary 
random process, e.g. tossing a coin. The common tendency is to reproduce series with 
some degree of negative autocorrelation, alternating between heads and tails too often 
compared to a truly random series. Rapoport and Budescu [1997] refer to this 
tendency as the “alternation bias”. One explanation widely cited for this bias is the 
concept of “local representativeness”, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky [1972]: 
apparently, people’s perception is that short sequences should have the same 
proportions of heads and tails, which in fact is a distribution property of large 
sequences.61 More generally, people’s perception that small samples replicate the 
probability distribution properties of the parent population, as much as large samples, 
is a cognitive phenomenon known as the law of small numbers or sample-size neglect 
(see Tversky and Kahneman [1971]).  
 
Rabin [2002]’s model is a theoretical description of how local representativeness 
conduces to the alternation bias.62 It applies to specific situations where samples are 
                                                                                                                                                             
disposition effect and cognitive dissonance, partly accounting for the reluctance of investors to divest from bad 
performers (see e.g.  Shefrin and Statman [1985], Goetzmann and Peles[1997]).   
60 Berk and Green [2004] argue that in equilibrium and under decreasing returns to scale, money flows chase 
the winners to the point where the risk-adjusted expected excess return is zero. Therefore, there is no 
persistence precisely because money rationally flows to the managers with the best track records.  
61 For a review of the theoretical explanations of the alternation bias, see Wagenaar [1972] and Bar-Hillel and 
Wagenaar [1991]. 
62 In Rabin [2002]’s model, an infinite sequence of signals is generated from an i.i.d. random binary process. 
Suppose for example that the binary signal indicates either above average (A) or below average (B) 
performance of a manager. Investors are Bayesians, but believe that signals are drawn from an urn of finite 
size N without replacement (although the urn is renewed periodically). Suppose the manager has some talent, 
with a certain probability θ >0.5 to be above average. Thus an investor believes there are θN A signals and (1-
θ)N B signals in the urn that corresponds to this manager. This is the key feature in the model that captures 
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drawn from a binary process, as for instance a series of coin tosses, or a series of 
signals indicating good or bad performance over time of a manager, a firm or a 
basketball player. Further, it is formally derived from the model that belief in the law 
of small numbers leads to two well known biases in pattern recognition: the gambler’s 
fallacy and the hot-hand fallacy. When people observe a streak of signals and they are 
certain that the process is purely random (i.e. a fair coin, a lucky manager), in general 
they expect a reversal given their belief in frequent alternations. This mistaken belief 
in mean reversion is known as the “gambler’s fallacy”. On the other hand, if people 
do not know whether the process is entirely random, they may infer (mistakenly) that 
the series is too long to be random, attributing a causal significance to the streak of 
signals (i.e. the coin is not fair, the manager is talented, the player has hot hand). In 
that case, people expect continuation. It follows from Rabin [2002]’s model that the 
larger the observed streak, the larger the expected probability of continuation will be. 
63 This is the rationale behind the so called “hot-hand fallacy”, first documented by 
Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky [1985] in the context of basketball players’ shots.64 
Contrarian investment strategies (trading against the trend) are often attributed to the 
gambler’s fallacy (see De Bondt [1991], Shefrin [2000]), while momentum strategies 
(e.g. trend-chasing or feed-back trading) are often attributed to the hot-hand bias65. 
 
In the present paper we empirically investigate investors’ momentum strategies in 
selecting fund managers and the extent to which they relate to the law of small 
numbers. To this end, we analyze actual money flows to and from hedge funds and 
their relationship with the length of past (winning and losing) performance streaks. 
This allows us to test the predictions of the model of Rabin [2002] concerning 
                                                                                                                                                             
local representativeness, or the belief that a sample of size N contains the same proportions of signals as the 
parent population. 
63 Following the previous example in footnote 7, since the urn is not replaced, after a signal A is drawn there 
are less A signals remaining in the urn and the drawing of another A signal appears less likely than it actually 
is.  Put differently, when N is small, signals appear necessarily correlated to the eyes of the investor. More 
formally, given a rate θ  known with certainty,  the conditional  probability that a streak of e.g. three A signals 
occurs, P(AAA|θ), will be underestimated, leading to the gambler’s fallacy.  Conversely, when the proportions 
in the urn are unknown, then given a streak of three A signals, the inferred probability that the manager has a 
rate θ, P(θ |AAA), will be overestimated (which can be shown using Bayes’ rule). The overinference of the 
likelihood that a manager has talent leads in the medium run to the hot-hand fallacy. 
64 After successively scoring several times, people perceive a player has “hot hand” and expect she will 
continue scoring successfully. Gilovich et al. demonstrated that there is no such hot hand phenomenon and that 
shots by basketball players are largely random. Evidence from the market for organized gambling in basketball 
games is provided by Camerer [1989]. People seem to believe that teams with winning (alternatively losing) 
streaks are somewhat more likely to continue winning (losing) than they actually are. Experimental evidence 
of forecasts of stock prices and exchange rates is presented by De Bondt [1993]. He reports an “extrapolation 
bias” among non-experts, who tend to identify trends of prices when none exists, and to expect continuation, 
while underestimating the chances of reversal. For an overview of the psychological evidence supporting the 
hot hand phenomenon, see Gilovich [1991] and Falk and Konold [1997]. 
65  Extrapolative expectations or trend chasing are referred to as positive feedback trading by De Long et al 
[1990]. 
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investors’ overinference of managers’ talent, as revealed by their observed actions, 
viz. their investments in and divestments from a hedge fund. Specifically, we test the 
hypothesis that overinference is positively related to the length of the streak. The 
extent to which investors’ decisions are determined by persistence patterns of winning 
and losing streaks and whether or not investors display a hot-hand bias are specific 
questions that have not been addressed so far in the empirical literature. One reason is 
that all studies on the flow-performance relationship mentioned above use annual 
data, and thus an investigation of the responsiveness of money flows to the length of 
winning or losing streaks is necessarily limited by the time periods available, 
persistence horizons and the survival of funds.66  
 
To overcome these limitations, we use quarterly data of hedge funds which allows us 
to identify relatively long performance streaks. The advantages of using a database of 
hedge funds for the purposes of this investigation will be discussed in Section 4.3. The 
typical hedge fund investor has arguably more financial expertise than the average 
client of mutual funds. Actually, the magnitude of the minimum investments required 
in this industry is meant to limit participation in hedge funds to highly sophisticated 
investors.67  We could therefore expect a hedge fund investor to pay attention to 
appropriate benchmarks, styles, risk adjusted measures of performance and tracking 
error and to make sound performance analyses. Thus, by studying hedge fund 
investors’ decisions we can separate misperceptions due to the lack of experience or 
the lack of understanding of financial markets from a psychological bias, if any. As 
suggested by De Bondt [1991], especially experts may be prone to distinguish patterns 
where there are none.  
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. We first provide a model that explains 
relative performance of a hedge fund from historical performance streaks while 
controlling for size, age, style and other fund characteristics. We find that the length 
of the streak is to some extent indicative of future relative performance, which 
confirms previous findings of multi-period performance persistence of hedge funds 
(see Agarwal and Naik [2000]). Second and most importantly, we investigate the 
                                                 
66 For example, for hedge funds, Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2004] relate annual flows to persistent 
winners/losers. They define winners and losers along two years only. They find that persistent winners over 
two years significantly attract inflows, while persistent losers experience significant outflows, compared to 
those funds that revert between two consecutive years, but they do not explain investors’ response in terms of 
an overreaction. 
67 Investments in hedge funds are limited to “accredited investors” and “sophisticated investors” (Investment 
Company Act, 1940). A person is a “sophisticated investor,” if the investor either alone or with the investor's 
purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that the 
investor is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of an investment in the hedge fund. An “accredited 
investor” is either an individual with a net worth of $1 million or more or an annual income of $200000 or 
more, either an entity with total assets above $5 million.  
105
Sophisticated Investors and the Law of Small Numbers 
 
93
 
response of money flows to the length of the streak, while controlling for expected 
performance and several variables accounting for the riskiness of a fund. Our results 
indicate that the length of the streak of a hedge fund manager has a statistically and 
economically significant impact on flows, beyond what is justified by expected future 
performance of the fund, suggesting that investors overinfer the likelihood of 
performance persistence. Our findings are in line with the predictions of Rabin 
[2002]’s model and with previous experimental and empirical evidence of the hot-
hand bias in other domains. 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  In Section 4.2 we discuss some 
relevant characteristics specific to the process of investing in hedge funds. In Section 
4.3 we describe our dataset and variables. Section 4.4 presents stylized evidence of 
momentum investing of hedge fund investors in response to multi-period performance 
persistence. In Section 4.5 we provide a model that disentangles a rational response of 
investors to past performance streaks from a response presumably induced by the law 
of small numbers. Section 4.6 presents some robustness checks, while Section 4.7 
concludes. 
 
4.2   The process of selecting a hedge fund manager 
 
This section describes some of the key aspects of investing in hedge funds that are 
necessary to understand how potential psychological factors might affect investors’ 
decisions. Simply stated, a hedge fund is a private investment portfolio with limited 
regulation that combines both long and short positions on a leveraged basis.68 The 
manager is usually a general partner and charges a performance-based incentive fee in 
addition to management fees that cover operation and administrative expenses. 
Relevant features are the limited transparency, implying increased searching costs for 
investors, and the limited liquidity offered to clients through lock-up periods and 
redemption restrictions. The attractiveness of hedge funds for both private and 
institutional investors lies in two key features. First, given the structure of managerial 
incentives, hedge funds seek absolute returns instead of relative returns with respect to 
a benchmark, as it is the case for the more traditional mutual funds.69 Second, the 
                                                 
68 Hedge funds avoid regulation either as domestic US investment companies with a limited partnership 
structure or as offshore investment companies operating in tax havens. 
69 Hedge fund managers are rewarded for achieving high absolute returns. The average hedge fund manager in 
our database receives 18% of annual profits as incentive fee besides 1.5% of total net assets annually as 
management fee. The manager receives the incentive fee if two conditions are met: first, the return must be 
greater than a hurdle rate, usually set as the risk-free rate. Second, the value of the fund has to surpass a 
threshold or “high water-mark”, meaning that previous losses must be recovered first.  This incentive structure 
might induce managers to take excessive risk. However, managers are in general requested to invest a 
substantial amount of their personal wealth in the fund, which mitigates risk-taking behavior to some extent 
while it aligns the interests of investors and managers.  
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limited regulation they enjoy allows them to make active use of short selling and 
derivatives and to dynamically trade in a wide array of assets, which explains the low 
historical correlations between hedge funds and traditional asset classes. These 
features make hedge funds attractive for diversification and hedging purposes in a 
variety of ways, depending on the specific risk and return targets of an investor’s 
portfolio.  
 
Any considerations about investing in hedge funds are usually preceded by a clear 
definition of investors’ own objectives. Investors often set a target return for their 
portfolio with a given exposure to markets. Given these investment objectives, 
investors seek the most appropriate hedge fund strategy that helps diversify their 
portfolio and achieve their investment goals. Once the appropriate strategy has been 
identified, investors strive to find the most talented manager(s) in that strategy.  The 
following is a schematic picture of the process of selecting a hedge fund manager.  In 
a first stage, investors identify potential talented managers by their performance track 
records.70 Given the information hurdles faced by investors (i.e. limited transparency 
and restricted advertising imposed by regulatory authorities), the track record of a 
manager plays a major role as the most readily available information indicative of his 
potential skill. It also gives the means for a screening procedure, to identify the 
potential targets among a large number of managers in a database that are worth a 
more careful analysis later. In a second stage, a quantitative and qualitative due 
diligence process follows, in order to determine whether the observed track record 
was generated by a lucky manager or by a truly skilled manager.  In a quantitative 
analysis, return and risk characteristics and other variables are assessed over time, like 
the amount of leverage, the amount of capital managed, money flows, the investment 
strategies employed, downside deviations, upside potential ratios and expense ratios. 
Besides, the alignment incentive mechanisms are taken into account, like the level of 
incentive fees and the amount of the manager’s personal wealth invested in the fund. 
Finally information contained in the offering memorandum, especially regarding 
redemption conditions, is essential.  The qualitative analysis pays attention to 
manager’s integrity and personality, his investment ideas, the quality of the 
organization and personnel. This is carried out through frequent personal meetings 
and references from former colleagues of the manager or peers in the industry. 
Finally, a third stage corresponds to the post-investment phase. After hiring a 
manager, an ongoing due diligence is crucial.  Frequent monitoring and quantitative 
                                                 
70 In practice, there are several channels through which managers with good performance track records are first 
identified, for example by word-of-mouth or references from other participants in the industry, through 
business conferences, where managers sell and market themselves, or through hedge fund databases, etc.  
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and qualitative evaluations are necessary to detect changes in investment style or 
major changes in the organization.71  
 
From this brief account of the steps usually undertaken by investors, it should remain 
clear that, regardless of whether the main purpose of investing in a hedge fund is 
diversification or the pursuit of absolute returns or both, the first task for an investor is 
to find a talented manager within the strategy that better suits the investor’s 
objectives. Notice that a primary assumption from investing in a hedge fund is that the 
manager has talent. In fact, the entire hedge fund industry is marketed on the grounds 
of managerial skill and defines itself as a skilled-driven industry. This is a feature with 
special relevance for our study. If investor’s perception of a manager’s track record is 
indeed biased due to local representativeness (i.e. the law of small numbers), it is 
precisely the belief or not in talent what determines, in theory, the direction of the 
bias. This is formally captured by the model of Rabin [2002]. Investors who are fully 
sceptical about managerial talent are certain about the probability of success of any 
manager (i.e. 50%), but also they believe in no variation in quality among managers 
(i.e. all managers have the same probability of success). Sceptical investors will be 
prone to the gambler’s fallacy and will tend to underestimate the probability of 
performance persistence72. Hedge fund investors, on the contrary, firmly believe that 
talented managers exist.73 Thus, by definition, they believe in quality dispersion. In 
theory, when investors are uncertain about the probability of success of a given 
manager, they will be prone to overinfer his talent from an observed performance 
streak and exaggerate the probability of continuation. Further, the longer the streak, 
the larger the overinference will be, which is precisely the feature we focus on and we 
test in the present paper. Curiously, an important additional result derived from the 
model of Rabin is that the belief in local representativeness results in an illusory belief 
in wider differential ability than actually exists. Further, investors’ overinference of 
the likelihood that a manager is talented exacerbates in turn his beliefs about how 
talented he is. 
                                                 
71 While the process of hiring a hedge fund manager is a lengthy and costly process, the decision to redeem in 
response to either bad performance or style drift is taken swiftly as a result of constant monitoring. This has 
been shown by Baquero and Verbeek [2005] who separately model inflows and outflows over different 
evaluation horizons.       
72 As explained above, the model of local representativeness from Rabin distinguishes the case in which the 
probability of success of a binary signal is known with certainty and the case in which it is uncertain. The 
former case leads inevitably to gambler’s fallacy. In the latter, however, the believe in local representativeness 
develops in an overinference of the probability of success from the observed unexpected streakiness, which in 
turn results in exaggerated beliefs about the probability of continuation in the medium-run (i.e. the hot-hand 
fallacy).  For instance, a person who approaches a coin convinced of its fairness will be prone to the gambler’s 
fallacy. But a person who is uncertain about its fairness will infer after observing an unexpected streak that the 
coin is not completely fair and will expect continuation. 
73 It is almost a coined expression among participants in the industry that investors’ efforts target the “best and 
the brightest” among hedge fund managers.  
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One could argue that the due diligence process is precisely in place to determine 
whether the observed streakiness is likely to be reproduced in the future. Therefore, 
by assessing the extent to which investors overinfer the level of skill from the 
observed persistence pattern of a manager, our study implicitly provides an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the due diligence process to counterbalance this 
potential bias.   
 
4.3   Data  
 
We use a survivorship-free data of open-end hedge funds from TASS Management 
Limited, a private advisory company and provider of information services. We focus 
on individual open-end funds reporting in U.S.$, and exclude funds-of-funds (i.e. 
portfolios of hedge funds). Our sample contains 752 funds and a total of 7457 fund-
period observations between the fourth quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 2000. 
The funds that liquidated amount to 163, while 86 funds self-selected out of the 
database for different reasons. 74 
 
Along this paper we argue that investors are sensitive to the precise pattern of 
performance signals they observe. In the hedge fund industry, information on total net 
assets under management (TNA) and raw returns of individual funds and style indices 
is released periodically, typically on a quarterly basis for monitoring purposes.75 The 
financial press and industry newsletters also emphasize quarterly figures. Further, 
most redemption restrictions take place quarterly, which imposes an implicit frame for 
investors’ decisions. We study, therefore, the response of investors to sequences of 
quarterly performance signals. Returns are net of all management and incentive fees.  
 
We employ the two standard definitions of cash flows provided in Chapter 3, namely 
in terms of dollar flows and growth rates (or normalized cash flows). Table I shows 
some descriptive statistics for normalized cash flows, dollar flows and assets under 
                                                 
74 Given the limited regulation and the lack of disclosure requirements, hedge-fund participation in any 
database is voluntary. Therefore, a self-selection bias might arise either because poor performers do not wish 
to make their performance known, either because funds that performed well and reached a critical size have 
fewer incentives to report to data vendors to attract additional investors. Further, several countries impose 
restrictions to hedge funds for public advertising. Many funds may refrain from reporting as it can be 
interpreted as illegal marketing (see Ter Horst and Verbeek [2005]). Also, different databases have different 
criteria for including or maintaining funds, which can lead to a further selection bias. However, active 
monitoring of managers by database vendors gives an incentive to hedge funds to provide complete and 
accurate data to avoid being deleted from a database. 
75 Monthly figures are available in our database. However, given that performance fees are deducted from the 
fund’s asset value on an individual-client basis, the calculation of total net assets and rates of return delays the 
release of monthly figures. Therefore, accurate monthly information might not be available to investors for all 
funds in real time. 
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management. Notice that the distribution of cash flows appears to be relatively 
symmetric, in sharp contrast with the distributions found for mutual funds.76 This is a 
feature that we exploit later in our investigation, as we are interested in both 
investments and divestments decisions as proxies for investors’ beliefs. 
 
Table I 
Distributions of Flows and Assets under Management 
in the Hedge Fund Industry 
This table shows the cross-sectional distribution of cash flows and total net assets under management in our 
sample of 752 open-end hedge funds from 1994Q4 till 2000Q1. Cash flows are computed as the change in 
total net assets between consecutive quarters corrected for reinvestments. A growth rate is calculated as 
relative cash flows with respect to the fund’s TNA of previous quarter. 
Percentile 
 
Cash Flows 
(growth rate) 
 
Cash Flows (dollars) 
 
Total Net Assets 
(million dollars) 
 
99% 1.0506 60572000 733.3959 
95% 0.3611 17720000 319.7788 
90% 0.1986 7833357 175.0006 
75% 0.0566 1068212 63.12327 
50% 0.0000 -93.943 19.68958 
25% -0.0606 -1032387 5.489787 
10% -0.1747 -6207153 1.651972 
5% -0.2863 -14200000 0.860888 
1% -0.6003 -61684000 0.24526 
 
Table A1 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics for several fund-specific 
characteristics as well as some performance and risk metrics of the funds in our 
dataset.  A brief description of each variable is also provided.77 Using data on hedge 
funds presents several advantages for the purposes of our study. First, given the 
persistence patterns of hedge funds at quarterly and annual horizons, it is more likely 
to identify relatively long series of successive wins and losses with quarterly data than 
for mutual funds. In fact, we could identify streaks from one up to twelve successive 
gains or failures.  Second, mutual fund flows are subject to noise in short horizons due 
to the liquidity needs of investors, for whom daily withdrawals and subscriptions are 
possible, while hedge funds impose restrictions to both withdrawals and subscriptions, 
typically monthly or quarterly78. This makes money flows to hedge funds less subject 
to noise or to large variations and more suitable to be studied in horizons shorter than 
one year.  Third, at quarterly horizons there appears to be a response of money 
outflows to poor performance in the previous quarter, contrary to annual horizons 
                                                 
76 For example, Del Guercio and Tkac [2002] find that the top 5% of dollar inflows in mutual funds are nearly 
three times larger than the outflows at the bottom 5%. 
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where investors display little sensitivity to previous year poor performance. Therefore, 
with quarterly data we can also assess a “cold-hand” phenomenon whereby investors 
expect continuation from observed losing streaks. 79  
 
4.4  The response of money flows to persistence patterns 
 
In this section we present stylized evidence describing the response of hedge fund 
investors to different patterns of performance persistence.  Table II provides a 
summary of all the series of successive wins and losses we could identify in our 
dataset. A fund is a winner (alternatively a loser) in a given quarter if its ranking 
based on the raw return at the end of the quarter is above (below) the median. A 
winner streak starts as soon as the ranking reverses from below-median to above-
median. Then we count the number of consecutive quarters in which the fund 
performs above the median.  For example, if a fund is a loser in 1997Q1 (meaning 
first quarter of 1997), but is a winner over 1997Q2, 1997Q3, 1997Q4,  then we 
actually identify a one-quarter streak (1997Q2), a two-quarter streak (1997Q2, 
1997Q3) and a three-quarter streak (1997Q2, 1997Q3, 1997Q4).   
 
According to Panel A in Table II, for instance, we identified 687 three-quarter 
winning streaks between 1994Q4 and 1999Q4.  In the quarter that followed the series, 
0.44% of funds liquidated and 0.58% self-selected.  Also, 57.5% of funds remained 
winners (i.e. persistent funds) while 70.89% received positive net flows of money. 
The average money flows that investors directed towards these funds after a 
successful three–quarters history amounts to nearly 6.2 million U.S. dollars per fund 
(considering both positive and negative net flows).   We interpret net flows of money 
as a measure reflecting the average opinion of investors about a given fund. If net 
flows of money are positive (i.e. inflows outweigh outflows), it means that a majority 
of investors expect an above-median performance of a fund in that quarter and they 
invest accordingly.80  
                                                                                                                                                             
77 For further details concerning this data set and a discussion of these variables, see Baquero and Verbeek 
[2005].  
78 In addition, hedge funds often require a written notice to the manager prior to redemption. The minimum 
notice period varies from fund to fund and typically ranges from 15 to 90 days.  The combination of notice 
periods and redemption periods can become a serious liquidity restriction to investors. 
79 Baquero and Verbeek [2005] have empirically studied the dynamics of flows and hedge fund performance at 
quarterly horizons. They find a significant response of flows, especially outflows, to the most recent lagged 
performance over four quarters or so. However, they do not explicitly look at the response of flows to winning 
or losing streaks. 
80 Notice that for a given streak length, the number of persistent funds slightly differs from the number of 
funds with one additional quarter of streak length reported in the table. For example, among the 687 funds with 
three consecutive winning quarters, 57.5% (i.e. 395 funds) persist. However the next row reports only 388 
funds with four consecutive winning quarters. The gap is due to some funds for which money flows are not 
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Panel A indicates that, in general, a fund is more likely to persist after longer winning 
streaks (see column five). While 52.77% of funds remained winners after two 
successful quarters, almost 70% of funds were winners after displaying a six-quarter 
winning streak. The pattern becomes somewhat erratic for streaks longer than six 
quarters, probably due to the reduced number of observations. These figures, 
however, favour the idea that managerial skill exists in the hedge fund industry and 
that hedge fund performance is to some extent predictable. We do observe a 
concomitant reaction of investors, who appear to pour larger amounts of money as the 
length of the streak increases. The average money flow that a fund experiences after a 
two-quarter winning streak is around 2.1 million U.S. dollars, while a fund receives 
on average above 9 million U.S. dollars after six successful quarters. For a given 
streak length, however, investors do not invest in 100% of funds, an indication of their 
effort to distinguish the lucky from the truly skilled managers. Noticeably, the 
percentage of funds receiving positive net flows of money also increases 
monotonically with the length of the streak, as indicated in column six. Distinguishing 
between luck and skill is a notoriously difficult task and a certain percentage of error 
is expected. The mismatch is shown in the last column of Table II.  For streaks of two 
quarters length, positive money flows were actually directed to subsequent loser funds 
in 41.26% of the cases. This percentage reduces with streak length as the probabilities 
for a fund to remain a winner increase.  However, for 6 quarters of streak length, the 
likelihood of an over-forecast is still a substantial 25.58%. If we repeat this exercise 
separately for large and small funds, the patterns remain the same and percentages do 
not change substantially81. The question of interest is how much of this forecast error 
is due to over-optimism, presumably induced by the length of the streak as the law of 
small numbers suggests? 
 
Panel B of Table II shows the results for losing streaks.  The likelihood for a fund to 
remain a loser after a series of successive failures increases with the length of the 
streak.  For instance, if a fund has been ranked below the median for six quarters on a 
row, there is a 60.76% probability that the fund persists as a loser in the subsequent 
quarter, while only 47.72% of funds are persistent losers after two quarters of poor 
performance.  These figures are likely to be underestimates given the large percentage 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
available in the quarter subsequent to the streak of four winning quarters, while remaining active, and therefore 
are not considered any longer in our analysis.  
81 According to Baquero and Verbeek [2005], there is a non linear impact of size upon quarterly relative 
performance of hedge funds, which presumably reflects decreasing returns to scale in this industry. There 
seems to be a turning point around US$ 25 million of total net assets under management.  Above this level, an 
increase in size results in a loss of ranking position.  Therefore we used this amount of assets to separate small 
from large funds. This threshold is slightly above the cross sectional mean of about US$18 million. 
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Table II 
Summary of Winner and Loser Streaks Based 
 on Quarterly Performance of Hedge Funds  
In each quarter we rank funds based on their raw returns and we define the winners and the losers taking the 
median as a threshold.  The table indicates the total number of streaks with consecutive winning quarters 
(Panel A) and consecutive losing quarters (Panel B) that we could identify in our database across all funds and 
all periods. For the quarter that follows the observed streak, the table also indicates the percentage of funds that 
either liquidated or self-selected, the percentage of persistent funds, the percentage of funds that experienced 
net positive/negative money flows and the average amount of dollar flows per fund.  We interpret net money 
flows as the opinion of the average investor in a fund. Thus, positive money flows indicate that investors on 
average expected a fund to be a winner after observing a given streak. The last column in Panel A reports the 
percentage of cases in which these expectations were not met (i.e. the fund actually became a loser). 
Conversely, the last column in Panel B reports the percentage of cases in which a fund became a winner while 
investors expected the fund to be a loser (as indicated by negative money flows).  
Panel A : Winner Streaks 
Streak 
Length 
(quarters) 
Number of 
observations 
 
Subsequent 
Liquidation 
% 
Subsequent 
Self-
selection 
% 
Subseq. 
Persistent 
Winner 
% 
Subsequent 
Positive 
Money Flows 
(%) 
Average 
Amount of 
Dollar Flows 
Invested 
Frequency of 
Wrong 
Forecasts Up 
% 
1 2818 1.28 1.06 48.86 57.38 1618354.31 47.31 
2 1319 0.99 0.83 52.77 63.76 2143430.16 41.26 
3 687 0.44 0.58 57.50 70.89 6193009.71 41.07 
4 388 0.00 0.26 59.79 73.20 8142902.68 37.32 
5 224 0.00 0.00 62.05 75.89 9715289.70 38.82 
6 111 0.00 2.70 69.37 77.48 9288168.96 25.58 
7 70 0.00 1.43 60.00 75.71 8152601.31 35.85 
8 41 0.00 2.44 60.98 75.61 14411952.51 38.71 
9 21 0.00 0.00 71.43 76.19 3597137.64 25.00 
10 12 0.00 0.00 33.33 91.67 9763031.47 72.73 
11 2 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 38385652.18 0.00 
12 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 18654944.34 100.00 
Panel B : Loser Streaks 
Streak 
Length 
(quarters) 
Number of 
observations 
 
Subsequent 
Liquidation 
% 
Subsequent 
Self-
selection 
% 
Subseq. 
Persistent 
Loser 
% 
Subsequent 
Negative 
Money Flows 
(%) 
Average 
Amount of 
Dollar Flows 
Invested 
Frequency of 
Wrong 
Forecasts 
Down (%) 
1 2846 1.76 1.19 48.95 44.83 787251.95 47.49 
2 1335 2.02 2.02 47.72 52.28 -1838814.00 49.71 
3 604 6.13 1.99 55.96 57.95 -2361213.04 39.71 
4 326 8.90 3.37 55.21 60.43 -5764902.06 35.03 
5 167 10.18 2.40 62.28 65.87 -10905250.07 27.27 
6 79 11.39 2.53 60.76 62.03 -2555103.83 32.65 
7 43 13.95 9.30 39.53 51.16 -9425391.90 40.91 
8 17 5.88 0.00 70.59 64.71 -943307.74 18.18 
9 11 27.27 0.00 45.45 45.45 -22592097.87 40.00 
10 5 20.00 0.00 80.00 20.00 -31560684.14 0.00 
11 5 20.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 -2724851.66 100.00 
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of funds liquidating, especially for long streaks. If a fund survived after an extended 
period of bad performance,  it is likely that it performed better than average so as to 
recover past losses and surpass the high watermark.82 Given these patterns of negative 
persistence, or “cold hand”, investors react accordingly by withdrawing increasing 
amounts of money as funds persist below the median for longer periods. After two 
quarters on a row of bad performance, a fund experiences average outflows of around 
1.8 million dollars. If bad performance persists up to five quarters, a fund will face 
further withdrawals of nearly 11 million dollars on average. Again, these figures are 
likely to be affected downwards by the high attrition rates of persistent losers. On the 
other hand, several factors might reduce the responsiveness of investors to losing 
streaks compared to winning streaks. For example, restrictions imposed to 
withdrawals are more important than restrictions to subscriptions. Further, investors 
often face switching costs relative to closing and opening accounts. Finally, several 
psychological biases may inhibit investors from divesting, like the endowment effect, 
the disposition effect or cognitive dissonance as suggested by Goetzmann and Peles 
[1997]. 
 
Table III reports results of a similar exercise when winners and losers are defined in 
terms of style-adjusted returns. Arguably, investors compare funds with each other in 
a given style category. A correction for style accounts for an important source of risk 
in hedge fund returns. Therefore, we subtract from the return of each fund the average 
return of all funds in the corresponding style. We then rank all funds in terms of 
excess returns. We find evidence of persistence also in style-adjusted returns (see 
column five), although the figures are in general less pronounced than in the previous 
table, especially for streaks longer than four quarters, an indication that persistence in 
raw returns accounts to some extent for a differential in risk or investment style. This 
also confirms the findings of multi-period performance persistence in style-adjusted 
returns reported by Agarwal and Naik [2000] and Baquero, Ter Horst  and  Verbeek 
[2005]. We find, however, the same previously observed pattern of investors’ 
behaviour. Larger amounts of money are directed towards funds with longer 
persistence patterns (columns 6 and 7), although long streaks have less predictive 
ability of future relative performance. The dispersion in money flows is less 
pronounced than in the previous table, consistent with the findings from Baquero and 
Verbeek [2005] that money flows are more responsive to ranks based on raw returns 
than on style-adjusted returns.83 
 
                                                 
82 Remember that the typical incentive contract aims at enhancing managerial effort by paying hedge fund 
managers a percentage of annual profits if returns are above some hurdle rate and provided the fund value is 
above a high watermark. 
83 This might be an indication of an insufficient adjustment of investors to style as a source of risk.  
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Table III 
Summary of Winner and Loser Streaks Based on Quarterly 
 Style-Adjusted Performance of Hedge Funds  
In each quarter we rank funds based on their style-adjusted returns and we define the winners and the losers 
taking the median as a threshold.  The table indicates the total number of streaks with consecutive winning 
quarters (Panel A) and consecutive losing quarters (Panel B) that we could identify in our database across all 
funds and all periods. For the quarter that follows the observed streak, the table also indicates the percentage of 
funds that either liquidated or self-selected, the percentage of persistent funds, the percentage of funds that 
experienced net positive/negative money flows and the average amount of dollar flows per fund.  We interpret 
net money flows as the opinion of the average investor in a fund. Thus, positive money flows indicate that 
investors on average expected a fund to be a winner after observing a given streak. The last column in Panel A 
reports the percentage of cases in which these expectations were not met (i.e. the fund actually became a loser). 
Conversely, the last column in Panel B reports the percentage of cases in which a fund became a winner while 
investors expected the fund to be a loser (as indicated by negative money flows). 
Panel A : Winner Streaks 
Streak 
Length 
(quarters) 
Number of 
observations 
 
Subsequent 
Liquidation 
% 
Subsequent 
Self-
selection 
% 
Subseq. 
Persistent 
Winner 
% 
Subsequent 
Positive 
Money Flows 
(%) 
Average 
Amount of 
Dollar Flows 
Invested 
Frequency of 
Wrong  
Forecasts Up 
% 
1 2759 1.27 1.27 51.58 56.07 1741945.60 44.47 
2 1354 1.48 1.33 54.06 61.30 2299633.69 41.33 
3 740 0.54 0.14 57.97 67.16 5471730.40 42.05 
4 416 0.48 0.48 59.62 69.47 6121840.31 37.02 
5 235 0.43 1.28 52.34 69.79 4704338.44 45.12 
6 109 0.00 0.00 53.21 74.31 5835617.80 39.51 
7 55 0.00 1.82 50.91 74.55 7665378.28 43.90 
8 28 0.00 0.00 60.71 78.57 7408980.44 36.36 
9 16 0.00 0.00 50.00 75.00 10374172.11 50.00 
10 7 0.00 0.00 57.14 85.71 11991434.33 33.33 
11 4 0.00 0.00 100.00 75.00 20390206.00 0.00 
12 3 0.00 0.00 66.67 66.67 7237176.90 50.00 
Panel B : Loser Streaks 
Streak 
Length 
(quarters) 
Number of 
observations 
 
Subsequent 
Liquidation 
% 
Subsequent 
Self-
selection 
% 
Subseq. 
Persistent 
Loser 
% 
Subsequent 
Negative 
Money Flows 
(%) 
Average 
Amount of 
Dollar Flows 
Invested 
Frequency of 
Wrong 
Forecasts 
Down (%) 
1 2774 1.84 1.12 50.76 44.66 964221.89 46.25 
2 1332 2.48 1.73 47.90 49.10 -521866.75 49.24 
3 642 5.61 2.49 57.32 52.80 -2749486.66 38.94 
4 352 6.25 1.70 50.57 54.83 -3412653.53 44.04 
5 163 9.82 3.68 54.60 55.83 -10746096.30 41.76 
6 74 8.11 1.35 58.11 60.81 -4746180.91 40.00 
7 40 15.00 2.50 40.00 50.00 -4067262.61 50.00 
8 15 0.00 6.67 60.00 60.00 -7340741.85 33.33 
9 9 11.11 0.00 66.67 77.78 -29151878.51 28.57 
10 5 0.00 0.00 80.00 100.00 -30473724.71 20.00 
11 4 0.00 0.00 75.00 100.00 -12016756.16 25.00 
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Intuitively, the belief on a manager’s skills is eroded with very long streaks and the 
increasing scepticism would lead eventually to commit gambler’s fallacy. This idea is 
also formally captured in Rabin’s model.84 The key question is for how long an 
investor believes talent will last. The hot-hand bias and the gambler’s fallacy are 
obviously two related biases and compete with each other. The stylized evidence 
presented in Tables II and III shows a monotonic pattern in money flows as the streak 
length increases, up to six quarters or so. As indicated above, for longer streaks the 
pattern becomes less clear.  It is difficult, however, to conclude from our data whether 
the change in pattern is the result of emergence of the gambler’s fallacy, since the 
number of observations considerably reduces with streak length. Moreover, money 
inflows might be increasingly restricted as funds grow in size. 
 
Overall, our results provide evidence of “hot hand” among the winners and “cold 
hand” among the losers. This is an indication of non-uniformity in quality among 
managers. Our results also indicate that investors recognize this feature and follow, in 
general, a momentum strategy while they strive to discriminate luck from skill. 
However, it is precisely the belief in quality dispersion what leads investors, in theory, 
to overestimate the degree of positive autocorrelation in a sequence. To assess the 
degree of investor’s overinference of managerial talent, we need a benchmark that 
indicates what can actually be expected of a manager. The next section provides first a 
model explaining future relative performance of hedge funds and we exploit this 
model to derive an estimate of rationally expected performance. We then propose a 
model explaining the response of money flows to performance streaks controlling for 
expected performance and additional factors as fund size, age and style, in order to 
detect any hot-hand bias in investors’ decisions.  
 
 
4.5  A model explaining money flows from the length of 
streaks  
 
Our results in the previous section show that money flows are increasingly directed 
towards funds that successfully performed for longer periods of time. In this section 
we investigate to what extent this seemingly overwhelming response of investors is 
rationally justified. Is there any component in that response that is beyond a rational 
expectation of future performance and risk?   
 
                                                 
84 Knowing with certainty the true rate of success of a given manager is a sufficient condition in Rabin 
[2002]’s model, to commit gambler’s fallacy.  Precisely for very large sequences, an investor will figure out 
the true rate:  his beliefs about the rate will converge to certainty.  
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In order to disentangle these two components of the response of investors to past 
performance, namely a sensible reaction from one presumably induced by a 
psychological bias,  we first determine what an investor can rationally expect of future 
relative performance of a fund given a number of informative variables, including 
historical persistence patterns.  Our previous analysis did not consider several factors 
that can also be driving performance, such as size, age, style and other fund-specific 
features. Arguably, investors, especially sophisticated investors, pay attention to these 
characteristics, as well as variables accounting for risk. Consider the following model 
predicting relative performance of a fund (i.e. relative to its peers):85   
 
+++++= −
===
− ∑∑∑ )ln(.... 1,26
1
,,3
6
1
,,2
6
1
,1, ti
j
tijj
j
tijj
j
jtijti TNALWRnkRnk ββββα    
 
  titititi
j
jtijti XFlowAGE ,1,
2
1,71,6
4
0
,51,4 '.).(..)ln(. εγσβσβββ ++++++ −−−
=
−− ∑     (1) 
 
where Rnkit  is relative performance as measured by a fund’s cross sectional rank,   
Rnkit-j  is the jth  lagged rank and Flowit-j is the jth lagged flow measured as a growth 
rate. The standard deviation of returns σit-1 has been computed based on the entire past 
history of monthly returns of a fund. The model includes the log of size (total net asset 
value) and age of the fund in the previous period, ln(TNAi,t-1)  and   ln(AGEi,t-1), and a 
vector Xi,t-1 of fund-specific characteristics like management fees, incentive fees, 
managerial ownership and style.  To explicitly capture the extent to which the streak 
length predicts future performance, we define 12 mutually exclusive dummies for 
each fund-period observation, six accounting for winner streaks and six dummies 
accounting for loser streaks, in the following way: 
 
W1 =1 if a fund is a winner in the previous quarter only. W1 =0 otherwise. 
W2 =1 if a fund is a winner in the previous 2 quarters only. W2 =0 otherwise. 
: 
W5 =1 if a fund is a winner in the previous 5 quarters only. W5 =0 otherwise. 
W6 =1 if a fund is a winner in the previous 6 quarters or more.  W6 =0 otherwise. 
L1 =1 if a fund is a loser in the previous quarter only. L1 =0 otherwise. 
 : 
L5 =1 if a fund is a loser in the previous 5 quarters only. L5 =0 otherwise. 
L6 =1 if a fund is a loser in the previous 6 or more quarters. L6 =0 otherwise. 
 
                                                 
85 This model is close to the one estimated by Baquero and Verbeek [2005], however their model does not 
explicitly include the dummies accounting for streak length. Also Agarwal, Daniel and Naik [2004] estimate a 
model explaining future performance of hedge funds. However, their model explains annual raw returns and 
does not include the structure of lagged performance measures.  
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We capture the effects of streaks longer than 6 quarters with only one dummy as the 
number of observations for long streaks is considerably reduced. The lagged ranks 
included in equation (1) and the persistence dummies just defined are different ways 
of capturing past performance, although they are closely related. Lagged ranks are 
informative of the dynamics of the fund’s performance, while the dummies have the 
appealing feature of explicitly capturing a persistence pattern.  The interaction or the 
joint impact of dummies and lagged ranks might be complex and difficult to interpret 
as both effects might overlap to some extent.  For our purposes, however, the 
predictions generated by the model are crucial, not the individual contribution of each 
of the information variables on the right-hand side.  
 
In column B of Table IV, we report the estimation results without including the 
lagged ranks in model (1).  The impact of the persistence dummies upon relative 
performance is apparent and in line with our previous results in Table II: in general, 
the longer the streak, the more likely that the fund persists in the subsequent quarter, 
for both winner and loser streaks. Also, it is apparent that not only persistence drives 
future performance. The control variables also have a significant impact. When these 
variables are not taken into account (column A), the model clearly overestimates the 
impact of streak length upon performance. However, when the structure of lagged 
ranks is included in the model in addition to the persistence dummies (column C), the 
lagged ranks appear to capture most of the impact of winner and loser streaks. Some 
of the coefficients of the dummies remain marginally significant, while some of the 
coefficients of lagged ranks are highly significant. Overall, the results in Table IV 
indicate that the relative performance of a hedge fund in the next quarter is to some 
extent predictable from available information and past performance, although the R2s 
indicate that the level of predictability is limited.  As stated previously, lagged ranks 
and persistence dummies capture each different aspects of past performance. Their 
effects upon future performance may have subtle differences difficult to be fully 
disentangled. The streak length has manifestly a predictive ability of relative 
performance. However, investors should not take it as the only predictor, nor as the 
best predictor. 
 
From the latter model, including both lagged ranks and persistence dummies, we can 
directly obtain a prediction of the relative performance a rational investor can expect.  
Let us come back to our initial question.  Is there any component in the response of 
investors to past performance that is beyond what would be justified given the 
expected performance and risk of a fund?  And if so, is that component of flows 
related to the length of the streak, as suggested by the law of small numbers? 
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Table IV   
A Model Predicting Relative Performance of Open-End 
 Hedge Funds from Historical Persistence Patterns 
The table reports estimates of a model explaining relative quarterly performance as measured by fractional 
ranks. The fractional rank ranges between 0 and 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative 
to all the funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s raw return in a given quarter. 
The sample includes 752 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. The independent 
variables include twelve dummies accounting for historical winner and loser streaks, six lagged fractional 
ranks, the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, 
four lagged measures of flows computed as quarterly growth rates,  upside potential based on the entire past 
history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking 
value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, 
management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the 
manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund (estimate not reported) and  10 dummies for investment 
styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported).  We estimate our model by 
pooling all fund-period observations.  T-statistics based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Parameters 
OLS estimates 
including only 
persistence dummies 
(A) 
 OLS estimates, 
excluding the structure 
of lagged ranks 
(B)  
OLS estimates 
including the structure 
of lagged ranks 
(C) 
Intercept 0.4938 (69.93)  -0.2036 (-0.84)  -0.2281 (-0.93) 
W2 0.0173 (1.40)  0.0092 (0.75)  0.0315 (1.86) 
W3 0.0417 (2.61)  0.0255 (1.64)  0.0118 (0.60) 
W4 0.0514 (2.60)  0.0250 (1.28)  -0.0116 (-0.51) 
W5 0.0879 (3.62)  0.0526 (2.16)  0.0413 (1.53) 
W6 0.0845 (4.85)  0.0405 (2.21)  0.0374 (1.72) 
L1 -0.0091 (-0.92)  -0.0051 (-0.52)  0.0123 (0.70) 
L2 0.0071 (0.58)  0.0190 (1.58)  0.0168 (1.01) 
L3 -0.0631 (-3.99)  -0.0384 (-2.41)  -0.0086 (-0.44) 
L4 -0.0737 (-3.74)  -0.0453 (-2.31)  0.0060 (0.26) 
L5 -0.1070 (-4.26)  -0.0747 (-2.99)  -0.0444 (-1.60) 
L6 -0.0860 (-3.51)  -0.0439 (-1.77)  -0.0229 (-0.84) 
Rnk lag 1       0.0296 (1.21) 
Rnk lag 2       -0.0002 (-0.01) 
Rnk lag 3       0.0754 (4.61) 
Rnk lag 4       0.0160 (1.09) 
Rnk lag 5       -0.0508 (-3.66) 
Rnk lag 6       -0.0172 (-1.28) 
Cash Flows lag 1    -0.0119 (-1.05)  -0.0133 (-1.18) 
Cash Flows lag 2    -0.0021 (-0.20)  -0.0035 (-0.33) 
Cash Flows lag 3    -0.0094 (-1.14)  -0.0089 (-1.06) 
Cash Flows lag 4    -0.0057 (-0.90)  -0.0026 (-0.41) 
Ln(TNA)    0.0799 (2.79)  0.0783 (2.70) 
Ln(TNA)2    -0.0024 (-2.78)  -0.0023 (-2.69) 
Ln(AGE)    -0.0118 (-1.78)  -0.0117 (-1.76) 
Offshore    -0.0202 (-2.63)  -0.0193 (-2.50) 
Incentive Fees    0.0004 (0.83)  0.0005 (0.91) 
Management Fees    -0.0053 (-1.30)  -0.0048 (-1.19) 
StDev    0.7991 (4.57)  0.7970 (4.47) 
StDev2    -1.3844 (-2.80)  -1.4036 (-2.69) 
Upside Potential Ratio     0.0035 (5.87)  0.0035 (5.87) 
(Upside Pot Ratio)2    0.00001 (-4.63)  0.0000 (-4.73) 
Number of observations 7457  7425   7425   
R2 0.0159  0.0521     0.0583   
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Table V provides an answer to these questions. In column A, we report the estimates 
of a probit model explaining the sign of cash flows from the expected rank, as 
obtained from our previous model, but we explicitly include the persistence dummies 
in order to identify any additional effect that the pattern of persistence might have on 
investors’ decisions. The impact of the predicted rank upon flows is positive and 
highly significant, as can be expected. The higher the predicted rank, the more likely a 
fund will experience positive money flows. Besides, we find a remarkable pattern for 
the coefficients of the dummies. All the estimated coefficients for winning and losing 
streaks are highly significant, while in absolute value they increase monotonically as 
the length of the streak increases. The longer the winner streak, the more likely is a 
fund to attract further inflows of money, regardless of what is rationally justified 
given expected relative performance. Conversely, the longer the losing streak, ceteris 
paribus, the more likely that a fund experiences further outflows. In column B we 
provide an extended model that considers the fact that investors’ decisions are also 
affected by their expectations about risk.  If we include several control variables like 
age, size, style, standard deviation of historical returns, downside risk, that are 
informative of the fund’s riskiness besides expected rank, the explanatory power of 
the model enhances substantially, as indicated by the value of the pseudo R2. Several 
of these added variables have indeed economically and statistically significant 
coefficients. Statistically, the impact of expected rank upon flows reduces slightly but 
remains significant.  However, the pattern and magnitude of coefficients for the 
persistence dummies remains essentially unchanged, clearly showing that flows are 
directed much more towards persistently winning funds and out of persistently losing 
funds than is justified by expected future performance.86  
 
To have an idea of the economic significance of our findings, we use the coefficients 
of the persistence dummies in the previous model to compute the implied probability 
that investors invest in a fund (as indicated by a positive sign of cash flows) given a 
certain streak length, for different values of the expected rank. All other variables in 
our model are fixed at their sample average.  The results are shown in figure 1, where 
we focus on expected ranks in the range 0.4-0.7, because this is where most 
observations in our sample are located.  
 
Consider a fund which is rationally expected to be in the 70th percentile of the 
distribution in the next period according to our model (i.e. rank=0.70). The likelihood 
that  investors  direct  their  money  towards  this  fund  differs  across  streak  lengths, 
 
                                                 
86 In a robustness check, we allowed for the possibility of non-linearities in the response of flows to expected 
relative performance, by adding the square of expected rank. The added variable had no significant impact.  
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Table V   
The Effect of Persistence Patterns upon Money Flows  
for Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports estimates of a probit model explaining positive and negative flows. The sample includes 752 
open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate 
corrected for reinvestments. The independent variable takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. Otherwise it 
takes value 0. The independent variables include 12 mutually exclusive dummies accounting for the length of 
winner and losing streaks and we control for expected rank (obtained from our model reported in Table IV, 
Panel C). The model reported in Panel B also controls for fund specific characteristics including the log of 
fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged 
measures of flows, upside potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to 
the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a 
percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets 
under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and  
seven dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). 
The model also includes 21 time dummies (estimates not reported). We estimate each model by pooling all 
fund-period observations. z-statistics  are provided in parentheses. 
 
Probit model explaining positive  
and negative cash flows. 
Parameters A   B 
Intercept -0.5493 (-4.34)  0.1341 (0.37) 
Expected Rank 1.2044 (4.84)  1.2691 (2.08) 
W2 0.1534 (2.87)  0.1473 (2.66) 
W3 0.2954 (4.27)  0.2870 (3.97) 
W4 0.4450 (4.95)  0.3864 (4.15) 
W5 0.4783 (4.13)  0.4265 (3.56) 
W6 0.6884 (6.97)  0.4565 (4.30) 
L1 -0.0876 (-2.06)  -0.1388 (-3.17) 
L2 -0.2453 (-4.70)  -0.2762 (-5.02) 
L3 -0.3954 (-5.42)  -0.4652 (-5.93) 
L4 -0.4889 (-5.22)  -0.5457 (-5.50) 
L5 -0.6354 (-5.01)  -0.6098 (-4.42) 
L6 -0.4265 (-3.59)  -0.4194 (-3.35) 
Ln(TNA)    -0.0078 (-0.74) 
Ln(AGE)    -0.1729 (-5.46) 
Cash Flows lag 1    0.3693 (4.76) 
Cash Flows lag 2    0.3120 (5.08) 
Cash Flows lag 3    0.1607 (3.44) 
Cash Flows lag 4    0.0887 (2.17) 
Offshore    -0.1467 (-3.87) 
Incentive Fees    -0.0023 (-0.94) 
Management Fees    -0.0157 (-0.87) 
Personal Capital    -0.0446 (-1.18) 
Upside Potential Ratio    0.0052 (1.21) 
StDev       -1.5398 (-2.60) 
      
Number of observations 7195   7195  
Pseudo R2 0.0428   0.0904  
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Figure 1 
Probability of investing implied 
 by the estimated model of flows (model B, Table V). 
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although the information content of a streak is already accounted for in the expected 
rank. This likelihood is 69% after a winning streak of six quarters, compared to 51% 
after a winning streak of one quarter. Similarly, if a fund is expected to be ranked in 
the 40th percentile, the likelihood that investors redeem is 78% after a losing streak of 
six quarters, compared to 69% after a losing streak of one quarter. Interestingly, there 
is a non negligible probability of 35% that investors invest in a fund after six losing 
quarters when the expected rank equals 0.7, while in 46% of cases investors will 
divest from a fund after six winning quarters if the fund’s expected rank equals 0.4.   
 
The results so far indicate that hedge fund investors are directing their money flows in 
response to winner and losing streaks much more than is justified by the expected 
future performance of the funds. To further investigate this issue, we consider three 
different investment strategies. The first one is a naïve strategy that prescribes to 
invest in all persistent winners and to divest from all persistent losers. The second 
strategy is the one followed by the average investor, as indicated by the sign of money 
flows. That is, this strategy invests in funds with a positive money flow (equally 
weighted) and divests from funds with a negative money flow. The third strategy is 
based on our model explaining ranks reported in Table IV, Panel C, and prescribes to 
invest (divest) in a fund if the model predicts that subsequent rank is above (below) 
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the median.87  In Table VI,  Panel A,  we report raw returns obtained from these three 
strategies, where we also decompose the returns across subsets of funds with a given 
(winner or losing) streak length. The investment strategy based upon the model 
provides an average return of 6.31% per quarter, outperforming the funds with 
positive money flows by 1.72%, especially the funds with losing streaks. The 
divestment strategy based upon the model prescribes to divest from funds that 
subsequently performed worse than the funds from which investors actually redeemed 
(1.81%  against 2.98% on average)88. Assuming that divestments finance investments, 
the zero-investment strategy prescribed by the model provides an excess return of 
4.5% per quarter, against 1.61% obtained by the zero-investment strategy followed by 
investors89. Panel B shows similar results in terms of style adjusted returns. We can 
conclude that the excessive importance that investors attribute to the length of 
performance streaks as indicative of future performance, is detrimental to investors’ 
wealth. On the other hand, investors directed money inflows towards funds with 
winning streaks that outperformed the naïve strategy (5.27% against 4.46% on 
average). Conversely, investors redeemed from funds with losing streaks that 
underperformed, on average, the naïve divestment strategy (2.76% against 3.14%). 
 
These figures indicate that investors strive to discriminate between skilled and lucky 
managers in spite of a given performance streak. However, it seems that many 
investors follow contrarian strategies more actively than what the model prescribes, 
often investing in previous losers and divesting from previous winners, which offsets 
to a large extent the gains from momentum investing. As a result, investors do not 
perform overall much better than the naïve strategy. In fact, in terms of style adjusted 
returns, the naïve strategy provides slightly higher returns from investments (0.59% 
against 0.52%) and slightly worse returns from divestments (-0.34% against -0.28%). 
 
Our previous analysis indicates that investors’ allocations are potentially suboptimal. 
The opportunity costs involved appear sizeable, suggesting that investors take 
decisions that are not adequately grounded. On the other hand, we did not take into 
account transaction costs  or  liquidity  restrictions  that  may  prevent  investors from  
                                                 
87 Because the model is estimated over the entire sample period, this third strategy is not an investment 
strategy that investors could have followed in real time. Also transaction costs and redemption restrictions are 
not taken into consideration.  However, by using this hypothetical strategy as a benchmark, our purpose is to 
give some indication of the potential suboptimal allocation of resources of hedge fund investors.  The impact 
of liquidity restrictions in estimating our model explaining flows is investigated in the next section.  
88 The model more often prescribes to invest in funds with long winning streaks and divest from funds with 
long losing streaks than what investors do. For example, the model indicates to invest in 318 funds with three 
successive winning quarters, while investors invested only in 294 funds (not reported). Conversely, the model 
indicates to divest from 373 funds with three consecutive losing quarters while investors divested from 274 
funds.  
89 Remember that the distribution of cash flows in our database is almost symmetric. Moreover, the average 
money inflows per fund is 7.9 million US$ while the average money outflow per fund is 7.4 million US$.  
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Table VI  
Comparison Between the Performance of Investors’ Decisions and the 
Performance of the Model’s Prescriptions, Conditional to Past Performance  
The table reports the returns obtained from three different investment strategies, conditional to historical 
performance. Historical performance is measured by the length of winning or losing streaks and is indicated by 
12 mutually exclusive dummies. The first strategy is a naïve strategy that prescribes to invest in all funds with 
a previous winning streak and to divest from all funds with a previous losing streak. The second strategy is the 
one followed by investors: if a fund experienced positive (alternatively negative) money flows, it indicates that 
the average investor invested (alternatively divested)  in that fund. The third strategy follows the prescription 
of our model of ranks reported in Table IV: investing in funds with a predicted rank above the median while 
divesting from funds with a predicted rank below the median.  Panel A reports equally weighted raw returns 
for a given streak length. Panel B reports equally weighted style-adjusted returns.  
Panel A: Subsequent quarter raw returns 
Returns from investments  Returns from divestments Historical performance: 
winning and losing 
streaks defined in terms 
of lagged raw returns 
Naïve 
strategy 
Funds with 
positive 
money flows 
Model 
prescription 
 
Naïve 
strategy 
Funds with 
negative 
money flows  
Model 
prescription 
W1 0.0377 0.0454 0.0597   0.0292 0.0209 
W2 0.0402 0.0497 0.0564   0.0267 0.0202 
W3 0.0484 0.0549 0.0636   0.0370 0.0143 
W4 0.0698 0.0760 0.0856   0.0559 0.0224 
W5 0.0681 0.0548 0.0674   0.1055 0.0734 
W6 0.0609 0.0686 0.0675   0.0322 0.0076 
L1  0.0373 0.0618  0.0357 0.0342 0.0199 
L2  0.0491 0.0625  0.0442 0.0405 0.0285 
L3  0.0237 0.0866  0.0142 0.0091 0.0045 
L4  0.0103 0.0673  0.0093 0.0088 0.0053 
L5  0.0181 -0.0470  0.0085 0.0055 0.0098 
L6  0.0091 0.0432  0.0034 0.0007 0.0023 
All winning streaks 0.0446 0.0527 0.0633  - 0.0329 0.0206 
All losing streaks - 0.0365 0.0628  0.0314 0.0276 0.0165 
Average Returns 0.0446 0.0459 0.0631  0.0314 0.0298 0.0181 
Panel B: Subsequent quarter style-adjusted returns 
Returns from investments  Returns from divestments Historical performance: 
winning and losing 
streaks defined in terms 
of lagged style-adjusted 
returns 
Naïve 
strategy 
Funds with 
positive 
money 
flows  
Model 
prescription
 
Naïve 
strategy 
Funds with 
negative 
money flows  
Model 
prescription
W1 0.0004 0.0042 0.0120   -0.0038 -0.0086 
W2 0.0086 0.0149 0.0114   -0.0003 0.0054 
W3 0.0096 0.0105 0.0195   0.0080 -0.0127 
W4 0.0129 0.0132 0.0180   0.0123 -0.0022 
W5 0.0263 0.0132 0.0232   0.0635 0.0512 
W6 0.0100 0.0160 0.0117   -0.0125 -0.0002 
L1  0.0027 0.0026  0.0020 0.0013 0.0016 
L2  0.0040 0.0059  0.0017 0.0000 -0.0017 
L3  -0.0131 0.0095  -0.0156 -0.0169 -0.0189 
L4  -0.0137 0.0127  -0.0102 -0.0087 -0.0117 
L5  -0.0334 -0.0620  -0.0267 -0.0246 -0.0258 
L6  -0.0342 0.0109  -0.0360 -0.0369 -0.0373 
All winning streaks 0.0059 0.0097 0.0143  - 0.0005 -0.0046 
All losing streaks - -0.0010 0.0041  -0.0034 -0.0052 -0.0070 
Average Returns 0.0059 0.0052 0.0106  -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0060 
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taking timely decisions or from shifting their capital as the model prescribes. The next 
section analyzes the impact of liquidity restrictions in the estimation of our model and 
discusses several additional robustness tests.  
 
4.6   Robustness checks 
 
In this section, we consider a large number of alternative model specifications and 
assumptions to analyze the sensitivity of our main results. First, we investigate a 
model that explains growth rates of cash flows rather than just their sign. Second, we 
experiment with different thresholds to define winners and losers. Third, we consider 
specifications where we use ranks and persistence dummies based on style-adjusted 
returns instead of raw returns. Fourth, we include expected performance over the 
coming year rather than just the next quarter in the model. And finally, we explore the 
potential effects of liquidity restrictions.  
 
If our model explains cash flows measured as growth rates instead of the sign of flows 
(Table VII), the impact of the persistence dummies is virtually the same as in our 
previous specification, while several control variables have a highly significant impact 
too. Surprisingly, however, the effect of expected rank disappears. This suggests that 
investors decide the amount of their investments largely based upon the length of the 
streaks, and do not consider anything else that forecasts future rank. Again, investors 
appear to direct their money flows too strongly based upon persistence of winning and 
losing. 
 
This main result is robust to a number of alternative specifications. We have 
experimented with different thresholds to define winners and losers other than the 
median (see Tables A4, A5, A6, A7 in the appendix). Also, we have estimated our 
models using ranks and persistence dummies based on style-adjusted returns instead 
of raw returns90 (see Tables A2 and A3). In all these specifications we obtain similar 
results as before: the longer the streak, the more important is its impact on investors’ 
decisions. 
  
 
                                                 
90 In this case, the persistence dummies have also been defined in terms of funds’ returns in excess of the style 
index. The model explains less variation in ranks than our model estimated in Table IV. We included the 
expected style-adjusted rank in our model explaining the sign of flows, together with the persistence dummies 
based on style-adjusted returns. We obtain similar results as before. The longer the streak, the more important 
is the impact on investors’ decisions. The model, however, explains less variation in the likelihood to invest or 
divest in a hedge fund, compared to our model reported in Table V, an indication that  investors adjust 
insufficiently for style as a source of risk. 
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Table VII   
The Effect of Persistence Patterns upon Money Flows  
for Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports OLS estimates of a model explaining money flows. The sample includes 752 open-end hedge 
funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate corrected for 
reinvestments. The independent variables include 12 mutually exclusive dummies accounting for winner and 
losing streaks. We control for expected rank (obtained from our model estimated in Table IV, Panel C) and for 
fund specific characteristics like the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in 
months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, upside potential based on the entire past history of the 
fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for 
offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a 
percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal 
capital is invested in the fund and  seven dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont 
indices (estimates not reported). The model also includes 21 time dummies (estimates not reported). We 
estimate each model by pooling all fund-period observations (t-statistics  are provided in parentheses). 
 
OLS estimates of a model explaining growth rates  
 
Parameters A   B 
Intercept 0.0256 (0.89)  0.3174 (3.52) 
Expected Rank 0.0169 (0.31)  0.1250 (1.24) 
W2 0.0096 (0.82)  0.0109 (0.91) 
W3 0.0846 (4.00)  0.0846 (4.02) 
W4 0.0796 (4.09)  0.0697 (3.50) 
W5 0.1353 (3.46)  0.1239 (3.24) 
W6 0.1219 (5.37)  0.0849 (3.77) 
L1 -0.0232 (-2.44)  -0.0285 (-3.04) 
L2 -0.0372 (-2.28)  -0.0411 (-2.48) 
L3 -0.0719 (-5.21)  -0.0756 (-5.43) 
L4 -0.1032 (-6.43)  -0.1068 (-6.32) 
L5 -0.1100 (-4.07)  -0.1022 (-3.75) 
L6 -0.0733 (-2.58)  -0.0758 (-2.59) 
Ln(TNA)    -0.0156 (-4.80) 
Ln(AGE)    -0.0232 (-3.67) 
Cash Flows lag 1    0.0526 (2.89) 
Cash Flows lag 2    0.0501 (3.44) 
Cash Flows lag 3    0.0350 (2.00) 
Cash Flows lag 4    0.0162 (1.50) 
Offshore    0.0005 (0.07) 
Incentive Fees    -0.0015 (-3.06) 
Management Fees    -0.0076 (-1.59) 
Personal Capital    0.0060 (0.66) 
Upside Potential Ratio    0.0009 (4.23) 
StDev       0.0365 (0.21) 
      
Number of observations 7195   7195  
Pseudo R2 0.0275   0.0629  
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The models reported so far assume that investors seek to exploit performance 
predictability at quarterly horizons. It is possible, however, that investors are 
concerned about future long run performance, over the next year for example, 
although previous studies find only weak evidence of predictability at annual horizons 
for hedge funds. We estimated an alternative model explaining future rank over a year 
and we included the corresponding expected performance in the model of flows, see 
Table A8. There are no substantial changes in the coefficients of the persistence 
dummies. Surprisingly, however, the coefficient for expected annual rank is negative 
and significant, while the coefficient for expected quarterly rank remains positive and 
significant. This might be an indication that investors perceive a higher risk associated 
to higher expected ranks in the long run.  
 
An additional concern is the potential impact that liquidity restrictions may have in 
our results. The significant positive response of net money flows to winner streaks 
may be due to the fact that outflows are restricted. As explained earlier in this paper, 
hedge funds impose in general  monthly or quarterly redemption periods with written-
notice periods typically ranging between 15 and 90 days.  To isolate the effect of 
liquidity restrictions,  we allow for  interactions between the persistence dummies and 
dummies accounting for the combined impact of redemption and notice periods.91 
 
Table VIII reports our results. Notice first that the impact of winning streaks on 
money flows is indeed magnified when liquidity restrictions are in place, especially 
for streaks of 4 and 5 quarters length, while the response of money flows to losing 
streaks is virtually non-existent, as could have been expected. As a consequence, the 
response of unrestricted money flows to winning streaks reduces slightly compared to 
our results in Table V, while the response to losing streaks is enhanced. Removing the 
effect of restrictions, however, does not change the main result of this paper. We still 
find a significant and increasingly positive (negative) response of unrestricted money 
flows to the length of winning (losing) streaks.  
 
                                                 
91 In each quarter t, and for each fund i, we define a dummy variable REDRi,t  that takes value 1 if redemption 
restrictions do not prevent outflows in quarter t in response to a previous winner/loser streak of length n 
quarters. To separate the response of restricted and unrestricted net money flows, we interact dummies 
accounting for restrictions with dummies accounting for the length of the streak as follows:  
 
                      W unrestrictedn,i,t = Wn,i,t . (REDRi,t)  and    W restrictedn,i,t  = Wn,i,t . (1-REDRi,t) 
                      L unrestrictedn,i,t = Ln,i,t . (REDRi,t)  and    L restrictedn,i,t  = Ln,i,t . (1-REDRi,t) 
 
Where the dummies Wn,i,t  and Ln,i,t take value 1 if the fund i experienced a winner (loser) streak of length n 
quarters between t-n and t-1.  
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Table VIII   
The Effect of Persistence Patterns Upon Money Flows  
Subject to Liquidity Restrictions in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports estimates of a probit model explaining positive and negative flows. We measure cash flows as a 
quarterly growth rate corrected for reinvestments. The independent variable takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. 
Otherwise it takes value 0. The independent variables include 12 mutually exclusive dummies accounting for winner 
and losing streaks interacting with dummies accounting for restrictions to liquidity. The model reported in Panel B 
also controls for fund specific characteristics including the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log 
of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, upside potential based on the entire past 
history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value 
one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a 
percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital 
is invested in the fund and the dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices 
(estimates not reported). The model also includes 21 time dummies (estimates not reported). The sample includes 
752 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We estimate each model by pooling all fund-period 
observations. z-statistics  are provided in parentheses. 
 Probit model explaining positive and negative cash flows 
Parameters Panel A  Panel B 
Intercept -0.5055 (-3.95)  0.1567 (0.43) 
Expected Rank 1.1159 (4.44)  1.2683 (2.06) 
W2 Unrestricted 0.1706 (3.07)  0.1707 (2.97) 
W3 Unrestricted 0.2936 (4.05)  0.2902 (3.83) 
W4 Unrestricted 0.4112 (4.38)  0.3566 (3.65) 
W5 Unrestricted 0.4478 (3.68)  0.3921 (3.13) 
W6 Unrestricted 0.6902 (6.66)  0.4743 (4.31) 
L1 Unrestricted -0.1046 (-2.39)  -0.1513 (-3.37) 
L2 Unrestricted -0.2614 (-4.89)  -0.2871 (-5.07) 
L3 Unrestricted -0.4566 (-6.00)  -0.5156 (-6.31) 
L4 Unrestricted -0.4651 (-4.91)  -0.5190 (-5.18) 
L5 Unrestricted -0.6623 (-5.09)  -0.6172 (-4.38) 
L6 Unrestricted -0.4408 (-3.67)  -0.4306 (-3.41) 
W2 Restricted 0.0226 (0.16)  -0.0488 (-0.35) 
W3 Restricted 0.3402 (1.87)  0.2639 (1.40) 
W4 Restricted 0.7986 (2.86)  0.6819 (2.51) 
W5 Restricted 0.8116 (2.30)  0.7347 (2.06) 
W6 Restricted 0.7386 (2.65)  0.3107 (0.98) 
L1 Restricted 0.0688 (0.67)  -0.0188 (-0.18) 
L2 Restricted -0.0201 (-0.12)  -0.1451 (-0.89) 
L3 Restricted 0.2376 (1.02)  0.0822 (0.35) 
L5 Restricted -0.2636 (-0.47)  -0.4936 (-0.82) 
L6 Restricted -0.0034 (0.00)  0.0987 (0.13) 
Ln(TNA)   -0.0083 (-0.79) 
Ln(AGE)   -0.1747 (-5.51) 
Cash Flows lag 1   0.3696 (4.79) 
Cash Flows lag 2   0.3128 (5.07) 
Cash Flows lag 3   0.1614 (3.45) 
Cash Flows lag 4   0.0879 (2.15) 
Offshore   -0.1400 (-3.63) 
Incentive Fees   -0.0026 (-1.04) 
Management Fees   -0.0168 (-0.93) 
Personal Capital   -0.0440 (-1.17) 
StDev   -1.5589 (-2.61) 
Upside Potential Ratio   0.0054 (1.21) 
Number of observations 7187  7187 
Pseudo R2 0.0441  0.0912  
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Finally, it is conceivable that investors’ decisions are mostly determined by an 
aggregate measure of past performance in the long run and the persistence dummies 
might be just a proxy for it. To separate this effect from one strictly due to the length 
of the persistence pattern, we included in our model the rank based on raw returns 
over the previous year (see Table A9). Still, the coefficients of persistence dummies 
remain statistically significant and in general they increase with the length of the 
streak. However, their combined impact reduces by 10% for winner streaks and by 
30% for losing streaks. The effect of the annual rank is positive and highly significant 
while the coefficient of expected rank becomes negative and significant. It seems that 
the effect of annual rank and expected rank overlap to some extent, and that historical 
long run performance is also an important determinant of investors’ decisions beyond 
rational expectations. 
 
 
4.7  Concluding remarks  
 
Contrarian and momentum investing are often considered as irrational behaviour. The 
heuristic known as the law of small numbers, and more particularly the concept of 
local representativeness, have been proposed as the underlying psychological 
principles (see e.g. De Bondt and Thaler [1985], Shefrin [2000], Rabin [2002]). Our 
paper provides empirical evidence that supports this theory in the context of investors 
who select hedge fund managers.  Specifically,  we investigate the response of 
investors to performance streaks  of  
hedge funds and we present a model that disentangles a rational component from a 
heuristic-driven component in momentum investing.  
 
We find that persistence patterns of a hedge fund do have a predictive ability of future 
relative performance: the longer the winner streak, the larger the probability for a fund 
to remain a winner subsequently. Investors, in turn, appear to be aware of the 
information content of performance streaks, as the pattern of money flows is 
positively correlated to the length of the historical persistence pattern of funds. The 
larger the length of a winner (loser) streak, the most likely funds will experience 
positive (negative) money flows, indicating that the average investor indeed follows a 
momentum strategy.  
 
Our model explaining future relative performance of hedge funds shows, however, 
that persistence patterns should neither be taken as the only predictor, nor as the best 
predictor of future performance. Yet, our model explaining money flows from 
expectations of performance and persistence patterns, shows that the length of the 
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streak has an economically and statistically significant impact on flows beyond 
rationally expected performance, which confirms a “hot-hand” bias driving to a large 
extent momentum investing. These results are not driven by liquidity restrictions and 
are robust to a number of alternative specifications using different performance 
measures, cash-flow measures and different definitions of winners and losers. Finally, 
we show that investors’ decisions are suboptimal compared to a hypothetical 
investment strategy based on our model explaining future relative performance.  
 
It seems that the due diligence process, if ever conducted, does not effectively 
counteract the excessive weight that investors place in the managers’ track records as 
a criterion for decision. One explanation may be found in the psychological theory of 
cognitive dissonance from Festinger [1957] or in the closely related concept of 
confirmation trap documented by Wason [1960] and Enhorn and Hogarth [1978]. 
Once investors have persuaded themselves about the talent of a manager based on a 
given performance streak, they are likely to later neglect evidence that disconfirms or 
conflicts with their initial beliefs. In fact, for this reason several investment advisors 
recommend to conduct first a qualitative exploration, before starting a quantitative 
analysis of track records, in order to obtain preliminary indications of potential 
weaknesses of the manager or the organization that require further attention. The idea 
here is that it is not the same to approach the due diligence process with some 
scepticism about managerial skill than approaching it with a belief that talent exists.  
 
Altogether, our results provide conclusive evidence that the response of investors to 
past performance of hedge funds is largely driven by a mistaken belief in the law of 
small numbers. Investors are over-sensitive to the precise sequence of performance 
signals they observe over time. Previous studies have ignored this feature by 
aggregating performance measures over annual horizons. Apparently, sophisticated 
investors do exhibit psychological biases that may have adverse consequences for 
their wealth. 
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Table A1 
Cross-Sectional Characteristics of the Hedge Fund Sample 
This table presents summary statistics on cross-sectional characteristics of our sample of 752 hedge funds for 
the period 1994Q4 till 2000Q1. Cash flows are the change in total net assets (TNA) between consecutive 
quarters corrected for reinvestments. Returns are net of all management and incentive fees. Age is the number 
of months a fund has been in operation since its inception.  In each quarter, the historical standard deviation of 
monthly returns, semi deviation and upside potential have been computed based on the entire past history of 
the fund.  Semi deviation and upside potential are calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury 
bill taken as the minimum investor’s target.  Offshore is a dummy variable with value one for non-U.S. 
domiciled funds. Incentive fee is a percentage of profits above a hurdle rate that is given as a reward to 
managers. Management fee is a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management that is paid annually to 
the manager for administering a fund.  Personal capital is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
manager invests from her own wealth in the fund.  The dummy leverage takes the value one if the fund makes 
substantial use of borrowing. We include 10 mutually exclusive dummies for investment styles defined on the 
basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The dummy labelled hedge fund index takes value 1 whenever a fund could 
not be categorized in a specific investment style.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Cash Flows (growth rate) 0.0295 0.3215 -1.4303 8.1577 
         Cash Flows>0  (3676 obs) 0.1751 0.3792 0.0001 8.1577 
         Cash Flows<0  (3551 obs) -0.1193 0.1549 -1.4303 -0.0001 
         Cash Flows=0  (407 obs)     
Cash Flows  (dollars) 235008.8 3.70E+07 -1.41E+09 6.87E+08 
ln(TNA) 16.7296 1.8298 8.1050 23.2966 
ln(AGE) 3.8293 0.5943 2.8904 5.6168 
Quarterly Returns 0.0388 0.1377 -0.9763 1.8605 
Historical St.Dev. 0.0529 0.0431 0.0021 0.7753 
Semi Deviation 0.0310 0.0255 0 0.3387 
Upside Potential 0.0248 0.0183 0.0006 0.2914 
Upside Potential Ratio 1.7025 10.934 0.0757 440.1028 
Offshore 0.5418 0.4983 0 1 
Incentive Fee 17.7078 7.0181 0 50 
Management Fees 1.4744 1.0129 0 8 
Personal Capital 0.7180 0.4500 0 1 
Leverage 0.7683 0.4220 0 1 
Convertible Arbitrage 0.0076 0.0871 0 1 
Dedicated Short Bias 0.0118 0.1080 0 1 
Emerging Markets 0.0927 0.2900 0 1 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0935 0.2911 0 1 
Event Driven 0.1191 0.3239 0 1 
Fixed Income Arbitrage. 0.0122 0.1098 0 1 
Global Macro 0.0235 0.1514 0 1 
Long/Short Equity 0.2476 0.4316 0 1 
Managed Futures 0.2331 0.4228 0 1 
Hedge Fund Index 0.1590 0.3657 0 1 
     
 
 
131
Sophisticated Investors and the Law of Small Numbers 
 
119
 
Table A2 
A Model Explaining Relative Quarterly Performance of Open-End 
Hedge Funds from Historical Persistence Patterns (Style-adjusted) 
The table reports estimates of a model explaining relative performance as measured by fractional ranks. The 
fractional rank ranges between 0 and 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all the 
funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s style-adjusted return. The sample includes  
752 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. The independent variables include twelve 
dummies accounting for historical winner and loser streaks, six lagged fractional ranks, the log of fund’s total 
net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows 
computed as quarterly growth rates,  upside potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated 
with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, 
incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the 
fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in 
the fund (estimate not reported) and the dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont 
indices (estimates not reported).  We estimate our model by pooling all fund-period observations.  T-statistics 
based on robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Parameters 
OLS estimates 
including only 
persistence dummies 
(A) 
 OLS estimated, 
excluding the structure 
of lagged ranks 
(B)  
OLS estimates 
including the structure 
of lagged ranks 
(C) 
Intercept 0.5084 (71.31)  -0.1991 (-0.83)  -0.2066 (-0.85) 
W2 0.0034 (0.28)  -0.0029 (-0.23)  -0.0219 (-1.27) 
W3 0.0381 (2.58)  0.0307 (2.07)  -0.0062 (-0.32) 
W4 0.0463 (2.58)  0.0363 (2.01)  -0.0134 (-0.61) 
W5 0.0124 (0.55)  -0.0016 (-0.07)  -0.0386 (-1.48) 
W6 0.0357 (1.80)  0.0111 (0.54)  -0.0231 (-0.98) 
L1 -0.0212 (-2.11)  -0.0196 (-1.96)  -0.0253 (-1.37) 
L2 -0.0220 (-1.81)  -0.0157 (-1.30)  -0.0023 (-0.14) 
L3 -0.0854 (-5.64)  -0.0761 (-5.05)  -0.0442 (-2.33) 
L4 -0.0645 (-3.36)  -0.0476 (-2.47)  -0.0038 (-0.17) 
L5 -0.0780 (-2.95)  -0.0538 (-2.10)  -0.0209 (-0.74) 
L6 -0.0910 (-3.70)  -0.0435 (-1.73)  -0.0137 (-0.49) 
Rnk lag 1       0.0468 (1.90) 
Rnk lag 2       0.0584 (2.37) 
Rnk lag 3       0.0426 (2.59) 
Rnk lag 4       0.0142 (1.00) 
Rnk lag 5       -0.0240 (-1.83) 
Rnk lag 6       -0.0023 (-0.18) 
Cash Flows lag 1    -0.0140 (-1.23)  -0.0171 (-1.52) 
Cash Flows lag 2    -0.0043 (-0.44)  -0.0054 (-0.53) 
Cash Flows lag 3    -0.0067 (-0.83)  -0.0071 (-0.86) 
Cash Flows lag 4    -0.0077 (-1.10)  -0.0063 (-0.91) 
Ln(TNA)    0.0777 (2.74)  0.0717 (2.50) 
Ln(TNA)2    -0.0023 (-2.69)  -0.0021 (-2.46) 
Ln(AGE)    -0.0112 (-1.69)  -0.0112 (-1.69) 
Offshore    -0.0197 (-2.51)  -0.0196 (-2.50) 
Incentive Fees    0.0005 (0.96)  0.0005 (0.87) 
Management Fees    -0.0044 (-1.13)  -0.0037 (-0.95) 
StDev    0.6533 (3.67)  0.6376 (3.55) 
StDev2    -1.2238 (-2.50)  -1.1996 (-2.36) 
Upside Potential Ratio     0.0032 (5.47)  0.0031 (5.23) 
(Upside Pot Ratio)2    6.4E-6 (-3.67)  6.24E-6 (-3.58) 
Number of observations 7457  7425   7425   
R2 0.0125  0.0325     0.0356   
132
Chapter 4 
 
 
120
 
Table A3   
The Effect of Style-Adjusted Persistence Patterns upon  
Quarterly Money Flows for Open-End Hedge Funds  
The table reports estimates of a probit model explaining positive and negative flows. The sample includes 752 
open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate 
corrected for reinvestments. The independent variable takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. Otherwise it 
takes value 0. The independent variables include 12 mutually exclusive dummies accounting for winner and 
losing streaks. Winner and losers are defined with respect to the median of the distribution of style-adjusted 
returns. Independent variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net 
assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, 
upside potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the 
U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of 
profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under 
management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and the 
dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). The 
model also includes 21 time dummies (estimates not reported). We estimate each model by pooling all fund-
period observations. z-statistics  are provided in parentheses. 
 
Probit model explaining positive and negative cash flows. 
(all ranks based on style-adjusted returns) 
Parameters A   B 
Intercept -0.1134 (-0.66)  -0.5395 (-1.19) 
Expected Style-Adjusted Rank 0.2275 (0.69)  2.6020 (2.90) 
W2 0.1489 (2.80)  0.1568 (2.85) 
W3 0.3186 (4.78)  0.2368 (3.25) 
W4 0.3980 (4.67)  0.3077 (3.33) 
W5 0.5080 (4.83)  0.4690 (4.37) 
W6 0.6454 (6.51)  0.4206 (4.02) 
L1 -0.0302 (-0.69)  -0.0224 (-0.47) 
L2 -0.1179 (-2.23)  -0.1038 (-1.85) 
L3 -0.2636 (-3.59)  -0.1297 (-1.32) 
L4 -0.2732 (-3.12)  -0.1954 (-2.01) 
L5 -0.4302 (-3.46)  -0.3208 (-2.40) 
L6 -0.4762 (-3.91)  -0.3924 (-2.96) 
Ln(TNA)    -0.0078 (-0.73) 
Ln(AGE)    -0.1501 (-4.58) 
Cash Flows lag 1    0.4276 (5.27) 
Cash Flows lag 2    0.3260 (5.16) 
Cash Flows lag 3    0.1722 (3.76) 
Cash Flows lag 4    0.0959 (2.38) 
Offshore    -0.1008 (-2.49) 
Incentive Fees    -0.0022 (-0.89) 
Management Fees    -0.0166 (-0.91) 
Personal Capital    -0.0175 (-0.45) 
Upside Potential Ratio    0.0060 (0.99) 
StDev       -1.6514 (-2.52) 
      
Number of observations 7195   7195  
Pseudo R2 0.023   0.0816  
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Table A4   
Four Model Specifications Explaining Relative Performance of 
Open-End Hedge Funds from Historical Persistence Patterns  
Using Different Thresholds to Define Winners and Losers 
The table reports estimates of four different specifications of a model explaining relative performance of hedge funds as 
measured by fractional ranks. The fractional rank ranges between 0 and 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile 
performance relative to all the funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s raw return. The 
independent variables include twelve dummies accounting for historical winner and loser streaks. In each model 
specification reported in the table, we use a different percentile in the distribution of raw returns as a threshold to separate 
winners and losers. We control for six lagged fractional ranks, the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log 
of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows computed as quarterly growth rates,  upside 
potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a 
dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to 
managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the 
manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund (estimate not reported) and the dummies for investment styles defined 
on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). The sample includes 752 open-end hedge funds for the 
period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We estimate our model by pooling all fund-period observations.  T-statistics based on robust 
standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
OLS estimates of a model explaining current rank  
(all ranks based on raw returns) 
Threshold to separate winners and losers 
Parameters 
20th percentile  
(A)  
40th percentile  
 (B) 
60th percentile  
 (C)  
80th percentile  
 (D) 
Intercept -0.2130 (-0.87)  -0.2603 (-1.07)  -0.2241 (-0.91)  -0.2434 (-1.00) 
W2 -0.0080 (-0.44)  0.0449 (2.70)  0.0152 (0.86)  0.0130 (0.58) 
W3 -0.0339 (-1.72)  0.0176 (1.00)  -0.0239 (-1.06)  -0.0418 (-1.06) 
W4 -0.0072 (-0.35)  0.0025 (0.13)  -0.0222 (-0.80)  0.0104 (0.18) 
W5 -0.0435 (-2.10)  0.0202 (0.91)  0.0490 (1.40)  -0.0355 (-0.38) 
W6 -0.0226 (-1.57)  0.0399 (2.43)  0.0176 (0.57)  0.1513 (1.83) 
L1 -0.0239 (-1.32)  0.0319 (1.83)  -0.0062 (-0.34)  0.0007 (0.04) 
L2 0.0020 (0.08)  0.0335 (1.93)  0.0054 (0.33)  0.0130 (0.75) 
L3 -0.0649 (-1.56)  0.0285 (1.20)  0.0046 (0.26)  0.0020 (0.11) 
L4 -0.0331 (-0.43)  -0.0229 (-0.77)  -0.0028 (-0.15)  -0.0007 (-0.04) 
L5 0.1232 (1.37)  0.0113 (0.26)  -0.0285 (-1.26)  -0.0074 (-0.37) 
L6 -0.1074 (-0.54)  0.0172 (0.31)  -0.0168 (-0.95)  0.0043 (0.29) 
Rnk lag 1 0.0291 (1.64)  0.0515 (2.21)  0.0283 (1.21)  0.0378 (2.18) 
Rnk lag 2 0.0417 (2.41)  -0.0056 (-0.24)  0.0254 (1.08)  0.0254 (1.45) 
Rnk lag 3 0.0852 (5.55)  0.0861 (5.33)  0.0813 (4.92)  0.0770 (4.99) 
Rnk lag 4 0.0160 (1.09)  0.0133 (0.90)  0.0088 (0.60)  0.0158 (1.08) 
Rnk lag 5 -0.0335 (-2.36)  -0.0434 (-3.11)  -0.0479 (-3.43)  -0.0394 (-2.79) 
Rnk lag 6 -0.0225 (-1.62)  -0.0205 (-1.51)  -0.0153 (-1.14)  -0.0151 (-1.09) 
Cash Flows lag 1 -0.0131 (-1.18)  -0.0133 (-1.18)  -0.0131 (-1.16)  -0.0130 (-1.15) 
Cash Flows lag 2 -0.0035 (-0.33)  -0.0036 (-0.33)  -0.0034 (-0.32)  -0.0032 (-0.29) 
Cash Flows lag 3 -0.0086 (-1.03)  -0.0086 (-1.03)  -0.0089 (-1.07)  -0.0086 (-1.03) 
Cash Flows lag 4 -0.0029 (-0.47)  -0.0029 (-0.46)  -0.0023 (-0.37)  -0.0025 (-0.39) 
Ln(TNA) 0.0760 (2.62)  0.0786 (2.71)  0.0773 (2.67)  0.0776 (2.68) 
Ln(TNA)2 -0.0022 (-2.61)  -0.0023 (-2.69)  -0.0023 (-2.65)  -0.0023 (-2.66) 
Ln(AGE) -0.0109 (-1.64)  -0.0115 (-1.73)  -0.0113 (-1.70)  -0.0112 (-1.69) 
Offshore -0.0191 (-2.48)  -0.0192 (-2.50)  -0.0189 (-2.46)  -0.0195 (-2.54) 
Incentive Fees 0.0005 (0.88)  0.0005 (0.94)  0.0004 (0.84)  0.0005 (0.97) 
Management Fees -0.0046 (-1.14)  -0.0046 (-1.15)  -0.0046 (-1.13)  -0.0042 (-1.04) 
StDev 0.7395 (3.73)  0.8185 (4.52)  0.7774 (4.23)  0.8109 (4.14) 
StDev2 -1.2985 (-2.32)  -1.4356 (-2.74)  -1.3800 (-2.59)  -1.4297 (-2.65) 
Upside Potential Ratio  0.0037 (6.31)  0.0035 (5.99)  0.0036 (6.18)  0.0037 (6.33) 
(Upside Pot Ratio)2 0.0000 (-5.15)  0.0000 (-4.80)  0.0000 (-5.03)  0.0000 (-5.12) 
Number of observations 7425   7425   7425   7425  
R2 0.0583   0.0586   0.0578   0.0573  
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Table A5   
Four Model Specifications Explaining The Sign of Flows in  
Open-End Hedge Funds From Historical Persistence Patterns  
Using Different Thresholds to Define Winners and Losers 
The table reports estimates of four different specifications of a probit model explaining positive and negative money 
flows. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate corrected for reinvestments. The independent variable 
takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. Otherwise it takes value 0. The independent variables include 12 mutually 
exclusive dummies accounting for winner and losing streaks. In each model specification reported in the table, we 
use a different percentile in the distribution of raw returns as a threshold to separate winners and losers. Independent 
variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the 
log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, standard deviation of returns, upside 
potential  based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury 
bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward 
to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one 
if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and the dummies for investment styles defined on the basis 
of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). The model also includes 21 time dummies (estimates not 
reported). The sample includes 752 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We estimate each 
model by pooling all fund-period observations. z-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
             Probit estimates of a model explaining the sign of flows 
 (all ranks based on raw  returns) 
 
Threshold to separate winners and losers 
Parameters 
20th percentile  
(A)  
40th percentile  
 (B) 
60th percentile  
 (C)  
80th percentile  
 (D) 
Intercept -1.4829 (-4.16)  -0.5091 (-1.43)  -0.3515 (-0.89)  -0.8403 (-1.92) 
Expected Rank 4.0759 (6.78)  2.4171 (3.96)  2.1423 (3.05)  3.4397 (4.18) 
W2 0.1732 (2.69)  0.1227 (2.25)  0.1692 (2.80)  0.1367 (1.56) 
W3 0.2990 (4.36)  0.2339 (3.59)  0.2743 (3.33)  0.3140 (2.14) 
W4 0.1801 (2.21)  0.2712 (3.44)  0.2906 (2.50)  0.1607 (0.63) 
W5 0.5145 (6.31)  0.4882 (5.14)  0.2856 (1.75)  0.9274 (1.95) 
W6 0.5225 (10.10)  0.3191 (4.42)  0.3824 (2.14)  0.3996 (0.59) 
L1 -0.0188 (-0.33)  -0.1035 (-2.33)  -0.1417 (-3.11)  -0.1002 (-1.80) 
L2 -0.3097 (-3.33)  -0.3854 (-6.34)  -0.2547 (-4.79)  -0.2304 (-3.66) 
L3 0.2634 (1.45)  -0.5272 (-5.46)  -0.3775 (-5.60)  -0.2387 (-3.48) 
L4 0.1047 (0.34)  -0.2928 (-2.07)  -0.3635 (-4.33)  -0.2159 (-2.78) 
L5 -0.8858 (-1.97)  -0.4454 (-2.53)  -0.3358 (-3.28)  -0.3186 (-3.89) 
L6 1.2283 (1.78)  -0.2790 (-1.15)  -0.3536 (-4.51)  -0.3390 (-6.26) 
Ln(TNA) -0.0156 (-1.47)  -0.0097 (-0.92)  -0.0041 (-0.39)  -0.0047 (-0.45) 
Ln(AGE) -0.1472 (-4.60)  -0.1613 (-5.05)  -0.1532 (-4.76)  -0.1350 (-4.05) 
Cash Flows lag 1 0.3871 (5.09)  0.3776 (5.00)  0.4051 (5.08)  0.4209 (5.30) 
Cash Flows lag 2 0.2915 (4.98)  0.3065 (5.05)  0.3205 (5.18)  0.3153 (5.24) 
Cash Flows lag 3 0.1838 (4.15)  0.1726 (3.73)  0.1716 (3.70)  0.1756 (3.88) 
Cash Flows lag 4 0.1030 (2.45)  0.0985 (2.36)  0.0943 (2.26)  0.0951 (2.37) 
Offshore -0.0869 (-2.28)  -0.1158 (-3.05)  -0.1169 (-3.04)  -0.0829 (-2.08) 
Incentive Fees -0.0032 (-1.28)  -0.0028 (-1.11)  -0.0032 (-1.27)  -0.0038 (-1.51) 
Management Fees 0.0086 (0.48)  -0.0093 (-0.52)  -0.0102 (-0.56)  -0.0079 (-0.44) 
Personal Capital -0.0528 (-1.40)  -0.0449 (-1.19)  -0.0467 (-1.24)  -0.0532 (-1.40) 
StDev -0.9438 (-1.37)  -1.5271 (-2.33)  -2.2711 (-3.23)  -3.2199 (-3.56) 
Upside Potential Ratio 0.0004 (0.31)  0.0034 (1.16)  0.0052 (1.01)  0.0044 (0.78) 
            
Number of observations 7195  7195   7195   7195  
Pseudo R2 0.0923  0.0908  0.085   0.0809  
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Table A6 
Four Model Specifications Explaining Style-Adjusted Relative Performance of 
Open-End Hedge Funds from Historical Persistence Patterns Using Different 
Thresholds to Define Winners and Losers 
The table reports estimates of four different specifications of a model explaining relative performance of hedge funds as 
measured by fractional ranks. The fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance 
relative to all the funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s style-adjusted return. The 
independent variables include twelve dummies accounting for historical winner and loser streaks. In each model 
specification reported in the table, we use a different percentile in the distribution of style-adjusted returns as a threshold to 
separate winners and losers. We control for six lagged fractional ranks, the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior 
quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows computed as quarterly growth 
rates,  upside potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. 
Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a 
reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value 
one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund (estimate not reported) and the dummies for investment styles 
defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). The sample includes 752 open-end hedge funds 
for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We estimate our model by pooling all fund-period observations.  T-statistics based on 
robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
             OLS estimates of a model explaining current style-adjusted rank 
 (all ranks based on style-adjusted returns) 
Threshold to separate winners and losers 
Parameters 
20th percentile  
(A)  
40th percentile  
 (B) 
60th percentile  
 (C)  
80th percentile  
 (D) 
Intercept -0.2395 (-0.98)  -0.1770 (-0.73)  -0.2136 (-0.88)  -0.2226 (-0.91) 
W2 0.0185 (1.03)  -0.0032 (-0.19)  -0.0289 (-1.64)  -0.0143 (-0.63) 
W3 0.0376 (2.12)  0.0034 (0.20)  -0.0225 (-1.04)  -0.0729 (-1.95) 
W4 0.0246 (1.36)  -0.0322 (-1.70)  -0.0254 (-0.93)  0.0099 (0.14) 
W5 -0.0211 (-1.09)  -0.0267 (-1.20)  -0.1147 (-3.19)  -0.1557 (-1.53) 
W6 -0.0003 (-0.02)  -0.0136 (-0.75)  -0.0218 (-0.50)  0.1072 (0.99) 
L1 0.0014 (0.08)  -0.0254 (-1.41)  -0.0173 (-0.97)  0.0217 (1.24) 
L2 0.0092 (0.39)  0.0009 (0.05)  -0.0062 (-0.38)  -0.0011 (-0.06) 
L3 -0.0273 (-0.63)  -0.0703 (-3.21)  -0.0281 (-1.60)  0.0087 (0.50) 
L4 0.0473 (0.53)  0.0178 (0.62)  -0.0095 (-0.49)  -0.0002 (-0.01) 
L5 0.0831 (0.54)  0.0308 (0.69)  -0.0095 (-0.46)  0.0338 (1.87) 
L6 -0.1571 (-0.58)  -0.1085 (-2.39)  -0.0111 (-0.60)  -0.0039 (-0.28) 
Rnk lag 1 0.0550 (3.12)  0.0395 (1.67)  0.0614 (2.64)  0.0788 (4.70) 
Rnk lag 2 0.0291 (1.68)  0.0508 (2.18)  0.0596 (2.54)  0.0309 (1.80) 
Rnk lag 3 0.0559 (3.64)  0.0495 (3.04)  0.0500 (3.07)  0.0594 (3.92) 
Rnk lag 4 0.0168 (1.24)  0.0206 (1.47)  0.0124 (0.87)  0.0002 (0.02) 
Rnk lag 5 -0.0182 (-1.39)  -0.0290 (-2.22)  -0.0217 (-1.64)  -0.0222 (-1.63) 
Rnk lag 6 -0.0093 (-0.74)  -0.0061 (-0.48)  -0.0055 (-0.43)  -0.0123 (-0.94) 
Cash Flows lag 1 -0.0169 (-1.49)  -0.0175 (-1.57)  -0.0173 (-1.54)  -0.0174 (-1.55) 
Cash Flows lag 2 -0.0052 (-0.52)  -0.0047 (-0.47)  -0.0055 (-0.54)  -0.0039 (-0.39) 
Cash Flows lag 3 -0.0065 (-0.79)  -0.0077 (-0.94)  -0.0062 (-0.76)  -0.0071 (-0.86) 
Cash Flows lag 4 -0.0066 (-0.97)  -0.0062 (-0.91)  -0.0068 (-0.98)  -0.0068 (-0.99) 
Ln(TNA) 0.0729 (2.53)  0.0690 (2.41)  0.0714 (2.48)  0.0718 (2.49) 
Ln(TNA)2 -0.0021 (-2.50)  -0.0020 (-2.38)  -0.0021 (-2.46)  -0.0021 (-2.46) 
Ln(AGE) -0.0103 (-1.54)  -0.0116 (-1.76)  -0.0111 (-1.68)  -0.0111 (-1.67) 
Offshore -0.0197 (-2.52)  -0.0198 (-2.52)  -0.0194 (-2.47)  -0.0195 (-2.49) 
Incentive Fees 0.0005 (0.89)  0.0004 (0.76)  0.0004 (0.83)  0.0004 (0.75) 
Management Fees -0.0038 (-0.98)  -0.0039 (-1.00)  -0.0038 (-0.98)  -0.0041 (-1.06) 
StDev 0.6296 (3.32)  0.6454 (3.59)  0.6474 (3.54)  0.6332 (3.37) 
StDev2 -1.1830 (-2.21)  -1.2104 (-2.42)  -1.2086 (-2.34)  -1.1712 (-2.23) 
Upside Potential Ratio  0.0031 (5.38)  0.0030 (5.14)  0.0030 (5.11)  0.0029 (5.09) 
(Upside Pot Ratio)2 0.0000 (-3.67)  0.0000 (-3.52)  0.0000 (-3.48)  0.0000 (-3.46) 
          
Number of obs 7425   7425  7425  7425  
R2 0.0366   0.0377  0.0363  0.0372  
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Table A7 
Four Model Specifications Explaining The Sign of Flows in Open-End Hedge 
Funds from Historical Persistence Patterns (Style-Adjusted) 
Using Different Thresholds to Define Winners and Losers 
The table reports estimates of four different specifications of a probit model explaining positive and negative money 
flows. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate corrected for reinvestments. The independent variable 
takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. Otherwise it takes value 0. The independent variables include 12 mutually 
exclusive dummies accounting for winner and losing streaks. In each model specification reported in the table, we 
use a different percentile in the distribution of style-adjusted returns as a threshold to separate winners and losers. 
Independent variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in the 
prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, standard deviation of 
returns, upside potential  based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the 
U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits 
given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management, a 
dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and  seven dummies for investment 
styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). The model also includes 21 time 
dummies (estimates not reported). The sample contains 752 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 
Q1. We estimate each model by pooling all fund-period observations. z-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
             Probit estimates of a model explaining the sign of flows 
 (all ranks based on style-adjusted returns) 
Threshold to separate winners and losers 
Parameters 
20th percentile  
(A)  
40th percentile  
 (B) 
60th percentile  
 (C)  
80th percentile  
 (D) 
Intercept -1.3634 (-3.33)  -0.5248 (-1.24)  -1.2289 (-2.58)  -1.1830 (-2.98) 
Expected Style-Adjusted 
Rank 4.5761 (5.51)  2.5108 (3.06)  3.9437 (4.10)  4.0206 (5.27) 
W2 -0.0037 (-0.06)  0.1330 (2.48)  0.2338 (3.88)  0.0942 (1.11) 
W3 -0.0108 (-0.13)  0.1696 (2.51)  0.2153 (2.62)  0.3103 (2.17) 
W4 -0.0765 (-0.89)  0.3323 (4.41)  0.1658 (1.49)  0.1062 (0.42) 
W5 0.4180 (5.53)  0.3517 (4.03)  0.8496 (5.16)  0.9019 (2.32) 
W6 0.3283 (6.16)  0.4567 (6.22)  0.1746 (0.85)  -0.2928 (-0.62) 
L1 0.0132 (0.23)  0.0134 (0.28)  -0.0279 (-0.57)  -0.0575 (-1.03) 
L2 -0.2295 (-2.54)  -0.1948 (-3.30)  -0.0478 (-0.82)  -0.0522 (-0.84) 
L3 0.1741 (0.90)  -0.1204 (-0.98)  -0.0015 (-0.02)  -0.1284 (-1.81) 
L4 -0.1405 (-0.42)  -0.2872 (-2.49)  -0.0253 (-0.28)  -0.1491 (-1.88) 
L5    -0.5766 (-2.99)  -0.3144 (-3.14)  -0.3428 (-4.68) 
L6 2.4049 (2.98)  -0.0692 (-0.27)  -0.1850 (-2.09)  -0.1841 (-2.99) 
Ln(TNA) -0.0135 (-1.26)  -0.0099 (-0.93)  -0.0057 (-0.54)  -0.0036 (-0.33) 
Ln(AGE) -0.1508 (-4.51)  -0.1572 (-4.78)  -0.1330 (-3.97)  -0.1341 (-4.10) 
Cash Flows lag 1 0.4458 (5.55)  0.4162 (5.25)  0.4521 (5.56)  0.4558 (5.65) 
Cash Flows lag 2 0.3145 (5.25)  0.3176 (5.12)  0.3350 (5.36)  0.3238 (5.30) 
Cash Flows lag 3 0.1702 (3.87)  0.1760 (3.86)  0.1743 (3.86)  0.1773 (3.91) 
Cash Flows lag 4 0.1046 (2.59)  0.0972 (2.38)  0.1067 (2.61)  0.1108 (2.74) 
Offshore -0.0685 (-1.68)  -0.1004 (-2.50)  -0.0742 (-1.79)  -0.0734 (-1.88) 
Incentive Fees -0.0042 (-1.69)  -0.0026 (-1.05)  -0.0030 (-1.19)  -0.0032 (-1.31) 
Management Fees -0.0079 (-0.44)  -0.0167 (-0.92)  -0.0087 (-0.48)  -0.0048 (-0.27) 
Personal Capital -0.0015 (-0.04)  -0.0125 (-0.32)  -0.0171 (-0.44)  -0.0185 (-0.48) 
StDev -0.0872 (-1.83)  -1.3808 (-2.15)  -2.1782 (-2.83)  -2.4676 (-3.24) 
Upside Potential Ratio 0.0012 (0.46)  0.0058 (1.00)  0.0040 (0.71)  0.0044 (0.75) 
        
Number of observations 7195   7195   7195   7195  
Pseudo R2 0.084   0.083   0.0817   0.0789  
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Table A8 
A  Model explaining Annual Ranks and the Effect of Persistence Patterns 
 Upon Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
Panel A reports estimates of a model explaining relative annual performance as measured by a fractional rank. The 
fractional rank ranges between 0 and 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all the funds existing 
in the sample in the same year, based on the fund’s annual raw return. We use this model to obtain estimates of expected 
annual performance. We include these estimates as regressors in the probit model reported in Panel B explaining positive 
and negative money flows, together with estimates of expected quarterly ranks obtained from the model reported in Table 
IV. The dependent variable in the probit model takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. Otherwise it takes value 0. Cash 
flows are measured as a quarterly growth rate corrected for reinvestments. The explanatory variables include 12 mutually 
exclusive dummies accounting for winner and losing streaks, the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log 
of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, upside potential based on the entire past history of 
the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore 
funds, incentive fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the 
fund’s net assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund 
and the dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not reported). The model 
reported in Table A also includes six lagged fractional ranks while the probit model  includes 21 time dummies (estimates 
not reported).  The sample contains 752 open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We estimate each 
model by pooling all fund-period observations. T-statistics and z-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
Panel A  Panel B 
Parameters 
OLS estimates of a model 
explaining current annual rank 
(all ranks based on raw returns)
 
Parameters 
Probit model 
 explaining the sign 
of   money flows 
Intercept -1.0186 (-3.79)  Intercept 1.1757 (3.45) 
W2 0.0153 (0.89)  Expected Annual Rank -3.1826 (-7.18)
W3 0.0284 (1.37)  Expected Quart. Rank  2.2712 (4.34) 
W4 0.0182 (0.73)  W2 0.1201 (2.22) 
W5 0.0889 (2.84)  W3 0.2433 (3.43) 
W6 0.0440 (1.67)  W4 0.2271 (2.41) 
L1 0.0445 (2.41)  W5 0.5455 (4.19) 
L2 0.0337 (1.94)  W6 0.4032 (3.44) 
L3 0.0015 (0.07)  L1 -0.1754 (-4.04)
L4 0.0110 (0.42)  L2 -0.3064 (-5.60)
L5 -0.0396 (-1.20)  L3 -0.4734 (-6.35)
L6 -0.0526 (-2.28)  L4 -0.4771 (-4.98)
Rnk lag 1 0.0703 (2.68)  L5 -0.5357 (-4.27)
Rnk lag 2 -0.0561 (-2.14)  L6 -0.8161 (-7.46)
Rnk lag 3 -0.0479 (-2.72)  Ln(TNA) -0.0101 (-1.00)
Rnk lag 4 -0.0447 (-2.86)  Ln(AGE) -0.1994 (-6.50)
Rnk lag 5 -0.0046 (-0.31)  Cash Flows lag 1 0.2811 (3.85) 
Rnk lag 6 0.0155 (1.07)  Cash Flows lag 2 0.2602 (4.31) 
Cash Flows lag 1 -0.0223 (-1.90)  Cash Flows lag 3 0.0995 (2.15) 
Cash Flows lag 2 -0.0119 (-0.84)  Cash Flows lag 4 0.0592 (1.52) 
Cash Flows lag 3 -0.0198 (-2.00)  Offshore -0.1976 (-5.22)
Cash Flows lag 4 -0.0079 (-1.18)  Incentive Fees 0.0004 (0.17) 
Ln(TNA) 0.1784 (5.60)  Management Fees -0.0193 (-1.09)
Ln(TNA)2 -0.0053 (-5.64)  Personal Capital -0.0654 (-1.77)
Ln(AGE) -0.0129 (-1.80)  Upside Potential Ratio 0.0115 (2.07) 
Offshore -0.0244 (-2.97)  StDev -1.1298 (-2.51)
Incentive Fees 0.0006 (1.22)     
Management Fees -0.0058 (-1.31)     
StDev 0.7970 (4.11)     
StDev2 -1.4339 (-2.67)     
Upside Potential Ratio  0.0034 (5.38)     
(Upside Pot Ratio)2 -0.00001 (-4.59)     
Number of obs.  5905   Number of obs.  7425  
R2 0.1021   Pseudo R2 0.089  
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Table A9   
The Effect of Persistence Patterns and Aggregate Annual Performance  
Upon Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports estimates of a probit model explaining positive and negative flows. The sample includes 752 
open-end hedge funds for the period 1994 Q4 till 2000 Q1. We measure cash flows as a quarterly growth rate 
corrected for reinvestments. The independent variable takes value 1 if cash flows are positive. Otherwise it 
takes value 0. The independent variables include the previous annual rank and 12 mutually exclusive dummies 
accounting for winner and losing streaks. Independent variables accounting for fund specific characteristics 
include the log of fund’s total net assets in the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, 
four lagged measures of flows, upside potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with 
respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive 
fee as a percentage of profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net 
assets under management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund 
and  seven dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices (estimates not 
reported). The model also includes 21 time dummies (estimates not reported). We estimate each model by 
pooling all fund-period observations. z-statistics  are provided in parentheses. 
 
Probit model explaining positive  
and negative cash flows. 
Parameters A   B 
Intercept -0.5444 (-4.27)  1.3065 (3.79) 
Expected Rank 0.2130 (0.81)  -1.8034 (-3.09) 
Lagged Annual Rank 0.9059 (13.37)  0.9258 (12.15) 
W2 0.0904 (1.67)  0.1009 (1.80) 
W3 0.1739 (2.48)  0.2123 (2.91) 
W4 0.1880 (2.04)  0.1740 (1.85) 
W5 0.2658 (2.26)  0.3100 (2.60) 
W6 0.4867 (4.84)  0.3265 (3.10) 
L1 -0.0660 (-1.53)  -0.1217 (-2.76) 
L2 -0.1001 (-1.87)  -0.0838 (-1.47) 
L3 -0.2281 (-3.07)  -0.3702 (-4.75) 
L4 -0.2061 (-2.15)  -0.3655 (-3.66) 
L5 -0.3818 (-2.96)  -0.5213 (-3.78) 
L6 -0.1486 (-1.24)  -0.2538 (-2.03) 
Ln(TNA)    -0.0189 (-1.78) 
Ln(AGE)    -0.1975 (-6.32) 
Cash Flows lag 1    0.2903 (4.07) 
Cash Flows lag 2    0.2588 (4.37) 
Cash Flows lag 3    0.1092 (2.41) 
Cash Flows lag 4    0.0675 (1.61) 
Offshore    -0.1918 (-5.09) 
Incentive Fees    -0.0011 (-0.45) 
Management Fees    -0.0280 (-1.54) 
Personal Capital    -0.0402 (-1.07) 
Upside Potential Ratio    0.0108 (2.21) 
StDev       -0.8345 (-1.76) 
      
Number of observations 7195   7195  
Pseudo R2 0.0612   0.106  
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“[…] The Event Driven category grew by 28% in 2004. The sector attracted just 
over USD 10 billion in new capital and returned 14.2% to investors, catalyzed by a 
vigorous 7.8% return in Q4. The USD 107.4  billion Global Macro category picked 
up inflows of only USD5.3 billion over the year, a steep drop off  from the USD28.1 
billion inflow seen in 2003. The category returned a lackluster 4.1% to investors…” 
(A report from a style-trend analyst in the hedge fund industry) 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Style Investing:  
Evidence from Hedge Fund Investors92  
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
Classifying assets into categories or “styles” provides investors with a simple 
framework to organize their allocation decisions.93 Recent theoretical models of 
aggregate capital flows in financial markets make the non-trivial assumption that 
investors’ allocations at the style-level are based on relative past performance. In 
these models investors exhibit extrapolative expectations and form their beliefs about 
future performance by learning from past performance information at the style level 
exclusively. In this view, style investing is unrelated to fundamentals and it simply 
amounts to chasing the styles with better prior records. Put differently, investors’ 
coordinated shift of capital from one category to another is the result of correlated 
sentiment vis-à-vis styles performance. The style-chasing hypothesis is a key feature, 
for instance, in the model of Barberis and Shleifer [2003] who show how style-driven 
demand creates comovement and temporary mispricings of securities within the 
favoured categories while it imposes an externality with opposite repercussions in less 
favoured style categories94. Also Shleifer and Vishny [1997] make explicit the notion 
                                                 
92 I am grateful to Kees Koedijk and Ronald Mahieu for many suggestions and very constructive comments. 
93 For example, the typical top-down approach implemented mostly by institutional investors, starts with an 
allocation policy at the style level followed by within-style selection.  
94 Barberis and Shleifer [2003] combine extrapolative expectations with a constraint on investors’ allocations 
to the broadest asset classes (i.e. cash, bonds and stocks) leading investors to shift their capital from poor 
performing styles towards good performing styles. Essentially, their model focuses on the cross effects of a 
coordinated demand driven by a common sentiment factor vis-à-vis style categories. 
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of style-chasing as a result of extrapolative expectations. However, their model 
captures the idea that capital from individual and institutional investors flows to 
different markets or style categories often via professional fund managers specialized 
in each style or market, like hedge funds. In this case style investing translates into 
chasing the best performing category of fund managers. In their model, the 
coordinated response of money flows to past aggregate performance of fund managers 
in a given style regardless of the actual opportunities available in that market 
conduces to the perverse effect of constraining managers’ ability to counteract 
mispricings of securities.95   
 
On this account, the purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, we empirically test 
the underlying assumption of the models of style investing. Concretely, we test the 
hypothesis that hedge fund investors chase hedge fund style-categories. Our second 
aim is to document the extent to which style investing is indeed the result of 
uninformed supply of capital. If this is the case, style driven flows should be 
uncorrelated with future style performance. If, on the contrary, investors are well 
informed, they should be able to timely direct their money into the best performing 
categories in the future and out of the poor performing categories. Therefore, we also 
test whether past style performance is informative about future performance, in a way 
that style-chasing could be justified, and whether there is any indication of smart 
money at the style level.  
 
Several considerations suggest that especially hedge fund investors are likely to 
follow simple feed-back trading strategies based on past performance of investment 
styles. On the one hand, a large portion of capital inflows to hedge funds, currently 
about 50%, comes from institutional investors who tend to follow systematic portfolio 
allocation rules in a way they can later justify their actions to those monitoring them 
(as argued by Lakonishok et al [1992]). On the other hand, given the opacity and 
limited regulation of the industry, investors are in general poorly informed. Further, 
the arbitrage strategies typically used by hedge fund managers are difficult to evaluate 
and their understanding requires financial expertise. Under these circumstances 
investors may tend to fall back on the use of style classifications together with a 
simple decision rule based on past performance as powerful means to simplify the 
                                                 
95 In their model arbitrageurs in one segment gain or lose money under management depending on their 
performance with respect to other segments. They refer to this mechanism as “performance-based aribitrage 
(PBA). Notice however, that their model does not address the cross effects of style investing (which is the 
focus of Barberis and Shleifer [2003]), but focuses on the particular relation between funds and past relative 
performance of a given segment and how sentiment-driven flows place a constraint on arbitrageurs while 
reducing their investment horizon, especially after adverse performance.  Conversely, the model of Barberis 
and Shleifer [2003] makes abstraction of the intermediate role of professional fund managers specialized in a 
given style.  
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processing of complex and noisy information.  Finally, at least one study has provided 
evidence that hedge fund investors misperceive patterns of performance persistence of 
individual funds, and overinvest accordingly (see Baquero and Verbeek [2006b]).  
The question arises whether or not investors display any cognitive bias also in their 
perception of aggregate performance at the style level. For instance, De Bondt [1991, 
1993] describes the results of experiments in which both professional and naïve 
investors tend to see trends in aggregate market indices, presumably as a result of 
anchoring and representativeness. While naïve investors expect continuation, 
sophisticated investors expect a reversal in the trend.  
 
The empirical evidence of style chasing is relatively scarce so far.96 At the individual 
fund level, Cooper et al [2004] present evidence of style investing strategies among 
mutual fund investors. Money flows are attracted by mutual funds that change their 
names in order to suggest a different style focus. Their results indicate that funds with 
previous poor performance are the most inclined to change names. But they also find 
little evidence that after the name change funds indeed changed of allocation strategy.  
Among the few studies on aggregate money flows to investment funds, only two of 
them have explicitly attempted to link money flows to the performance of styles. The 
study by Lettau [1997] focuses on aggregate flows to different mutual fund categories 
and assumes adaptive learning of investors at the style level because of bounded 
rationality. He finds evidence that aggregate past performance determines the 
movements of capital into and out of mutual fund categories, especially for the riskier 
categories (e.g. aggressive growth and growth). Further, the sensitivity is higher for 
poor performing categories. Also Pomorski [1994] examines whether mutual fund 
flows chase styles, while using different possible style classifications of mutual funds 
for his test. He finds that aggregate money flows to a given category are positively 
related to prior returns in that category and negatively related to those in other 
categories, consistent with the feed-back trading model of Barberis and Shleifer 
[2003]. However, at the individual level, the effect disappears. Flows are negatively 
related to styles and chase individual manager performance.97 
                                                 
96 Several empirical studies have rather focused on the theoretical implications of style investing. For example, 
Teo and Woo [2002] test one of the predictions of Barberis and Schleifer [2003], namely that value and 
momentum strategies are profitable. Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler [2002] test the prediction of comovement 
by looking at inclusions of stocks in the S&P500 index. They find evidence that the beta of stocks and their 
correlations with the index increase after the inclusion, consistent with the idea that the index itself represents a 
style category. 
97 Other studies of money flows at the aggregate level are Warther [1995], Brown et al [2000], Edelen and 
Warner [1999], which concentrate on the relation between money flows and the aggregate market, but do not 
study the cross effects between segments or styles.  These studies also argue that money flows to investment 
funds, especially mutual funds are a proxy for investor sentiment. Warther [1996] for example examines the 
possibility that investors are, on aggregate, feed-back traders and invest by chasing aggregate stock returns. He 
also examines the effect of aggregate flows upon aggregate stock market returns, under the assumption of a 
price-pressure hypothesis. By modeling the times series of aggregate money flows, he separately analyzes the 
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The aforementioned studies at the aggregate level, though, suffer from two main 
drawbacks. First, a certain component of money flows, even at the aggregate level, 
reflect decisions motivated by individual fund manager evaluation. This component 
has not been isolated so far. Second, these studies have been conducted under the 
assumption that the style classifications considered in the test are the true asset classes 
that investors have in their minds. For this reason, Pomorski [1994] employs several 
criteria to define a style classification and construct an aggregate performance 
measure.   
 
One contribution of our study is precisely to tackle these two issues. First, we employ 
hedge fund style indices which offer a neat and concrete way to identify styles as 
perceived by investors for an empirical test. In spite of the many criticisms they have 
faced, style indices are widely used by hedge fund investors for several 
benchmarking-related purposes. Style indices are reported monthly and are followed 
closely by the investment community as the only available reference tool, albeit 
imperfect as we will discuss below.  Second, we identify and isolate the component of 
flows related to individual fund selection by estimating first a cross-sectional model of 
money flows from style adjusted performance and other fund characteristics. From 
this model we obtain an estimate of expected money flows driven by fund selectivity 
while we link the aggregate residuals to the performance of style indices.  
 
We report two main results. First, we find evidence that investors chase the winning 
styles in the previous one to three quarters. Second, we do not find evidence that 
style-driven flows are related to subsequent style performance, nor indications of 
momentum in style index performance at quarterly horizons, which suggests that 
momentum investing is the result of a biased perception of style trends.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section offers an 
overview of the main characteristics of style categories and style indices.  Section 5.3 
describes our data on individual funds and style indices. Section 5.4 isolates the style-
allocation component from individual fund selectivity and tests the style-chasing 
hypothesis.  Section 5.5 studies momentum in style index performance, while Section 
5.6 tests the style-timing abilities of hedge fund investors. Finally Section 5.7 
concludes. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
impact of expected and unexpected flows. While he finds evidence consistent with positive feedback trading, 
his results do not support the price pressure hypothesis. 
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5.2   Hedge Fund Indexation 
 
This paper devotes attention to the style-level decisions of hedge fund investors. 
Specifically, we test the hypothesis that investors’ allocations across style categories 
are determined by relative past performance. A primary requirement to test the style 
investment hypothesis is to have a well defined and unique set of style categories 
common to all investors. In the hedge fund industry, such a set of style categories can 
be concretely identified by a set of style indices. There are currently more than a 
dozen competing providers of hedge fund indices and sub indices reporting monthly 
figures. By reducing the vast array of trading and investment strategies pursued by 
fund managers to a handful of style categories, hedge fund indexation has 
tremendously simplified the evaluation of individual fund managers and the overall 
decision-making process of their investors. Accordingly, an allocation decision into 
hedge funds commonly proceeds in two distinct phases. Investors first determine the 
style category that better suits their investment objectives. In a second phase investors 
select funds within that specific category.  
 
The first indices were launched in the early 1990’s. Index providers are usually 
private investment advisors or database vendors such as CSFB/Tremont, who use their 
own datasets for construction of the index. Therefore each index reflects the 
characteristics of that particular universe, as there is little overlap of funds across 
datasets.  More recently, a number of private firms traditionally involved in tracking 
and evaluating the aggregate market, such as S&P, have also started constructing their 
own index products. 
 
Hedge fund indices have had a huge impact in the industry by helping disseminating 
the industry’s overall performance among an expanding base of investors. They are 
widely used as the only available reference tool for comparison across managers and 
strategies. Hedge fund index products are seen as guidelines for investing, facilitating 
the comparison across asset classes, but also for style analysis, portfolio analysis and 
portfolio construction. The last developments include investable hedge fund indices, 
which allow investors to have exposure to a well diversified portfolio of hedge funds 
with the additional advantage of being able to buy and sell the shares in the index in a 
secondary market. Before investable indexes existed, investors could only diversify 
across hedge funds through funds of funds, at a substantial liquidity risk. 
 
Indices of hedge funds are generally constructed as a representative average of funds 
with a similar investment style. Developing a taxonomy of hedge funds is, however, a 
notoriously difficult task since hedge funds enjoy a distinctive flexibility in the types 
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of investment strategies they can deploy. It is difficult to refer to a given hedge fund 
style as a homogenous group. Hedge fund managers’ nimble behaviour in moving into 
and out of different asset classes, their use of leverage and short selling, often with 
exposures to illiquid securities, makes the use of any index-based benchmarking 
questionable. In spite of that, several classification systems are currently in use in the 
industry, with large differences among them.  There is no consensus yet on a unique 
standardized system. 
 
Hedge fund styles encompass not only categories of securities, which might include a 
geographic dimension (e.g. convertible securities, fixed income securities, equity, 
global,  etc), but also a particular trading style  (long short, short bias, arbitrage, 
market neutral, etc). Therefore, the performance of a hedge fund style index is not 
only a reflection of the performance of the underlying securities, as it is the case for 
mutual fund styles, but above all it reflects the effectiveness of the trading style.  
 
One important caveat in the construction of a meaningful style classification is the 
quality and frequency of available data. Hedge funds commonly report their 
performance monthly, but most do so with a considerable delay given the complexity 
in the computation and deduction of incentive fees. Therefore, it is likely that by the 
date necessary for calculation of the index, funds have been unable to report or they 
have reported performance estimates to be revised later. Further, hedge fund reporting 
is voluntary, leading to selection biases and backfilling biases98.  Funds with 
unusually good performance may have incentives to report, or to report earlier in 
order to attract further investors. On the other hand, established funds with good track 
records that have reached capacity limits may decide to close to new investments and 
self-select out of the database. Finally, hedge funds liquidate at relatively high 
frequencies, conducing to survivorship biases in the construction of the index. 
Moreover data gathering problems might differ across strategies and periods. 
 
The construction technology of indices of hedge funds has considerably evolved, 
becoming more rigorous, under increasing demand for indexing products from 
institutional investors.  There are three broad weighting schemes used by most 
providers of hedge fund indices. An equally-weighted average, asset weighted average 
and percentile-based indices.  The former is a simple average return of the constituent 
funds and it was the typical scheme used by the first indices as it does not require 
information on assets under management. It continues to be used by most indices 
today (MAR, S&P, VanHedge Fund Advisors, HFR, MSCI).  A percentile-based 
                                                 
98 Instant-history bias (or backfilling bias) has been documented by Park [1995], Ackermann et al. [1999] and 
Fung and Hsieh [2002], and refers to the possibility that hedge funds participate in a database conditional on 
having performed well over a number of periods prior to inception.  
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index uses a percentile –usually the median, the 10th and 90th percentile - instead of 
the mean of the return distribution of the constituents, while TNA are not required 
either. They avoid the impact of extreme values in the returns of any of its constituent 
funds (Zurich Capital Markets index family, PerTrac Online index family). However, 
they do not reflect the actual dollar returns. Three providers of indices currently offer 
asset weighted schemes: Credit Swiss First Boston/Tremont (CSFB/Tremont), 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and  Hedge Fund Research (HFR). A 
weighted scheme represents more accurately the actual dollar returns across their 
constituent funds.  
 
Hedge fund indices and subindices have been subject of controversy, especially 
concerning the consistency of hedge fund classifications, the lack of transparency of 
the rules and techniques of construction employed by different index providers, and 
how these construction techniques deal with the limited data quality.  It is not 
surprising that a large number of academic studies have focused attention on the 
impact of data-related biases, on the statistical properties of style indices, their 
consistency, and their actual usefulness for hedge fund allocation and portfolio 
analysis99.  Brooks and Kat [2001] and Amenc and Martellini [2002] have 
documented heterogeneity in the information content of competing indices. For a 
given strategy, competing indices exhibit relatively low correlations, and very large 
differences in returns in some periods, especially in periods of crises100. Other studies 
have instead pointed out at the potential usefulness of indices. For example, using the 
TASS database, Brown and Goetzmann [2002] find that style categories account for 
20% in the cross sectional variation of fund returns, indicating that the classification 
conveys some valuable information. Finally, by studying the time series of style index 
returns, Amenc and Martellini [2002] suggest that style tactical allocation is 
profitable. 
 
It remains an open question how investors are actually driven in their allocation 
decisions by style-level information. In fact the financial press, industry newsletters 
and providers of hedge fund indices, offer periodic reports about the past performance 
and expected performance of style indices, they compare indices with each other and 
often highlight trends in the time series. The question arises whether investors on 
                                                 
99 See for example Amenc and Martellini [2001, 2002], Amenc, El Bied and Martellini [2003], Brooks and Kat 
[2001], Brown and Goetzmann [2003], Fung and Hsieh [1997, 2002]. In mutual funds, two relevant studies 
about consistency of style classifications are those of Brown and Goetzmann [1997] and Chen, Chan, 
Lakonishok [2002]. 
100 Amenc and Martellini [2002] give the example of Long Short index in February 2000, between Zurich 
Capital Market index, ZCM, (20.48%) and Evaluation Associates Capital Markets, EACM, (-1.56%).  Brooks 
and Kat[2001] also find large differences between index families, especially for macro and Equity Market 
Neutral indices. 
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aggregate pay attention to such information and actively seek to time styles. If this is 
the case, it also remains to be clarified whether investors pay attention to absolute 
style index returns or compare style indices relative to each other. Are investors 
influenced by upward or downward trends of an index? Over which horizons is the 
information contained in an index relevant for an investor?  And finally, does this 
information help investors to timely direct their money into the best performing 
categories and out of the poor performing categories?  The following sections explore 
these interrelated questions and offer an assessment of the efficiency of capital 
allocation across hedge funds. 
 
 
5.3   Data 
 
Access to hedge fund data is one of the major limitations in hedge fund studies. Hedge 
funds are not complied to report their performance and holdings, as they are subject to 
limited regulation. Therefore, hedge fund datasets are based upon voluntary reporting, 
which gives room to several potential biases, as documented by previous researchers 
(see e.g. Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek [2005], Agarwal and Naik [2000], Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson [1999]). Given this major drawback, in order to make 
inferences about the portfolio of hedge fund investors as a whole, we require a 
representative sample that encompasses not only all investment styles but also a wide 
range of funds in terms of size, age, incentive fees, and location. Our dataset contains 
1543 hedge funds spanning the period 1994Q4-2004Q3 (funds of funds and closed 
end funds are excluded). This is a sample of the TASS database that has been widely 
used in previous academic research. TASS provides a classification of mutually 
exclusive styles based on self-reported styles by managers and information contained 
in the offering memorandum. This classification matches the set of nine style indices 
provided by CSFB/Tremont. In this study we focus attention on quarterly returns and 
quarterly flows, although monthly data is available. However, a quarterly horizon is a 
natural investment horizon for hedge fund investors, as most redemption restrictions 
operate in a quarterly basis. Further, a powerful driver of investor sentiment is the 
coverage of media channels (e.g. press reports), and their attention focuses in general 
on quarterly returns. Table A1 in the appendix provides the total number of hedge 
funds in our sample per quarter and aggregate total net assets and cash flows. Table 
A2 provides summary statistics and a description of different fund-specific variables.  
Finally, Table A3 disaggregates the number of funds per period and per style 
category. 
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Table I 
Average Quarterly Performance of Style Indices, Market Indices 
and Funds in our Sample, between 1994Q4 and 2004Q3 
Panel A gives a summary statistics of quarterly returns of CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund indices over 40 
quarters, from 1994Q4 till 2004Q3. We also include the performance of the S&P500 index and the 90 days T-
bill for comparison. Panel B gives a summary statistics of quarterly returns of hedge funds in our sample 
sorted per style over the same period. In this panel, the category labelled “General Hedge fund index” contains 
the funds in our sample for which the investment style was not clearly identified. The sample consists of 1543 
open-end hedge funds taken from TASS database that have a complete series of monthly total net assets 
(TNA), with a minimum of 6 quarters of quarterly returns history and with computed quarterly cash flows 
available at least for one year. Funds of funds are not included.  
Panel A: Summary Statistics of quarterly returns of  CSFB/Tremont Indices and Market Indices 
Index Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Convertible Arbitrage  0.0271 0.0314 -0.0724 0.0972 
Dedicated Short Bias -0.0045 0.0984 -0.2008 0.2178 
Emerging Markets 0.0189 0.1056 -0.2867 0.3066 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0277 0.0161 -0.0002 0.0593 
Event Driven 0.0290 0.0380 -0.1435 0.0839 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.0182 0.0207 -0.0469 0.0483 
Global Macro 0.0386 0.0583 -0.1046 0.1683 
Long/Short Equity 0.0332 0.0617 -0.0781 0.2778 
Managed Futures 0.0151 0.0632 -0.1046 0.1618 
General Hedge fund index 0.0293 0.0417 -0.0887 0.1662 
     
S&P500 0.0304 0.0884 -0.1728 0.2128 
Tbill 90days 0.0098 0.0045 0.0023 0.0152 
     
Panel B: Time-series averages of cross-sectional means per style in our sample  
Style Category Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Convertible Arbitrage  0.0278 0.0281 -0.0563 0.0785 
Dedicated Short Bias 0.0086 0.1050 -0.1777 0.2242 
Emerging Markets 0.0310 0.1132 -0.2770 0.2571 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0206 0.0178 -0.0177 0.0539 
Event Driven 0.0256 0.0328 -0.0997 0.0786 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.0185 0.0254 -0.0496 0.0642 
Global Macro 0.0244 0.0402 -0.0504 0.1153 
Long/Short Equity 0.0337 0.0616 -0.0844 0.2150 
Managed Futures 0.0231 0.0552 -0.1063 0.1449 
General Hedge fund index 0.0246 0.0287 -0.0278 0.0893 
All funds in our sample 0.0271 0.0350 -0.0502 0.1177 
 
  
The CSFB/Tremont is an asset weighted index with 403 funds from the TASS 
database, rebalanced quarterly. The constituent funds are required to have a minimum 
TNA of $10 million, a one-year track record and an audited financial statement before 
being included. They are removed from the index for liquidation reasons or failure to 
meet reporting requirements. Some investment styles seek to time market movements 
and are referred to as directional strategies. Others seek to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities and are referred to as non directional.  Table I provides a summary of 
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quarterly performance of the general CSFB/Tremont hedge fund index and the nine 
sub-indices in Panel A, and the aggregate performance of hedge funds in our dataset 
sorted by style in panel B. Noticeably, there is wide dispersion in volatility across 
hedge fund categories. The most extreme returns are associated with Dedicated Short 
Bias and Emerging Markets styles, while Equity Market Neutral appears to be a 
relatively conservative category, with dispersion in returns far below the one of the 
market. Finally, Table I also indicates that both the general hedge fund index and the 
average hedge fund in our dataset have underperformed the stock market index over 
the sample period by 11 and 33 basis points per quarter respectively.   
 
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of total assets under management shared by each 
category of funds in our database. The aggregate  portfolio of hedge fund investors 
varies widely over time in terms of allocations across styles, sometimes dramatically. 
For instance, after 2002 the global macro strategy has experienced a sharp decrease in 
size, becoming almost unimportant. Our purpose in the following sections is to 
analyze more closely the behaviour of aggregate money flows to better understand the 
motives underlying these changes in exposure to hedge fund categories. 
  
 
 
Figure 1 
Style Allocation of Hedge Fund Investors 
Hedge funds are sorted per style category every quarter from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3. The 
figure indicates the variations over time of holdings of hedge fund investors across styles. 
Our sample consists of 1543 open-end hedge funds taken from TASS database. 
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5.4   Style level flows vs. fund selectivity  
 
In this paper we argue that investors’ learning occurs at two distinct levels. On the one 
hand, allocation decisions are powerfully driven by fund indexation, as many channels 
of information and advice within the industry regularly highlight the performance of 
style indices. On the other hand, individual fund evaluation via due diligence is a 
major and ineluctable task, as information hurdles resulting from limited regulation 
and disclosure prevent investors from a transparent assessment of fund managers. Our 
study concentrates on style level decisions and we are confronted to the problem of 
isolating as neatly as possible both components. Fund selection within a given style 
involves both a qualitative and quantitative analysis. Besides information on returns 
and assets under management, the TASS database provides a number of fund specific 
variables that are likely to be determinants of investors’ final choice, like the structure 
of incentives, liquidity restrictions, geographic location, etc. Our methodology 
consists of estimating first a cross-sectional model of flows, in which we include on 
the right hand side only variables strictly related to fund selection.  The main 
specification is the following: 
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where Flowi,t represents the net percentage growth in fund i in period t, and Rnki,t-j is 
the jth lagged relative style-adjusted performance as measured by a fund’s cross-
sectional rank. We distinguish between restricted and unrestricted ranks by allowing 
for interactions between lagged ranks and dummies accounting for limits to 
liquidity.101 We include the size and age of the fund in the previous period, ln(TNAi,t-1 ) 
and ln(AGEi,t-1). Flowi,t-j is the jth lagged flow. Xi,t is a vector of fund specific 
characteristics like management fees, incentive fees, managerial ownership. We 
control for time effects by including time dummies, denoted by λt, to capture 
economy wide shocks conducing to different average flows across quarters, as 
suggested by Table A1. Notice that our model does not include style-related variables, 
as our purpose is to capture such effects within the error term. 
                                                 
101 In each quarter t, we define for each j-lagged rank and for each fund i :  
 
                      Rank Unrestrictedi,t-j = Ranki,t-j * (REDRi,t-j )  
               and    Rank Restrictedi,t-j  = Ranki,t-j * (1-REDRi,t-j) 
 
  where REDRi,t-j is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if redemption restrictions do not prevent outflows 
  in quarter t in response to j-lagged performance given by Ranki,t-j.   
150
Chapter 5 
 
 
138
Cash flows are defined as in Chapter 3, either as growth rates or dollar flows. The 
previous model assumes that the selectivity process is similar across styles. More 
particularly, it assumes that the sensitivity of investors to past style-adjusted 
performance is independent  of  style.  Our  estimation  results  in  Table II  confirm  
 
Table II 
The Effect of Relative Style-Adjusted Performance Subject to Liquidity 
Restrictions Upon Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports OLS estimates of a model of flows subject to liquidity restrictions. The sample includes 1543 
open-end hedge funds for the period 1994Q4 till 2003Q4. We measure cash flows as the change in total net 
assets between consecutive quarters corrected for reinvestments. We normalize this measure as a growth rate 
relative to the fund’s total net assets of previous quarter. The independent variables that account for relative 
performance include six lagged fractional ranks interacting with dummies accounting for limits to liquidity. 
The fractional rank ranges from 0 to 1 and is defined as the fund’s percentile performance relative to all the 
funds existing in the sample in the same period, based on the fund’s style-adjusted return in previous quarter. 
Independent variables accounting for fund specific characteristics include the log of fund’s total net assets in 
the prior quarter, the log of fund’s age in months since inception, four lagged measures of flows, the inverse of 
upside potential based on the entire past history of the fund and calculated with respect to the return on the 
U.S. Treasury bill, a dummy variable taking value one for offshore funds, incentive fee as a percentage of 
profits given as a reward to managers, management fee as a percentage of the fund’s net assets under 
management, a dummy taking value one if the manager’s personal capital is invested in the fund and 39 time 
dummies (not reported). We estimate our model by pooling all fund-period observations. T-statistics based on 
robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
Parameters OLS estimates of a model explaining growth rates 
Intercept 0.1549 (4.98) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 1 Unrestricted 0.1063 (15.47) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 2 Unrestricted 0.0801 (11.70) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 3 Unrestricted 0.0605 (8.68) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 4 Unrestricted 0.0462 (6.82) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 5 Unrestricted 0.0192 (2.74) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 6 0.0060 (0.88) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 1 Restricted 0.1014 (6.15) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 2 Restricted 0.0718 (3.42) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 3 Restricted 0.0463 (2.82) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 4 Restricted 0.0491 (3.04) 
Style-adj. Rank lag 5 Restricted 0.0349 (1.90) 
Ln(TNA) -0.0124 (-8.91) 
Ln(AGE) -0.0171 (-5.08) 
Flows lag 1 0.0557 (4.68) 
Flows lag 2 0.0501 (5.83) 
Flows lag 3 0.0114 (1.67) 
Flows lag 4 0.0135 (2.21) 
Offshore 0.0095 (2.25) 
Incentive Fees -0.0006 (-2.06) 
Management Fees -0.0084 (-3.96) 
Personal Capital Invested -0.0031 (-0.76) 
Leverage 0.0149 (3.88) 
Downside-Upside Potential Ratio -0.0192 (-7.98) 
Standard Deviation of Returns -0.2663 (-3.82) 
Number of observations 21841  
R2 0.0811  
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previous evidence that money flows are directed to funds with better prior 
performance, and that past performance has a significant impact up to five lagged 
quarters or so. Liquidity restrictions, the age and the size of the fund are also 
important in the evaluation process of investors.102 
 
Next, we obtain the residuals from the previous model, and we aggregate them per 
period and per style category under the assumption that both components, namely 
style allocation and fund selectivity are orthogonal. Put differently, we focus on the 
components of money flows that cannot be explained by fund-specific factors and are 
style-related. Table III reports estimates of a linear model explaining aggregate capital 
flows per style as measured by growth rates. We analyze whether differences in 
aggregate capital flows across styles are explained by past relative performance, by 
past style index returns, by the length of upward or downward trends in style 
performance or by any style-related fixed effects. Our sample contains 399 
observations when all 10 styles indices are included and 359 observations when the 
general Hedge Fund index is excluded  and  we only consider the set of  9 
subindices.103   Table A4 in the appendix 
 
provides summary statistics of the relevant variables included in our model of 
aggregate flows. Over the sample period we have identified upward trends up to four 
quarters length and downward trends up to five quarters length. We capture the length 
of the trend with nine mutually exclusive dummies. We also include on the right hand 
side of our model a trend variable in order to account for the increase in the number of 
funds over time. We consider several alternative specifications corresponding to 
different ways of assessing past style performance. Recall that the style-investing 
hypothesis is rooted on the idea that investors compare styles with each other. 
Accordingly, in Panel A we include the structure of lagged style ranks as a measure of 
relative past performance, while controlling for upward and downward trends and 
style dummies. The style rank variable takes values between 1 and 9 and is obtained 
by ranking in each quarter the nine style indices based on their raw returns (therefore 
the general Hedge Fund index is excluded from the ranking).   
According to our results, investors strongly respond to relative performance over the 
three  lagged  quarters.  If  one  style  index  moves  from  the  bottom to the top of the  
 
                                                 
102 See Baquero and Verbeek [2005] for a detailed analysis of the impact of fund-specific variables on money 
flows. 
103 In fact we have 40 observations per style. However, we have identified one significant outlier 
corresponding to the Convertible Arbitrage strategy in the last quarter of 2001, a negative growth rate of -83%. 
The models presented in Tables III and IV exclude that single observation. When this observation is included 
in our model specifications, the impact of the individual variables remains for the most part unchanged but the 
explanatory power of the model is significantly affected, with a reduction in the R2 to levels of 2 to 3%. 
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Table III 
The Effect of Style Performance  
 Upon Aggregate Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports OLS estimates of a model of aggregate money flows per style. Money flows are the residuals 
of the  cross sectional model estimated in Table II explaining growth rates from style-adjusted performance 
and fund specific characteristics. We first obtain dollar flows per fund by multiplying the residuals by the total 
net assets in the previous period. Then we aggregate dollar flows per style and per period. Alternatively, we 
obtain an aggregate growth rate by dividing aggregate dollar flows by the aggregate total net assets in the 
previous quarter. The sample consists of 399 style-period observations between 1994Q4 and 2004Q3. The 
independent variables include three lagged style index returns, a trend variable, eight dummies accounting for 
the length of upward and downward trends in the style index and 7 dummies for investment styles defined on 
the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The general hedge fund index is taken as reference category. We estimate 
our model by pooling all style-period observations. T-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
 Model explaining style-driven growth rates 
 ( A )  ( B )  ( C )  ( D) 
Parameters Coeff t-test  Coeff. t-test  Coeff. t-test  Coeff. t-test 
Intercept -0.0765 (-5.40)  -0.0098 (-0.97)  -0.0732 (-4.17)  0.0120 (1.05)
Style Rank lag 1 0.0070 (4.82)     0.0058 (2.92)    
Style Rank lag 2 0.0035 (2.31)     0.0044 (2.15)    
Style Rank lag 3 0.0043 (2.97)     0.0029 (1.44)    
Style Return lag 1   0.2520 (4.21)  0.0846 (1.05)    
Style Return lag 2   0.0318 (0.50)  -0.0730 (-0.87)    
Style Return lag 3   0.1902 (3.15)  0.0818 (0.98)    
Winning Streak 2        0.0109 (0.83)
Winning Streak 3        0.0098 (0.54)
Winning Streak 4        0.0372 (2.25)
Losing  Streak 1        -0.0104 (-0.94)
Losing  Streak 2        -0.0172 (-1.33)
Losing  Streak 3        -0.0481 (-3.49)
Losing  Streak 4        -0.0454 (-2.75)
Losing  Streak 5        -0.0501 (-3.60)
Trend 0.0006 (2.13)  0.0005 (1.87)  0.0006 (2.15)  0.0006 (2.06)
Up 2 Quarters 0.0093 (0.81)  0.0203 (1.76)  0.0133 (1.11)  0.0049 (0.43)
Up 3 Quarters 0.0045 (0.23)  0.0122 (0.67)  0.0072 (0.37)  0.0037 (0.19)
Up 4 Quarters -0.0880 (-2.02)  -0.1019 (-2.25)  -0.0914 (-2.08)  -0.0905 (-2.04)
Down 1 Quarter 0.0018 (0.18)  0.0085 (0.81)  0.0084 (0.78)  -0.0025 (-0.27)
Down 2 Quarters 0.0033 (0.29)  0.0074 (0.63)  0.0071 (0.59)  0.0012 (0.11)
Down 3 Quarters 0.0056 (0.25)  0.0004 (0.02)  0.0078 (0.34)  -0.0034 (-0.15)
Down 4 Quarters 0.0195 (0.55)  0.0054 (0.15)  0.0234 (0.65)  0.0046 (0.13)
Down 5 Quarters -0.0351 (-0.58)  -0.0643 (-1.02)  -0.0319 (-0.52)  -0.0531 (-0.85)
Emerging Markets -0.0079 (-0.67)  -0.0104 (-0.90)  -0.0083 (-0.71)  -0.0110 (-0.90)
Equity Mrkt. Neutral 0.0216 (1.84)  0.0119 (1.03)  0.0203 (1.70)  0.0209 (1.74)
Event Driven -0.0048 (-0.40)  -0.0044 (-0.38)  -0.0050 (-0.42)  -0.0087 (-0.70)
Fixed Income 0.0055 (0.47)  -0.0088 (-0.77)  0.0041 (0.34)  0.0078 (0.65)
Global Macro 0.0010 (0.08)  0.0012 (0.11)  0.0003 (0.02)  -0.0052 (-0.39)
Long Short Equity -0.0151 (-1.28)  -0.0249 (-2.15)  -0.0168 (-1.40)  -0.0143 (-1.18)
Managed Futures 0.0143 (1.22)  0.0037 (0.32)  0.0133 (1.12)  0.0112 (0.94)
          
Adj R2 0.133   0.0798   0.132   0.0985  
No  obs. 359   399   359   359  
 
153
Style Investing: Evidence from Hedge Fund Investors 
 
141
 
ranking in one period,  the  aggregate  of  funds  in  that  style  experience  a  
significant increase of 5.6% in growth rates in the subsequent quarter, and a 
significant 11.6% increase over the next three quarters. Investors appear to be 
insensitive to the longer run in relative style performance.104 They are also somehow 
insensitive to the length in style trends, although the coefficient for an upward trend of 
four quarters is negative and significant. This long upward trend occurs in two 
occasions only, in June 1997 and March 2001, both in the Dedicated Short Bias 
strategy.  This gives some indication that investors in this very volatile strategy 
anticipate frequent reversals and act contrarian. Overall, the results of this first 
specification are consistent with the style-chasing hypothesis, whereby allocations are 
mostly directed to the styles with better prior performance and away of poor 
performing styles. Panel B reports estimation results when we include absolute 
performance instead of relative performance. In this case we also include the 
aggregate money flows for the group of funds without a clear investment style and we 
link it to the performance of the general Hedge Fund Index. This increases the 
number of observations from 359 to 399. The lagged structure of style index returns 
has also a significant impact upon growth rates but the pattern is less clear than with 
relative performance. The effect is mostly concentrated in the first lag.  A 1% 
difference in style index returns accounts for nearly 0.25% increase in growth of the 
style in the next quarter. However, this model explains substantially less variation in 
the cross-section of aggregate growth rates compared to the previous specification, as 
indicated by the reduced value of the R2. When both style ranks and style index 
returns are included (Panel C), ranks appear to capture all the impact on aggregate 
money flows.  
 
An alternative way to account for past relative performance is to define a dummy for 
winning and losing styles. In a given period we define a style as a winner if it is 
placed in one of the top four ranks with respect to other styles. Otherwise the style is 
classified as a loser. Next, we count the number of consecutive quarters over which 
the style remains as winner (alternatively as loser). In this way, we identified winning 
streaks up to 13 quarters and losing streaks up to 10 quarters length. While in our first 
specification we have shown that the lagged style ranks manifestly have an influence 
on investors’ decisions, here the question of interest is how investors do perceive a 
precise sequence in relative performance information.  To analyze this, we create four 
dummies accounting for the length of winning streaks and 5 dummies for losing 
streaks. With one dummy we capture the effect of winning streaks of four quarters 
length or more. The last dummy accounts for losing streaks of more than five quarters 
length. The estimation  results  are  presented  in Panel D.  It is apparent that investors  
                                                 
104 We have experimented with alternative specifications and additional lags do not have a significant impact 
on money flows. 
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Table IV 
The Effect of Style Performance  
 Upon Aggregate Money Flows in Open-End Hedge Funds 
The table reports OLS estimates of a model of aggregate money flows per style. Money flows are the residuals 
of the  cross sectional model estimated in Table II explaining growth rates from style-adjusted performance 
and fund specific characteristics. We first obtain dollar flows per fund by multiplying the residuals by the total 
net assets in the previous period. Then we aggregate dollar flows per style and per period. Alternatively, we 
obtain an aggregate growth rate by dividing aggregate dollar flows by the aggregate total net assets in the 
previous quarter. The sample consists of 399 style-period observations between 1994Q4 and 2004Q3. The 
independent variables include three lagged style index returns, a trend variable, eight dummies accounting for 
the length of upward and downward trends in the style index and 7 dummies for investment styles defined on 
the basis of CSFB/Tremont indices. The general hedge fund index is taken as reference category. We estimate 
our model by pooling all style-period observations. T-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
 
Model explaining style-driven dollar flows 
(coefficients expressed in thousands) 
 ( A ) ( B ) ( C ) ( D ) 
Parameters Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test. Coeff. t-test Coeff. t-test 
Intercept -609000 (-6.98) -156000 (-2.42) -612000 (-5.65) -41600 (-0.60) 
Style Rank lag 1 32600 (3.65)   38700 (3.15)   
Style Rank lag 2 37600 (4.05)   38800 (3.10)   
Style Rank lag 3 33200 (3.75)   25900 (2.08)   
Style Return lag1   915000 (2.41) -314000 (-0.63)   
Style Return lag2   849000 (2.09) -94200 (-0.18)   
Style Return lag3   1410000 (3.69) 433000 (0.84)   
Winning Streak 2     82900 (1.05) 
Winning Streak 3     147000 (1.34) 
Winning Streak 4     323000 (3.25) 
Losing Streak 1     30700 (0.46) 
Losing Streak 2     -177000 (-2.28) 
Losing Streak 3     -162000 (-1.96) 
Losing Streak 4     -220000 (-2.22) 
Losing Streak 5     -483000 (-5.78) 
Trend 6682 (3.92) 7226 (4.17) 6698 (3.92) 7118 (4.08) 
Up 2 Quarters 56700 (0.80) 123000 (1.69) 68000 (0.92) -3188 (-0.05) 
Up 3 Quarters 4081 (0.03) 64400 (0.56) 8931 (0.07) -12500 (-0.10) 
Up 4 Quarters -133000 (-0.50) -195000 (-0.68) -113000 (-0.42) -169000 (-0.63) 
Down 1 Quarter -19700 (-0.33) 5701 (0.09) -12700 (-0.19) -26800 (-0.47) 
Down 2 Quarters -1561 (-0.02) 4806 (0.06) -18700 (-0.25) 44500 (0.66) 
Down 3 Quarters -68500 (-0.50) -94400 (-0.68) -71600 (-0.51) -69200 (-0.51) 
Down 4 Quarters 110000 (0.50) -25000 (-0.11) 97900 (0.44) 18100 (0.08) 
Down 5 Quarters 121000 (0.32) -82800 (-0.21) 144000 (0.38) 97600 (0.26) 
Emerging Markets -11500 (-0.16) -20500 (-0.28) -9726 (-0.13) -46800 (-0.64) 
Equity Mkt.Neutral 4494 (0.06) -54500 (-0.75) 6170 (0.08) -9992 (-0.14) 
Event Driven 33700 (0.46) 43700 (0.60) 34900 (0.47) -7950 (-0.11) 
Fixed Income 35100 (0.49) -59900 (-0.83) 35800 (0.49) 65900 (0.91) 
Global Macro 34900 (0.47) 47500 (0.64) 35900 (0.48) -23900 (-0.30) 
Long Short Equity -120000 (-1.66) -180000 (-2.45) -121000 (-1.63) -96600 (-1.33) 
Managed Futures 283000 (3.92) 215000 (2.96) 284000 (3.90) 276000 (3.83) 
Adj R2 0.201  0.122  0.196  0.208  
No  obs. 359  399  359  359  
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follow a momentum strategy at the style level. Longer winning streaks attract 
significantly larger money flows,  while  longer  losing  streaks  are  associated  with  
increasingly  negative growth rates. For example, if a style index has underperformed 
most other indices for four consecutive quarters, it triggers significant negative growth 
rates of -4.54% compared to one-quarter streaks.  If this style index remains one 
additional quarter as  loser, growth rates reduce even further by 50 basis points. 
 
In Table IV, we present estimates of our model when the dependent variable is 
aggregate residual dollar flows. The results are similar to those presented above. 
Dollar flows are sensitive to past style performance either in terms of style returns or 
style ranks, while investors clearly follow momentum strategies in response to 
winning and losing streaks. However, if we compare the R2 of models in Panel A and 
B, we can conclude that ranks explain a substantially larger variation in cross 
sectional aggregate dollar flows. Moreover, styles at the top of the ranking attract $ 
293 million more than styles at the bottom, according to Panel A, while according to 
Panel B, a differential of 1% in style returns attracts a further $ 9 million.  
 
It is worthwhile to highlight that investors are apparently insensitive to upward and 
downward trends in the time series of index returns, but they are highly sensitive to 
sequences of relative performance measured in the cross section. Overall, our results 
strongly support the essential principle behind the style-investing hypothesis, namely 
that investors allocations depend on style performance relative to other styles. It is 
plausible, however, that style-chasing behaviour is explained by investors having 
superior information or having performed a sophisticated analysis of style 
performance that motivates them to actively shift their capital across styles.  If it is the 
case that investors exhibit style-timing abilities, it should be possible to identify a 
correlation between money flows and subsequent style performance.  The next two 
sections explore this possibility. 
 
5.5   Style indices and style momentum 
 
The results in the previous section indicate that investors on aggregate direct their 
money towards those styles for which the index displayed higher returns compared to 
other indices. Conversely, investors on aggregate pulled out their money from those 
styles with corresponding index returns below other indices. This suggests not only 
that investors pay attention to the style indices, but apparently they also expect 
continuation in the performance of the index. This section explores whether there is 
any evidence of persistence in returns across style indices.  
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The question of style momentum is not trivial. Studies on persistence have identified 
momentum in individual hedge funds both in raw returns and style-adjusted returns. 
But, is momentum related to specific funds or is it also a property of a specific 
investment category?  Is persistence related to the skills of an individual manager, or 
to the success of a trading style under specific market circumstances? As with 
individual funds, differences in returns across style indices might be associated to risk 
differentials. Table I, Panel A, shows for example that the indices Dedicated Short 
Bias and Emerging Markets are the most volatile in terms of standard deviation of 
historical quarterly returns. Another way to look at the riskiness of a given style index 
relative to other indices is by ranking the nine Tremont indices in each period in terms 
of returns, and then computing the frequency of rank position for each index.  Table V 
reports the frequencies for both monthly rankings (Panel A) and quarterly rankings 
(Panel B) over the period January 1994-December 2004. The rank 9 corresponds to 
the index with the highest return in a given period. For example, the index Dedicated 
Short  Bias  offered  the  highest  returns  across  styles  in  24.24% of the 132 months, 
 
 
 
Table V 
Rank Frequencies per Style Index 
In each period we rank the nine Tremont indices in terms of returns. Then we compute the frequency of rank 
position for each index. The table reports the frequencies for both monthly rankings (Panel A) and quarterly 
rankings (Panel B) over the period January 1994-December 2004. The rank 9 corresponds to the index with the 
highest return in a given period. 
Panel A: Rank frequency (%)  at monthly horizons 
Rank 
Position 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Dedicated 
Short Bias 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage 
Global 
Macro 
Long/Short 
Equity 
Managed 
Futures 
Top   9 2.27 24.24 25.00 5.30 3.79 0.00 9.09 13.64 16.67 
8 12.88 8.33 15.15 3.79 9.85 6.82 18.94 14.39 9.85 
7 15.15 2.27 6.82 13.64 15.15 11.36 14.39 13.64 7.58 
6 13.64 4.55 7.58 14.39 25.00 12.12 12.88 5.30 4.55 
5 15.15 2.27 4.55 17.42 21.97 14.39 5.30 12.12 6.82 
4 14.39 3.03 3.79 19.70 11.36 20.45 10.61 9.09 7.58 
3 15.91 3.03 2.27 13.64 7.58 23.48 11.36 9.09 13.64 
2 7.58 12.88 12.12 10.61 4.55 10.61 10.61 15.91 15.15 
Bottom 1 3.03 39.39 22.73 1.52 0.76 0.76 6.82 6.82 18.18 
Panel B: Rank frequency (%) at quarterly horizons 
Rank 
Position 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Dedicated 
Short Bias 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage 
Global 
Macro 
Long/Short 
Equity 
Managed 
Futures 
Top  9 6.82 34.09 31.82 0.00 2.27 0.00 6.82 6.82 11.36 
8 4.55 4.55 13.64 11.36 4.55 4.55 20.45 18.18 18.18 
7 11.36 0.00 2.27 4.55 31.82 9.09 25.00 11.36 4.55 
6 9.09 0.00 9.09 25.00 25.00 9.09 11.36 6.82 4.55 
5 20.45 2.27 0.00 15.91 15.91 15.91 6.82 13.64 9.09 
4 27.27 0.00 4.55 18.18 6.82 18.18 9.09 9.09 6.82 
3 11.36 4.55 2.27 13.64 6.82 34.09 9.09 13.64 4.55 
2 9.09 6.82 11.36 11.36 4.55 9.09 2.27 15.91 29.55 
Bottom 1 0.00 47.73 25.00 0.00 2.27 0.00 9.09 4.55 11.36 
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while it displayed the worst returns (rank 1) 39.39% of the time. Also the indices 
Emerging Markets and Managed Futures alternate very often between the extreme 
rank positions. All other indices are less volatile and rank most often in the middle 
positions.  We observe similar patterns with quarterly rankings (Panel B).  
 
In order to obtain a first indication of persistence in returns of style indices, we 
analyze the likelihood that the winning styles remain the winners in the subsequent 
period. Figure 2, shows a contingency table of quarterly index performance. In each 
quarter we compare the rank position of any index with its rank in the subsequent 
quarter. The style indices ranked in the top position (rank 9) have 28% of probabilities 
to remain in the top rank, but also 28% of probabilities to revert to the bottom rank.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Contingency Table of Quarterly Style Index Performance  
The nine Tremont indices are ranked each period based on the net returns at the 
end of the period.  We compare the initial rank position of any index with its 
rank in the subsequent month. The bar in cell (i,j) represents the conditional 
probability of achieving a subsequent rank position j given an initial rank 
position i.  
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Similarly, the styles in the bottom rank are very likely to alternate between the bottom 
rank and the top rank.105  Although the probabilities for the extreme ranks are to a 
large extent driven by the three most volatile style categories mentioned above 
                                                 
105 A pertinent question is to what extent these figures are the result of a survivorship bias affecting style 
indices performance?  Arguably, the funds used to construct the indices of these highly volatile categories are 
more likely to liquidate in case of extremely bad outcomes. By the same token, they are likely to exhibit very 
high returns conditional upon survival (see Fung and Hsieh [1999]). 
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(namely Dedicated Short Bias, Emerging Markets and Managed Futures), we also 
observe that the ranks 6, 7 and 8 have large probabilities of nearly 20% to remain in 
one of the top three ranks in the subsequent quarter, while the ranks 2, 3 and 4 are 
more likely to remain in one of the bottom three ranks.106  
 
The previous analysis indicates that some style indices tend to persist in the two 
extreme ranks. However, this does not necessarily imply that the winning style indices 
in one period offer on average higher returns than other indices in the subsequent 
period, given the high turnover rates of indices across ranks.  Therefore, we also 
calculate the average returns per rank in the period following the ranking. The 
statistical tests presented in Table VI for the entire sample period and the two half 
periods do not support the idea of performance persistence at the style level. In fact, 
the top rank underperforms most of other above-median ranks, as also shown in 
Figure 3. The difference between the top and bottom portfolios is of about 0.4% per 
quarter, statistically insignificant.  
 
 
Table VI 
Persistence Estimates in Quarterly Style Index Returns 
In each quarter between 1994Q1 and 2004Q4 we rank the nine Tremont indices in terms of absolute  returns. 
The rank 9 corresponds to the index with the highest return in a given period. The table reports average returns 
per rank in the period following the ranking. 
 
Sample period 
(Jan 1994 – Dec2004) 
First half period 
1994 Q1- 1999Q1 
Second half period 
1999 Q2- 2004 Q3 
 
Average 
 return t-test 
Average 
 return t-test 
Average 
 Return t-test 
Top rank    9 0.0223 (1.55) 0.0245 (1.14) 0.0202 (1.02) 
8 0.0228 (2.75) 0.0262 (2.01) 0.0195 (1.84) 
7 0.0368 (5.94) 0.0460 (4.42) 0.0280 (4.23) 
6 0.0173 (3.05) 0.0103 (1.15) 0.0240 (3.45) 
5 0.0247 (3.16) 0.0192 (2.15) 0.0299 (2.34) 
4 0.0345 (5.51) 0.0449 (4.83) 0.0246 (3.05) 
3 0.0135 (1.88) 0.0125 (0.96) 0.0144 (2.10) 
2 0.0134 (1.33) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0261 (1.68) 
Bottom rank   1 0.0180 (1.12) 0.0205 (0.77) 0.0156 (0.82) 
Top minus bottom 0.0043 (0.17) 0.0040 (0.10) 0.0046 (0.14) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 At monthly horizons, the style indices ranked in the top position (rank 9) have a probability of 25% to 
remain in the top rank. However there is a 12% probability that it reverts to the bottom rank. Similarly, the 
style indices in the bottom rank, have a probability of nearly 30% to remain the losers.   We found some 
evidence of persistence at monthly horizons in style index returns. The top rank provides an average monthly 
return of 1.3% compared to nearly -0.4% of the bottom rank. The difference of 1.7% is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. However, when we repeat this analysis by splitting the sample period in two halves, we only 
find statistically significant evidence of persistence in the first halve, from January 1994 till April 1999. 
159
Style Investing: Evidence from Hedge Fund Investors 
 
147
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Analysis of Quarterly Persistence in Style Index Performance  
In each quarter between 1994Q1 and 2004Q4 we rank the nine Tremont indices in 
terms of absolute returns. The rank 9 corresponds to the index with the highest return 
in a given period. The figure shows average returns per rank in the period following 
the ranking. 
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Table VII presents additional persistence tests by separating style indices between 
winners and losers, using different thresholds to define winners and losers. We follow 
the performance of each style over the four subsequent evaluation periods after 
ranking.  For example, Panel B shows the results when we consider the style indices 
in the two top ranks as the winning styles. In the ranking period, the portfolio of 
winning styles significantly outperforms the portfolio of losing styles by 8.97%. In the 
subsequent quarter, however, we find no significant differences between both 
portfolios. For further evaluation periods, the difference becomes in some cases even 
negative. We observe similar patterns in the remaining panels where we use other 
thresholds to define the winning portfolio.   
 
In conclusion, our tests reject the hypothesis of performance persistence of style 
indices at quarterly horizons. Past relative performance appears to convey no 
information about future performance. This is a very puzzling result, if we consider 
the evidence presented in Section 5.4 that investors follow momentum strategies at the 
style level, powerfully attracted by the best performing categories. Admittedly, the 
actual investors’ allocation might not be entirely equivalent to the investment strategy 
analyzed in this section, which is strictly based on separating styles between winners 
and losers. Therefore, the next Section analyzes the effectiveness of investors’ 
allocations and the possibility that they reflect informed choices. 
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Table VII 
The Persistence of Winners and Losers in Quarterly Style Index Returns 
In each quarter between 1994Q4 and 2004Q3 we rank the nine Tremont indices in terms of absolute returns. 
The rank 9 corresponds to the index with the highest return in a given period. Then we separate style indices 
between winners and losers, using different thresholds to define winners and losers. The table reports average 
returns over the four subsequent evaluation periods.  
Momentum in Quarterly Returns 
Panel A: Only the top rank is the winner 
 Ranking period Subsequent period 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Winners 0.1104 0.0281 -0.0004 0.0360 0.0201 
Losers 0.0116 0.0227 0.0259 0.0209 0.0242 
Difference 0.0988 0.0054 -0.0263 0.0151 -0.0041 
t-test (10.36) (0.33) (-1.83) (1.07) (-0.28) 
Panel B: The two top ranks are the winners 
 Ranking period Subsequent period 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Winners 0.0923 0.0261 0.0106 0.0321 0.0155 
Losers 0.0027 0.0225 0.0266 0.0199 0.0261 
Difference 0.0897 0.0036 -0.0159 0.0122 -0.0105 
t-test (10.53) (0.36) (-1.44) (1.10) (-0.90) 
Panel C: The three top ranks are the winners 
 Ranking period Subsequent period 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Winners 0.0778 0.0304 0.0203 0.0307 0.0204 
Losers -0.0051 0.0197 0.0244 0.0186 0.0254 
Difference 0.0829 0.0107 -0.0041 0.0121 -0.0050 
t-test (11.41) (1.32) (-0.43) (1.44) (-0.57) 
Panel D: the four top ranks are the winners 
 Ranking period Subsequent period 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Winners 0.0667 0.0268 0.0229 0.0301 0.0232 
Losers -0.0127 0.0205 0.0231 0.0166 0.0242 
Difference 0.0794 0.0063 -0.0002 0.0135 -0.0010 
t-test (13.16) (0.79) (-0.03) (1.56) (-0.10) 
Panel D: the five top ranks are the winners 
 Ranking period Subsequent period 
 0 1 2 3 4 
Winners 0.0583 0.0263 0.0244 0.0294 0.0218 
Losers -0.0221 0.0195 0.0212 0.0141 0.0261 
Difference 0.0804 0.0068 0.0032 0.0153 -0.0044 
t-test (14.88) (0.96) (0.41) (1.78) (-0.46) 
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5.6   Testing smart timing 
 
The analysis in Section 5.4 showed that aggregate money flows are sensitive to the 
performance of styles in the previous one to three quarters. Ceteris paribus, investors 
direct their inflows to the styles with higher returns in the past. Conversely, they 
withdraw their money in general from those styles with lower returns in the previous 
quarter. These patterns suggest that investors indeed attempt to time the styles based 
on index performance information. This seems inconsistent, however, with the results 
of last section, which indicate that past relative performance of style indices is 
unrelated to future performance. The present section relates aggregate money flows to 
the subsequent performance of style indices. Specifically, we analyze whether  
investors succeed in their timing attempt and shift their money towards those styles 
with higher returns in the future. To this effect, in each quarter we rank the style 
indices in terms of their corresponding aggregate money flows at the end of the 
period. Then we form two portfolios: one contains those indices associated to styles 
with net positive aggregate money flows. The second portfolio of indices is associated 
to those styles that experienced net negative aggregate money flows. For each 
portfolio, we compute both an equally-weighted return and a cash flow-weighted 
return, in the ranking period, in the two lagged quarters, and in each of the four 
subsequent quarters.  Finally we obtain the time series average returns of each 
portfolio over the 40 quarters. We compute the cash flow-weighted returns using both 
aggregate growth rates and aggregate dollar flows that occur in the ranking period. By 
using growth rates, we reduce the bias towards styles that have more numerous and 
larger funds. We can interpret this measure as a cash-flow-weighted return per unit of 
total net assets. Instead, by using dollar flows we reduce the bias towards styles for 
which the number of funds in our sample is not representative enough, namely the 
Convertible Arbitrage and Dedicated Short Bias strategies. 
 
Table VIII shows the results when we use the residual aggregate growth rates as the 
ranking variable. In the ranking period, the portfolio with positive flows significantly 
outperforms the portfolio with negative money flows by 2.48% in terms of cash-flow 
weighted returns (Panel A). In the two lagged quarters, the difference is even larger, 
of about 3.70% and 3.35% respectively. This is again an indication that investors 
select styles based on past indices performance, consistent with our previous results in 
Tables III and IV.  
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Table VIII 
Investors’ Returns from Style Allocation 
In each quarter we rank the style indices in terms of their corresponding aggregate residual growth rates at the 
end of the period. Next, we form two portfolios: one contains those indices associated to styles with net 
positive aggregate money flows. The second portfolio of indices is associated to those styles that experienced 
net negative aggregate money flows. For each portfolio, we compute both an equally-weighted return and a 
cash flow-weighted return, in the ranking period, in the two lagged quarters, and in each of the four subsequent 
quarters. The table reports the time series average returns of each portfolio over the 40 quarters. Panel A 
reports results based on cash flow weighted returns. Panel B reports results based on equally weighted returns. 
Panel C reports the differences between cash flow weighted and equally weighted returns.  T-statistics are 
provided in parentheses.  
Aggregate residual growth rates 
Panel A: Cash-flow weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0363 0.0390 0.0302 0.0210 0.0163 0.0239 0.0200 
Styles with net negative flows 0.0028 0.0021 0.0054 0.0221 0.0336 0.0212 0.0287 
Difference 0.0335 0.0370 0.0248 -0.0011 -0.0173 0.0028 -0.0087 
T-test (3.41) (3.40) (2.61) (-0.13) (-1.71) (0.29) (-0.85) 
Panel B: Equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0345 0.0367 0.0296 0.0259 0.0196 0.0243 0.0185 
Styles with net negative flows 0.0062 0.0061 0.0129 0.0206 0.0276 0.0238 0.0307 
Difference 0.0283 0.0307 0.0166 0.0053 -0.0079 0.0005 -0.0122 
T-test (3.70) (3.71) (3.06) (0.70) (-0.94) (0.09) (-1.43) 
Panel C: Cash-flow weighted minus equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0018 0.0023 0.0006 -0.0049 -0.0034 -0.0004 0.0015 
T-test (0.43) (0.56) (0.17) (-1.13) (-0.99) (-0.09) (0.45) 
        
Styles with net negative flows -0.0034 -0.0040 -0.0076 0.0015 0.0060 -0.0026 -0.0020 
T-test (-1.04) (-0.97) (-1.84) (0.46) (1.51) (-0.47) (-0.67) 
 
Table IX reports similar patterns when we use aggregate residual dollar flows as the 
ranking variable. Moreover, in the second lagged quarter, the cash flow weighted 
return significantly outperforms the equally weighted return by 1.08% for the 
portfolio with positive flows (Panel C).  Thus, inflows are not equally distributed 
across styles in each portfolio. Inflows are more heavily placed in those styles with 
the highest index returns in the previous quarters.   
 
Aggregate money flows appear to have a sorting capacity of contemporaneous and 
lagged index performance, a result that parallels the one obtained for individual funds 
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(see Baquero and Verbeek [2005]).107  However, money flows fail to discriminate 
future index performance. We do not find significant differences between the two 
portfolios over the four subsequent quarters. In fact, in the fourth quarter, styles with 
negative flows increasingly outperform those with positive flows. The results from 
Table VIII are depicted in Figure 4.  In sum, we find evidence that investors attempt 
to time the styles, but apparently aggregate flows are not smart. 
 
In Section 5.4 we showed that lagged style ranks and individual style effects explain 
nearly 13% of the cross-sectional variation of aggregate residual growth rates and 
nearly 20% of aggregate residual dollar flows (specification in Panel A, Table III). 
Therefore, we can obtain an estimate of the component of aggregate money flows 
explained by the models reported in Tables III and IV, which can be referred to as 
style-driven flows, in order to have a more accurate picture of the style-timing 
attempts of investors.  Table A5 in the appendix reports our results when we use style-
driven growth rates. In the two lagged quarters, the differences between the portfolios 
with positive and negative money flows are now 8.55% and 5.95% respectively in 
terms of cash-flow weighted returns, which are substantially larger compared to our 
previous results using residual growth rates (Table VIII).  Table A6 reports similar 
results with style-driven dollar flows. 
 
The fact that investors are unable to time the styles, suggests that investors tend to 
misread style index performance information. It also suggests that style indices may 
not be representative enough of broad investment categories, or that each style is such 
a heterogeneous class that it makes little sense to treat each style as a category for 
benchmarking purposes.  Alternatively, it could also be that the coordinated shift of 
capital supply to some categories drives itself the performance of those categories 
downwards. Hedge fund strategies may not be easily scalable and superior investment 
opportunities to allocate a massive money inflow may become rapidly scarce. Still, 
the question then is why sophisticated investors fail to learn and anticipate such 
effects. 
 
Our results also reveal that investors’ style allocation is not exactly equivalent to the 
chasing-the-winning-style strategy analyzed in Section 5.5. Both strategies show little 
correlation. We find an average Spearman-rank correlation coefficient over time of 
nearly 30% (not reported). Investors tend to allocate higher amounts of money to 
                                                 
107 Apparently, contemporaneous index performance has also an impact on aggregate money flows, although 
the effect is substantially reduced compared to the one of  lagged quarters.  Presumably, along a quarter, 
investors observe monthly index returns, which may have an effect on money flows by the end of the quarter.  
However, given the typical redemption restrictions imposed by most hedge funds, it is unlikely that investors 
profit from contemporaneous information on index returns. 
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styles with higher returns, but not necessarily the styles with the highest returns. On 
the other hand, very risky strategies are also favoured by clients. These strategies 
often shift from very high returns to very low returns and vice versa. Investors place 
large amounts of money into these strategies even when they have experienced low 
returns, presumably in the expectation of a reversal.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Investors’ Returns from Style Allocation  
In each quarter we rank the style indices in terms of their corresponding aggregate 
residual growth rates at the end of the period. Then we form two portfolios: one 
contains those indices associated to styles with net positive aggregate money flows. 
The second portfolio of indices is associated to those styles that experienced net 
negative aggregate money flows. For each portfolio, we compute both an equally-
weighted return and a cash flow-weighted return, in the ranking period, in the two 
lagged quarters, and in each of the four subsequent quarters. The figure depicts the 
time series average returns of each portfolio over the 40 quarters.  
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Table IX 
Investors’ Returns from Style Allocation 
In each quarter we rank the style indices in terms of their corresponding aggregate residual dollar flows at the 
end of the period. Next, we form two portfolios: one contains those indices associated to styles with net 
positive aggregate money flows. The second portfolio of indices is associated to those styles that experienced 
net negative aggregate money flows. For each portfolio, we compute both an equally-weighted return and a 
cash flow-weighted return, in the ranking period, in the two lagged quarters, and in each of the four subsequent 
quarters. The table reports the time series average returns of each portfolio over the 40 quarters. Panel A 
reports results based on cash flow weighted returns. Panel B reports results based on equally weighted returns. 
Panel C reports the differences between cash flow weighted and equally weighted returns.  T-statistics are 
provided in parentheses.  
Aggregate residual dollar flows 
Panel A: Cash-flow weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0453 0.0468 0.0322 0.0268 0.0235 0.0224 0.0205 
Styles with net negative flows 0.0081 0.0102 0.0192 0.0269 0.0320 0.0306 0.0385 
Difference 0.0372 0.0366 0.0130 -0.0002 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0180 
T-test (3.76) (4.60) (2.01) (-0.02) (-1.03) (-1.05) (-2.22) 
Panel B: Equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0345 0.0367 0.0296 0.0259 0.0196 0.0243 0.0185 
Styles with net negative flows 0.0062 0.0061 0.0129 0.0206 0.0276 0.0238 0.0307 
Difference 0.0283 0.0307 0.0166 0.0053 -0.0079 0.0005 -0.0122 
T-test (3.70) (3.71) (3.06) (0.70) (-0.94) (0.09) (-1.43) 
Panel C: Cash-flow weighted minus equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0108 0.0100 0.0026 0.0009 0.0039 -0.0019 0.0020 
T-test (2.10) (1.70) (0.70) (0.22) (1.03) (-0.36) (0.48) 
        
Styles with net negative flows 0.0019 0.0041 0.0062 0.0063 0.0044 0.0069 0.0078 
T-test (0.42) (1.25) (1.40) (1.59) (0.96) (1.77) (2.20) 
 
 
 
5.7   Concluding Remarks 
 
The results of this study indicate that investors learn at the style-level and invest 
following a momentum strategy, whereby they chase the winning styles. We find a 
statistically significant relation between aggregate residual money flows and the 
relative performance of style indices over the previous one to three quarters. 
Aggregate money flows exhibit a sorting ability of past style index performance. 
However, aggregate money flows are unrelated to future style performance. There are 
no significant differences in subsequent performance between those styles favoured 
by investors and those less favoured. Further, we do not find evidence that past style 
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index performance contains useful information of future performance. These two facts 
together suggest that style investing is the result of a common sentiment factor and 
reflects extrapolative expectations, consistent with the hypothesis of Barberis and 
Shleifer [2003]. Previous studies have shown that also within-style allocations at the 
individual fund level are inefficient (e.g. Baquero and Verbeek [2005]). Overall, these 
results raise serious concerns about investors’ ability to make the right allocation 
choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167
Style Investing: Evidence from Hedge Fund Investors 
 
155
 
APPENDIX  
Table A1 
Aggregate Cash Flows and Total Net Assets from a 
Sample of Hedge Funds from TASS Database 
This table gives the total number of hedge funds in the sample per quarter, aggregate cash flows, total net 
assets under management and average return. The sample consists of 1543 open-end hedge funds taken from 
TASS database, with a minimum of 6 quarters of quarterly returns history and with computed quarterly cash 
flows available at least for one year. Funds of funds are not included. The sample period has 40 quarters from 
1994Q4 till 2004Q3. Cash flows are computed as the change in total net assets between consecutive quarters 
corrected for reinvestments. A growth rate is calculated as relative cash flows with respect to TNA of previous 
period. 
 Number of funds 
Aggregate Cash 
Flows 
 (million dollars)
Cash flows 
 (growth rate) 
Aggregate TNA 
(million dollars) Average Return 
1994 Q4 231 -437.44 -0.0235 17861.15 -0.0077 
1995 Q1 258 -1312.14 -0.0646 19387.67 0.0524 
1995 Q2 279 -461.56 -0.0228 20469.12 0.0370 
1995 Q3 315 -317.83 -0.0146 22972.14 0.0459 
1995 Q4 326 -757.99 -0.0327 23215.81 0.0345 
1996 Q1 348 148.85 0.0050 30969.63 0.0244 
1996 Q2 360 -334.21 -0.0107 33047.34 0.0596 
1996 Q3 364 377.79 0.0112 34275.64 0.0164 
1996 Q4 371 945.09 0.0260 40431.19 0.0603 
1997 Q1 379 2277.90 0.0561 45255.20 0.0427 
1997 Q2 392 301.99 0.0066 48434.29 0.0467 
1997 Q3 414 2353.93 0.0471 56745.53 0.0742 
1997 Q4 438 675.00 0.0115 59948.61 -0.0136 
1998 Q1 470 1821.63 0.0295 66989.86 0.0484 
1998 Q2 482 1107.31 0.0167 68556.61 -0.0240 
1998 Q3 496 -268.07 -0.0041 60234.29 -0.0502 
1998 Q4 528 -3822.72 -0.0615 56650.24 0.0518 
1999 Q1 571 -2845.61 -0.0490 55262.50 0.0324 
1999 Q2 582 -850.49 -0.0152 58979.19 0.0832 
1999 Q3 598 -1289.20 -0.0219 56682.70 -0.0006 
1999 Q4 597 -703.00 -0.0124 63413.15 0.1177 
2000 Q1 626 670.00 0.0101 69948.90 0.0607 
2000 Q2 629 -2299.42 -0.0336 63643.12 -0.0139 
2000 Q3 658 697.77 0.0108 67016.20 0.0185 
2000 Q4 667 734.74 0.0109 68463.32 -0.0020 
2001 Q1 670 3382.16 0.0456 78678.59 0.0086 
2001 Q2 697 3380.75 0.0403 89049.14 0.0257 
2001 Q3 699 3145.77 0.0355 89959.58 -0.0250 
2001 Q4 702 -5713.63 -0.0574 97069.95 0.0482 
2002 Q1 702 1533.24 0.0157 100359.61 0.0184 
2002 Q2 700 2279.75 0.0222 105192.95 0.0057 
2002 Q3 702 67.69 0.0006 104609.51 -0.0212 
2002 Q4 697 -1099.04 -0.0104 106726.81 0.0219 
2003 Q1 685 2431.55 0.0255 99383.00 0.0116 
2003 Q2 687 5628.85 0.0560 112169.77 0.0775 
2003 Q3 703 6970.84 0.0607 124438.64 0.0376 
2003 Q4 711 6722.30 0.0539 137685.21 0.0541 
2004 Q1 703 16056.57 0.1207 154496.43 0.0409 
2004 Q2 712 10330.84 0.0659 163689.45 -0.0244 
2004 Q3 692 2730.60 0.0170 164632.56 0.0090 
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Table A2  
Cross-Sectional Characteristics of the Hedge Fund Sample  
This table presents summary statistics on cross-sectional characteristics of our sample of 1543 hedge funds for 
the period 1994Q4 till 2004Q3. Cash flows are the change in total net assets between consecutive quarters 
corrected for reinvestments. Returns are net of all management and incentive fees. Age is the number of 
months a fund has been in operation since its inception. In each quarter, the historical standard deviation of 
monthly returns, semi deviation and upside potential have been computed based on the entire past history of 
the fund. Semi deviation and upside potential are calculated with respect to the return on the U.S. Treasury bill 
taken as the minimum investor’s target. Offshore is a dummy variable with value one for non U.S. domiciled 
funds. Incentive fee is a percentage of profits above a hurdle rate that is given as a reward to managers. 
Management fee is a percentage of the fund’s net assets under management that is paid annually to managers 
for administering a fund. Personal capital is a dummy variable indicating that the managers invests from her 
own wealth in the fund. We include 10 dummies for investment styles defined on the basis of the 
CSFB/Tremont indices. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Cash Flows (growth rate) 0.0287 0.2734 -0.9107 4.3656 
     Cash Flows>0 (10876 obs) 0.1639 0.3052 0.0001 4.3656 
     Cash Flows<0 (10367 obs) -0.1115 0.1444 -0.9107 -0.0001 
     Cash Flows=0 (598 obs)     
Cash Flows (dollars) 2484343 6.80E+07 -7.23E+09 1.12E+09 
ln(TNA) 17.1746 1.8491 8.1050 23.2959 
ln(AGE) 4.0070 0.6189 2.8904 5.8171 
Quarterly Returns 0.0255 0.1175 -0.9763 1.7449 
Historical St.Dev. 0.0513 0.0407 0.0004 0.8318 
Semi Deviation 0.0299 0.0245 0 0.3326 
Upside Potential 0.0236 0.0169 0.0002 0.2797 
Downside-Upside Pot. Ratio 1.2862 0.8600 0 19.2076 
Offshore 0.6236 0.4845 0 1 
Incentive Fee 18.4599 5.8253 0 50 
Management Fees 1.4632 0.8832 0 8 
Personal Capital 0.6197 0.4855 0 1 
Leverage 0.7579 0.4283 0 1 
Convertible Arbitrage 0.0525 0.2231 0 1 
Dedicated Short Bias 0.0160 0.1256 0 1 
Emerging Markets 0.1036 0.3047 0 1 
Equity Market Neutral 0.0463 0.2102 0 1 
Event Driven 0.1222 0.3275 0 1 
Fixed Income Arbitrage. 0.0490 0.2159 0 1 
Global Macro 0.0691 0.2536 0 1 
Long/Short Equity 0.3468 0.4760 0 1 
Managed Futures 0.1576 0.3644 0 1 
Hedge Fund Index 0.0368 0.1883 0 1 
 
 
 
 
169
Style Investing: Evidence from Hedge Fund Investors 
 
157
 
 
 
Table A3 
Summary of Number of Funds per Style and per Period 
This table gives the total number of hedge funds in the sample per quarter and per style category. The sample 
consists of 1543 open-end hedge funds taken from TASS database, with a minimum of 6 quarters of quarterly 
returns history and with computed quarterly cash flows available at least for one year. Funds of funds are not 
included. The sample period has 40 quarters from 1994Q4 till 2004Q3. This results in a total of 21841 fund-
period observations.  
Style 
Conv. 
Arbitrage  
Dedicated 
Short 
Bias 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitr. 
Global 
Macro 
Long/ 
Short 
Equity 
Managed 
Futures Other Total 
1994Q4 9 3 17 5 25 7 24 74 63 4 231 
1995Q1 11 3 18 6 24 9 29 84 69 5 258 
1995Q2 10 3 19 7 27 10 32 89 75 7 279 
1995Q3 10 5 27 8 27 12 35 96 88 7 315 
1995Q4 12 5 26 8 31 13 34 100 89 8 326 
1996Q1 15 5 29 9 34 19 36 97 94 10 348 
1996Q2 15 5 33 8 38 22 35 104 90 10 360 
1996Q3 12 5 36 9 38 20 37 105 91 11 364 
1996Q4 14 5 35 10 41 20 36 105 92 13 371 
1997Q1 16 5 36 11 46 20 38 108 87 12 379 
1997Q2 16 5 39 11 47 20 39 111 93 11 392 
1997Q3 17 5 38 13 52 22 38 125 90 14 414 
1997Q4 18 5 45 13 55 25 40 134 89 14 438 
1998Q1 20 5 50 14 60 25 41 152 89 14 470 
1998Q2 20 6 50 15 64 21 39 161 92 14 482 
1998Q3 17 9 46 15 67 22 41 176 89 14 496 
1998Q4 19 11 52 18 68 22 42 186 96 14 528 
1999Q1 19 12 59 22 79 22 49 194 99 16 571 
1999Q2 22 11 65 25 72 24 50 193 104 16 582 
1999Q3 24 11 65 26 73 28 49 200 106 16 598 
1999Q4 28 11 66 23 72 31 50 202 97 17 597 
2000Q1 32 12 70 25 74 35 49 216 96 17 626 
2000Q2 34 13 74 28 73 34 46 219 91 17 629 
2000Q3 33 13 76 31 77 38 39 242 91 18 658 
2000Q4 37 13 82 31 83 35 34 246 85 21 667 
2001Q1 33 12 74 38 83 35 34 249 89 23 670 
2001Q2 34 12 78 43 88 36 33 256 90 27 697 
2001Q3 38 11 79 44 89 36 31 252 91 28 699 
2001Q4 40 11 78 43 90 33 32 262 85 28 702 
2002Q1 43 11 78 38 88 32 31 262 88 31 702 
2002Q2 48 10 79 36 89 33 29 261 84 31 700 
2002Q3 46 10 80 35 88 35 31 266 80 31 702 
2002Q4 45 12 77 39 89 32 34 261 76 32 697 
2003Q1 44 12 73 40 86 33 33 253 77 34 685 
2003Q2 45 12 70 40 88 33 33 257 74 35 687 
2003Q3 47 12 69 49 86 37 35 257 74 37 703 
2003Q4 51 12 69 45 89 36 37 258 76 38 711 
2004Q1 50 11 69 44 92 35 39 255 72 36 703 
2004Q2 54 8 68 46 90 35 46 258 70 37 712 
2004Q3 49 8 68 41 87 34 49 248 72 36 692 
 
TOTAL 1147 350 2262 1012 2669 1071 1509 7574 3443 804 21841 
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Table A4 
Summary Statistics of Aggregate Flows and Measures of Style Performance  
This table presents summary statistics of aggregate money flows and different measures of performance at the 
style level. Our dataset covers 40 quarters from 1994Q4 to 2004Q3. We aggregate, per style and per period, 
residual growth rates and residual dollar flows obtained from the model in Table III. One significant outlier 
corresponding to the Convertible Arbitrage strategy in 2001Q4 is excluded. This results in 359 style-period 
observations when the 9 style indices are considered and 399 observations when the general Hedge Fund Index 
is also included. The style rank is obtained by ranking all 9 indices in each period in terms of returns. The 
winner/loser dummy takes value 1 if the style is ranked among the top best performing styles.  A set of 9 
dummies accounts for the length of winning and losing streaks. For instance, the dummy Winning Streak 2 
takes value 1 if the style index is a winner over 2 consecutive quarters. The dummy Winning Streak 4 accounts 
for winning streaks of four quarters length or more. Similarly, Losing Streak 5 accounts for losing streaks of 
five quarters or more.  A set of 9 dummies accounts for the length of upward and downward trends in style 
index returns. Finally, the 10 dummies for investment styles are defined on the basis of the CSFB/Tremont 
indices. 
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aggregate Residual Growth Rates 399 0.0149 0.0648 -0.2673 0.2345 
Aggregate Residual Dollar Flows 399 83400000 421000000 -2.11E+09 1.81E+09 
Trend Variable 399 20.4787 11.5645 1 40 
Quarterly Style Index Return 399 0.0233 0.0612 -0.2867 0.3066 
Quarterly Style Rank 359 4.4962 2.8785 1 9 
Winner/Loser Dummy 359 0.4429 0.4974 0 1 
Winning Streak 1 399 0.2105 0.4082 0 1 
Winning Streak 2 359 0.0977 0.2973 0 1 
Winning Streak 3 359 0.0351 0.1842 0 1 
Winning Streak 4 359 0.0551 0.2285 0 1 
Losing  Streak 1 359 0.2130 0.4100 0 1 
Losing  Streak 2 359 0.0977 0.2973 0 1 
Losing  Streak 3 359 0.0677 0.2515 0 1 
Losing  Streak 4 359 0.0451 0.2078 0 1 
Losing  Streak 5 359 0.0777 0.2680 0 1 
Up 1 Quarters 399 0.3208 0.4674 0 1 
Up 2 Quarters 399 0.1303 0.3371 0 1 
Up 3 Quarters 399 0.0351 0.1842 0 1 
Up 4 Quarters 399 0.0050 0.0707 0 1 
Down 1 Quarter 399 0.3358 0.4729 0 1 
Down 2 Quarters 399 0.1404 0.3478 0 1 
Down 3 Quarters 399 0.0226 0.1487 0 1 
Down 4 Quarters 399 0.0075 0.0865 0 1 
Down 5 Quarters 399 0.0025 0.0501 0 1 
Convertible Arbitrage 399 0.0977 0.2973 0 1 
Dedicated Short Bias 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Emerging Markets 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Equity Market Neutral 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Event Driven 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Global Macro 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Long/Short Equity 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
Managed Futures 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
General Hedge fund index 399 0.1003 0.3007 0 1 
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Table A5 
Investors’ Returns From Style Allocation 
In each quarter we rank the style indices in terms of style-driven growth rates at the end of the period. Then we 
form two portfolios: one contains those indices associated to styles with net positive aggregate money flows. 
The second portfolio of indices is associated to those styles that experienced net negative aggregate money 
flows. For each portfolio, we compute both an equally-weighted return and a cash flow-weighted return, in the 
ranking period, in the two lagged quarters, and in each of the four subsequent quarters. The table reports the 
time series average returns of each portfolio over the 40 quarters. Panel A reports results based on cash flow 
weighted returns. Panel B reports results based on equally weighted returns. Panel C reports the differences 
between cash flow weighted and equally weighted returns.  T-statistics are provided in parentheses. 
Style-Driven Growth Rates 
Panel A: Cash-flow weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0434 0.0535 0.0293 0.0239 0.0213 0.0191 0.0209 
Styles with net negative flows -0.0161 -0.0320 0.0072 0.0085 0.0171 0.0352 0.0274 
Difference 0.0595 0.0855 0.0221 0.0154 0.0041 -0.0161 -0.0066 
T-test (4.98) (8.16) (2.08) (1.29) (0.36) (-1.36) (-0.50) 
Panel B: Equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0368 0.0444 0.0276 0.0261 0.0261 0.0207 0.0228 
Styles with net negative flows -0.0080 -0.0224 0.0075 0.0146 0.0155 0.0326 0.0265 
Difference 0.0448 0.0668 0.0200 0.0115 0.0106 -0.0119 -0.0038 
T-test (4.24) (7.71) (2.29) (1.31) (1.10) (-1.21) (-0.39) 
Panel C: Cash-flow weighted minus equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0066 0.0091 0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0049 -0.0016 -0.0019 
T-test (2.59) (4.04) (0.84) (-0.80) (-1.92) (-0.76) (-0.77) 
        
Styles with net negative flows -0.0081 -0.0096 -0.0003 -0.0061 0.0016 0.0026 0.0009 
T-test (-2.62) (-3.54) (-0.08) (-1.61) (0.33) (0.79) (0.24) 
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Table A6 
Investors’ Returns From Style Allocation 
In each quarter we rank the style indices in terms of style-driven dollar flows at the end of the period. Then we 
form two portfolios: one contains those indices associated to styles with net positive aggregate money flows. 
The second portfolio of indices is associated to those styles that experienced net negative aggregate money 
flows. For each portfolio, we compute both an equally-weighted return and a cash flow-weighted return, in the 
ranking period, in the two lagged quarters, and in each of the four subsequent quarters. The table reports the 
time series average returns of each portfolio over the 40 quarters. Panel A reports results based on cash flow 
weighted returns. Panel B reports results based on equally weighted returns. Panel C reports the differences 
between cash flow weighted and equally weighted returns.  T-statistics are provided in parentheses.  
Style-Driven Dollar Flows 
Panel A: Cash-flow weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0513 0.0439 0.0273 0.0225 0.0164 0.0131 0.0194 
Styles with net negative flows -0.0224 -0.0176 0.0051 0.0128 0.0236 0.0285 0.0302 
Difference 0.0737 0.0615 0.0222 0.0096 -0.0073 -0.0153 -0.0108 
T-test (6.34) (5.47) (2.06) (0.81) (-0.67) (-1.27) (-0.90) 
Panel B: Equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0409 0.0395 0.0317 0.0260 0.0220 0.0207 0.0213 
Styles with net negative flows -0.0092 -0.0058 0.0053 0.0242 0.0244 0.0244 0.0320 
Difference 0.0501 0.0452 0.0264 0.0017 -0.0025 -0.0037 -0.0107 
T-test (5.25) (6.12) (3.20) (0.19) (-0.28) (-0.42) (-1.21) 
Panel C: Cash-flow weighted minus equally weighted returns 
 Lagged quarters 
Ranking 
Period Subsequent quarters 
 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3 4 
Styles with net positive flows 0.0104 0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0035 -0.0056 -0.0075 -0.0019 
T-test (4.32) (1.45) (-1.34) (-1.02) (-2.11) (-1.93) (-0.72) 
        
Styles with net negative flows -0.0132 -0.0119 -0.0002 -0.0114 -0.0008 0.0041 -0.0018 
T-test (-2.98) (-2.47) (-0.04) (-2.55) (-0.18) (1.05) (-0.43) 
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"Institutional investors have accounted for a growing share of hedge fund investments, 
and they can and should protect their own interests rather than rely on the limited 
regulatory protections that would be provided as a result of a registration requirement." 
Former FED Chairman Alan Greenspan, in a letter to the Senate, August 2004 
 
"The primary mechanism for regulating excessive leverage and other aspects of risk-taking 
in a market economy is the discipline provided by creditors, counter-parties and investors," 
FED Chairman Ben Bernanke. Speech in Atlanta, May 2006 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Summary and Conclusions  
 
Financial intermediaries manage other people’s money. The question of what 
accounts for the enormous appeal of financial intermediaries among investors has 
called to the attention of academic research, as these intermediaries have on average 
failed to deliver returns above those of the market or of passive strategies. This thesis 
examined this question in the hedge fund industry by exploring first whether hedge 
fund managers exhibit persistence in their performance that may justify an active 
search for skilled managers; second, by characterizing the investment and divestment 
behaviour of hedge fund investors; and third, by testing  potential behavioural 
explanations for the observed investment patterns.  
 
In a relatively short period of time, hedge funds have become major players in the 
financial markets. Once perceived as risky alternative instruments, accessible only to 
institutional investors and wealthy individuals, hedge funds have rapidly evolved into 
a very attractive investment option, partly as a result of the perception that hedge fund 
managers are skilled professionals. In 2004, an estimate of 400 new hedge funds were 
created worldwide. The estimated total reached nearly 8000, the assets under 
management reached the $1 trillion. The client base has expanded beyond foundations 
and endowments to company pensions and public pensions. Further, hedge funds are 
becoming increasingly accessible to “non-sophisticated” investors. One important 
motivation for this thesis lies on the increasing concerns that capital is being 
inefficiently allocated across hedge funds. Is this overwhelming response of investors 
the result of a critical and careful due diligence process? Can we justify investors’ 
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response in terms of performance of the investors’ portfolio?  How successful have 
investors been in selecting the right hedge fund managers? 
 
This thesis provides four main conclusions:  
 
1. Look-ahead bias is quite severe, especially for the worst performing funds at 
one-year horizons. After correcting for look-ahead bias, we find evidence that 
past performance of hedge funds is to some extent informative about future 
performance, particularly at quarterly horizons. There is some evidence of 
performance persistence at annual horizons but statistically weaker. 
 
2. Large informational asymmetries between investors and managers create 
differences between the investment and divestment patterns of hedge fund 
investors.  While inflows are highly responsive to good performance in the 
previous year, we identify fast redemptions in response to poor performance in 
the previous quarter.  
 
3. On aggregate, money flows are not directed towards funds with above average 
subsequent returns. On the contrary, there are no significant differences 
between the portfolio of funds with positive money flows and the portfolio with 
negative money flows.  
 
4. Given the asymmetric information problem, investors apparently misread the 
information available and overreact to persistence patterns, both at the 
individual fund level and at the style level.   
 
Chapter 2 deals with performance persistence. Studies about performance persistence 
suffer from a well known methodological bias due to survivorship. The usual 
methodology imposes a survival condition over the evaluation horizon. Therefore, 
persistence might be overestimated. We propose a correction for look-ahead bias and 
we show that even after corrections, performance persistence is quite pronounced at 
quarterly horizons. Without corrections, the performance at annual horizons of the 
bottom 10% of funds in terms of raw returns may be overestimated by as much as 
3.8% annualized. Therefore the difference between the winning and the losing 
portfolio amounts to 8.1% per year after correction.  
 
The persistence results in Chapter 2 are not driven by funds closed to new flows, 
implying that persistence is susceptible of exploitation. Chapter 3 analyzes whether 
investors are indeed able to exploit it. The links between persistence and the 
responsiveness of flows to past performance are subtle and not well understood yet. 
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For example, studies in mutual funds have shown a very strong response of investors 
to the group of managers with the best track records in the previous year, although the 
evidence of performance persistence is scarce. Berk and Green [2004] reconcile these 
two seemingly inconsistent empirical findings. They argue that in equilibrium and 
under decreasing returns to scale and competitive supply of capital, investors 
rationally shift their capital towards the best managers. They do so until funds reach 
the critical size in which the expected rents are non existent, thus competing away 
persistence. If this is the case, the evidence of persistence in hedge funds at quarterly 
horizons suggests that investors are limited in chasing the best managers. We test this 
hypothesis by relating money flows to past performance at quarterly horizons and we 
do so by separately modelling inflows and outflows as two different regimes. This 
separation has been neglected in previous studies, to a large extent due to data 
limitations. Although, we do not observe inflows or outflows from individual 
investors, we do observe the net flow of money of the aggregate of investors in a 
given fund. Therefore, we use a regime switching model with endogenous switching 
to understand the determinants behind the investment and the divestment decisions of 
the average investor. Our results show a fast withdrawing reaction of investors in 
response to bad performance, mostly concentrated over the subsequent quarter, and 
lasting two or three quarters. This result remained hidden in previous studies. In 
contrast, quarterly inflows show little or no response to previous quarterly 
performance. The response of inflows is instead captured over annual horizons, while 
the response of annual outflows becomes weaker, suggesting a convex relationship 
that confirms the results of previous studies at annual horizons.  
 
Apparently when investors are confronted to select a manager, they evaluate past 
performance over relatively long horizons of one year or more. In contrast, when 
investors face the decision to redeem, they evaluate past performance over shorter 
horizons from one up to three quarters. The second part of Chapter 3 asks to what 
extent this differential response implies an ability of investors to make the right 
investment or divestment choices. Our results indicate that this is not the case. The 
average manager hired by investors does not outperform the average manager that was 
fired. Moreover, investors’ inflows are not equally placed among managers. Inflows 
largely favour those managers with good track records over the previous four quarters 
or so. However this group of managers underperforms the average hired manager 
subsequently. Conversely, outflows are heavily concentrated on relatively poor 
performers. But this group continues underperforming the average fired manager 
subsequently. In sum, while inflows are unable to select the right hedge fund 
managers, outflows discriminate correctly among the bad performers.  
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In Chapter 4 we investigate the possibility that one component in the response of 
investors to past performance documented in Chapter 3, is the result of a cognitive 
bias. The theoretical model of Rabin [2002] suggests that momentum investing is the 
reflection of investors’ overinference of managerial skill from past records. Our 
results are consistent with this theory. First, we find that persistence patterns have 
some predictive ability of future performance. The longer the performance streak, the 
larger is the probability of persistence. However, our model allows us to capture a 
responsiveness of money flows beyond what should be rationally justified by 
expected performance. Moreover, the longer the performance streak, the larger the 
degree of overinference, consistent with the theoretical predictions of Rabin [2002]’s 
model. Finally we show that investors decisions are potentially suboptimal compared 
to a strategy based on expected performance.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates to what extent investors learn at the style level by testing 
momentum in style investing.  A main hypothesis in models of aggregate demand is 
that investors compare styles with each other and invest in those styles with the best 
previous performance (e.g. Barberis and Shleifer [2003]).  Testing the hypothesis of 
style investing requires an unequivocal definition of style categories as interpreted by 
investors.  In that respect, the hedge fund industry constitutes a suitable setting since 
style categories are defined by a set of style indices closely followed by investors. 
Style indices play an instrumental role by offering investors a simplified and 
schematic taxonomy of investment strategies used by hedge fund managers. At the 
methodological level, we isolate the component of flows that is not explained by 
individual fund characteristics, and construct an aggregate per period and per style. 
Finally we explain these aggregates from past style ranks, style index returns and style 
index trends. Our model reveals that aggregate flows are strongly sensitive to style 
ranks up to three lags. However we do not find evidence of persistence in style 
relative performance at quarterly horizons, nor evidence that those styles favoured by 
investors subsequently outperform those styles from which they divested.  Our results 
are consistent with the idea that style investing reflects common sentiment among 
investors and is unrelated to fundamentals.  
 
Overall, the four essays in this thesis have made an attempt to portray hedge fund 
investors by characterizing their investment and divestment decisions. Although we 
better understand the nature of the interrelation between capital flows and 
performance, several contours in that portrait remain to be delineated.  The results of 
Chapter 3 suggest that flows are strongly related to subsequent liquidation 
probabilities. Funds experiencing the largest outflows in a given quarter exhibit the 
highest liquidation rates over subsequent quarters. However, money flows and 
liquidation rates are both partly determined by past fund performance, as described by 
177
Concluding Remarks 
 
165
 
the two models presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  Thus a model that disentangles 
the combined effect of money flows and performance on subsequent liquidation rates 
is crucial to understand the full economic implications of fast outflows. Here a 
number of intriguing issues arise pertaining to the perception of investors about the 
likelihood of fund liquidation. In the same line of Chapter 4, which suggests a more 
pronounced overreaction to persistence patterns for outflows compared to inflows, we 
could ask to what extent do fast outflows overreact to the likelihood of liquidation, 
especially for under-watermark funds? Do fast outflows further enhance liquidation 
probabilities? Additionally, if it is indeed the case that investors impose a credible 
threat of termination, this may constitute a mechanism that counterbalances the 
implicit gambling incentives of a convex flow-performance relation at annual 
horizons. Therefore a closer look at the interactions between managers’ risk-taking 
propensity and money flows would provide additional insights into contractual issues. 
On another point, the most interesting aspects of style investing, as revealed by 
Chapter 5, remain to be analyzed. For example, what its effects are on the flow-
performance relation at the individual fund level? Does chasing the winning styles 
create an externality on the returns of funds in other style categories? Does style 
investing create comovement of returns in funds within a given style? Finally, the 
several asymmetries between the two regimes of positive and negative net money 
flows reported in Chapter 3 remain open for additional scrutiny. Most particularly the 
asymmetric response time of inflows and outflows to past performance gives room for 
alternative behavioural explanations. How do sophisticated investors frame losses 
with respect to gains? How do investors perceive or evaluate more recent information 
with respect to the more distant?  
 
We believe these are exciting paths ahead for academic research, as exciting as the 
future developments within the hedge fund industry will be. 
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Samenvatting en Conclusies (Summary in 
Dutch) 
 
De enorme groei van de beleggingsindustrie, waarin professionals het geld beheren 
van individuele en institutionele beleggers, trekt grote belangstelling van academici, 
mede doordat de gemiddelde fondsmanager niet in staat is rendementen te genereren 
die hoger liggen dan een vergelijkbare marktindex of een eenvoudige passieve 
strategie. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt dit thema voor hedgefondsen, met vier 
belangrijke vragen. Ten eerste, bestaan er hedgefondsen die in staat zijn om 
systematisch hoge rendementen te leveren, waardoor een actieve zoektocht naar 
gekwalificeerde managers gerechtvaardigd is? Ten tweede, op welke manier alloceren 
beleggers in hedgefondsen hun geld en hoe reageren deze geldstromen op historische 
prestaties? Ten derde, zijn beleggers in staat die hedgefondsen te selecteren die 
vervolgens goede rendementen laten zien? En ten slotte, wat zeggen deze 
waargenomen geldstromen over het gedrag van beleggers?  
 
Hedgefondsen vormen een relatief nieuwe beleggingscategorie die erg populair is 
geworden sinds het eind van de jaren negentig. Pensioenfondsen als het ABP en 
PGGM hebben inmiddels vele honderden miljoenen belegd in hedgefondsen. Een 
hedgefonds lijkt veel op een traditioneel beleggingsfonds, maar is veel flexibeler in de 
soorten activa dat het aanhoudt en de posities die het inneemt. Hedgefondsen 
investeren bijvoorbeeld volop in derivaten, nemen short-posities in, of beleggen met 
geleend geld. Allemaal mogelijkheden die bij traditionele fondsen zeer ongebruikelijk 
zijn of zelfs niet toegestaan volgens de geldende regels. Een goede definitie voor 
hedgefondsen ontbreekt, maar het belangrijkste kenmerk is dat ze zich nauwelijks aan 
de richtlijnen voor traditionele beleggingsfondsen hoeven te houden. Ze zijn 
bijvoorbeeld niet verplicht hun prestaties en gevolgde strategie te rapporteren in de 
vorm van een jaarverslag. Doordat de meeste hedgefondsen streven naar een hoog 
absoluut rendement, onafhankelijk van de marktsituatie, bieden ze potentieel 
interessante diversificatiemogelijkheden ten opzichte van bestaande 
beleggingsportefeuilles. 
 
In het laatste decennium zijn hedgefondsen uitgegroeid tot belangrijke spelers op 
financiële marken. In eerst instantie werden hedgefondsen vooral gezien als een 
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risicovolle alternatieve beleggingscategorie, uitsluitend beschikbaar voor welvarende 
en institutionele beleggers. Inmiddels vormen hedgefondsen een aantrekkelijk 
alternatief en een interessante uitbreiding van bestaande beleggingsportefeuilles, mede 
door de perceptie dat de meest talentvolle fondsmanagers de overstap naar 
hedgefondsen gemaakt hebben. In 2004 werden naar schatting zo’n 400 nieuwe 
hedgefondsen opgericht, leidend tot een totaal van bijna 8000 fondsen wereldwijd, 
met een totaal belegd vermogen van meer dan 1 triljoen dollar. Steeds meer worden 
hedgefondsen ook toegankelijk voor beleggers die niet vallen onder de definitie van 
zogenoemde “sophisticated investors” (institutionele beleggers of individuele 
beleggers met een belegd vermogen van meer dan $100.000), mede door de opkomst 
van zgn. funds-of-funds, fondsen die uitsluitend beleggen in andere hedgefondsen. 
Ondanks de sterke groei van deze bedrijfstak is het niet evident dat er sprake is van 
een efficiënte allocatie van vermogen over het grote aantal hedgefondsen. Het gebrek 
aan transparantie van wat hedgefondsen nu werkelijk doen zou kunnen verhullen dat 
beleggers ten onrechte hun belegd vermogen verschuiven naar hedgefondsen. Is het 
inderdaad zo dat beleggers in hedgefondsen uiteindelijk hoge rendementen behalen? 
En hoe succesvol zijn beleggers om de juiste fondsbeheerders te kiezen? 
 
Dit proefschrift kent vier belangrijke conclusies. 
  
1. Hedgefondsen die in het recente verleden een bovengemiddelde prestatie 
hebben geleverd, zullen naar verwachting ook in de komende periode 
bovengemiddeld presteren. Op kwartaalbasis zou een zogenaamde winnaars-
verliezers strategie tot een buitengewoon rendement hebben geleid van 12% 
(op jaarbasis), terwijl diezelfde strategie op jaarbasis tot een buitengewoon 
rendement van 8% zou hebben geleid.  
2. Er is sprake van informatie-asymmetrie tussen beleggers en fondsmanagers 
vanwege de beperkte transparantie en rapportage, en vanwege het gebruik van 
soms ondoorzichtige en dynamische beleggingsstrategieën. Deze factoren 
veroorzaken grote verschillen tussen de manier waarop en snelheid waarmee 
extra beleggingen enerzijds en geldonttrekkingen anderzijds reageren op 
historische prestaties van hedgefondsen.  
3. Gemiddeld genomen wordt additioneel vermogen niet belegd in die 
hedgefondsen die vervolgens bovengemiddelde rendementen behalen. Er 
bestaat amper verschil in de rendementen van hedgefondsen die veel geld 
aantrekken en hedgefondsen die veel van hun inleg verliezen.  
4. In het licht van de genoemde informatie-asymmetrie worden beleggers 
blijkbaar misleid door de beschikbare informatie en reageren ze te sterk op 
historische patronen in rendementen, zowel op het niveau van individuele 
hedgefondsen als op het niveau van beleggingsstijlen. 
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In Hoofdstuk 2 is de vraag onderzocht of er sprake is van persistentie in de prestaties 
van hedgefondsen. In tegenstelling tot wat vaak bij traditionele beleggingsfondsen 
wordt gevonden, blijkt er in de periode 1994 – 2000 bij hedgefondsen wel sprake te 
zijn van persistentie. Een strategie waarbij in de beste 10% hedgefondsen van het 
afgelopen kwartaal wordt belegd, zou tot een jaarlijks rendement hebben geleid dat 
12% hoger is in vergelijking met de slechtste 10% hedgefondsen van het afgelopen 
kwartaal. Dit impliceert dat prestaties uit het verleden een belangrijke leidraad kunnen 
zijn bij de selectie van hedgefondsen, en dat dit tot een beter beleggingsrendement van 
bijvoorbeeld pensioenfondsen kan leiden.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 3 is onderzocht of beleggers in hedgefondsen in de praktijk in staat zijn 
een beter beleggingsresultaat te behalen door het kiezen van relatief goede fondsen (of 
het vermijden van minder goede fondsen). Het verband tussen persistentie enerzijds 
en de reactie van beleggers op historische fondsrendementen anderzijds is interessant. 
Voor traditionele beleggingsfondsen hebben studies aangetoond dat een beperkte 
groep fondsen met zeer goede prestaties de meerderheid van het nieuw te beleggen 
vermogen aantrekt, terwijl er vrijwel geen sprake is van persistentie in deze prestaties. 
Berk en Green [2004] verklaren deze twee schijnbaar tegenstrijdige resultaten met 
behulp van een evenwichtsmodel waarin er sprake is van afnemende meeropbrengsten 
en een concurrentie in het aanbod van nieuw kapitaal. In dit model wijzen beleggers 
op basis van rationele argumenten hun middelen toe aan beleggingsfondsen totdat een 
kritische omvang wordt bereikt en alle abnormale prestaties als het ware worden 
weggeconcurreerd. Indien dit beeld correct is, suggereert de gevonden persistentie 
voor hedgefondsen dat kapitaal onvoldoende flexibel toegewezen kan worden en dat 
beleggers slechts in beperkte mate (of met de nodige vertraging) in de beste fondsen 
inleggen. In dit hoofdstuk toetsen we deze hypothese door het verband op 
kwartaalniveau te onderzoeken tussen kapitaalstromen en historische 
beleggingsprestaties. We maken hierbij onderscheid tussen kapitaalinstromen 
enerzijds en uitstromen anderzijds. Door deze apart te modelleren kunnen we nagaan 
in hoeverre zij op dezelfde manier reageren op historische rendementen en andere 
fondskenmerken. De resultaten laten zien dat beleggers sterk en snel middelen 
onttrekken aan hedgefondsen indien zij geconfronteerd worden met lage rendementen, 
meestal binnen enkele kwartalen. Anderzijds zijn de kapitaalinstromen maar zeer 
beperkt gerelateerd aan fondsrendementen in de voorafgaande kwartalen.  
Op jaarniveau wordt de reactie tussen uitstromen en rendement zwakker en ontstaat 
er, consistent met de bestaande literatuur, een convex verband.  
 
De resultaten in dit hoofdstuk laten zien dat beleggers de prestaties van hedgefondsen 
over een relatief lange horizon van een tot twee jaar evalueren indien overwogen 
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wordt nieuw kapitaal in te leggen, terwijl anderzijds kapitaal wordt onttrokken indien 
lage rendementen worden behaald over een tot drie kwartalen. Het tweede deel van 
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de vraag in hoeverre deze asymmetrische reactie beleggers in 
staat stelt de juiste keuzes te maken bij het sturen van hun kapitaalstromen naar de 
juiste fondsen. De resultaten geven aan dat hiervan geen sprake is. Het gemiddelde 
hedgefonds dat extra middelen ontvangt behaalt slechtere resultaten dan het 
gemiddelde fonds dat geld aan zich onttrokken ziet worden. Ook binnen de groep van 
fondsen die extra kapitaal ontvangen vindt de allocatie suboptimaal plaats. Het 
vermogen gaat in grote mate naar die fondsmanagers die goede rendementen behalen 
over de voorafgaande vier kwartalen, maar deze managers behalen vervolgens 
rendementen die lager zijn dan anderen. Aan de andere kant vinden onttrekkingen 
voornamelijk plaats bij de slecht presterende fondsen, en deze fondsen behalen 
vervolgens gemiddeld genomen ook een lager rendement. Samenvattend geldt dus dat 
kapitaalinstromen niet terecht komen bij de juiste fondsmanagers, terwijl kapitaal wel 
aan de juiste fondsen worden onttrokken.  
 
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we nog een keer de relatie tussen kapitaalstromen van en 
naar hedgefondsen en historische prestaties, maar nu vanuit met een psychologische 
inslag die bekend staat als de wet van de kleine aantallen. Indien beleggers geloven in 
het bestaan van kundige fondsmanagers, kunnen zij in te sterke mate verwachten dat 
goede prestaties uit het verleden ook in de toekomst behaald zullen worden. Dit wordt 
geformaliseerd in het theoretische model van Rabin [2002]. Onze resultaten zijn 
consistent met deze theorie. Hoe langer een hedgefonds bovengemiddeld presteert, 
des te meer middelen in dit fonds worden belegd. Echter, de extra toestroom van 
middelen wordt op geen enkele manier gerechtvaardigd door toekomstige 
rendementen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert in hoeverre beleggers zich bij hun allocatie laten beïnvloeden 
door de ontwikkeling van de verschillende stijlindices die voor hedgefondsen 
beschikbaar zijn. Gezien het feit dat hedgefondsen weinig transparant zijn, beperkt 
rapporteren en een veelheid aan strategieën volgen, vormen stijlindices een 
belangrijke informatiebron voor geïnteresseerde beleggers. De belangrijkste 
hypothese in dit hoofdstuk is dat beleggers in die stijlen beleggen die in het verleden 
de beste rendementen laten zien (zie bijv. Barberis en Shleifer [2003]). In dit 
hoofdstuk isoleren we het deel van de kapitaalstromen dat niet verklaard kan worden 
door individuele fondskenmerken en –rendementen en aggregeren dit per periode en 
per stijl. Vervolgens relateren we de geaggregeerde kapitaalstromen aan historische 
stijlrendementen en –ontwikkelingen. Het model laat zien dat kapitaalstromen zich in 
sterke mate laten verklaren door de beleggingsresultaten op stijlniveau over de 
voorgaande drie kwartalen. Er is echter geen statistisch bewijs dat er sprake is van 
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persistentie in stijlrendementen, noch dat beleggers die stijlen selecteren die 
vervolgens beter dan gemiddelde rendementen laten zien. Deze resultaten zijn 
consistent met het idee dat stijlbeleggen voornamelijk door sentimenten wordt 
gedreven en weinig gerelateerd is aan fundamentele ontwikkelingen.  
 
De vier hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift geven samen een veelzijdig beeld van de 
beleggers in hedgefondsen en hun keuzes om kapitaal te (her)alloceren. Verschillende 
vragen blijven nog onbeantwoord. De resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat 
kapitaalstromen een sterke invloed hebben op de mogelijke liquidatie van een fonds. 
Hedgefondsen met een grote kapitaaluitstroom in een gegeven periode hebben in de 
daarop volgende kwartalen een grote kans op liquidatie. Zowel liquidatie als 
kapitaalstromen worden echter in sterke mate verklaard door historische rendementen 
(zie Hoofdstuk 2 en 3). Een model dat specifiek aandacht schenkt aan de rol van 
rendementen en kapitaalstromen op liquidatie is van belang om de economische 
implicaties van de snelle kapitaaluitstromen te doorgronden. Een interessant punt 
hierbij is hoe beleggers de kans op fondsliquidatie inschatten, gegeven de beperkte 
informatie waarover ze beschikken. Ook Hoofdstuk 4 levert hieromtrent interessante 
vragen. Leiden snelle onttrekkingen tot een grote kans op liquidatie en levert dit een 
geloofwaardig dreigement op voor fondsmanagers, opdat een te hoge mate van risico 
wordt voormeden? Een convexe relatie tussen kapitaalstromen en rendementen kan 
immers leiden tot gokgedrag bij fondsmanagers om de kans te maximeren bij de 
kopgroep van fondsen terecht te komen. Een uitgebreider onderzoek naar de 
samenhang tussen het gokgedrag van managers en kapitaalstromen, in combinatie met 
de kenmerken van de contracten waaronder fondsmanagers werken, is bijzonder 
interessant. Ten slotte zijn er nog diverse aspecten aan de asymmetrie tussen positieve 
en negatieve kapitaalstromen onderbelicht gebleven, met name gerelateerd aan de 
psychologie van beleggers. Hoe zien beleggers winst en verlies? Hoe evalueren 
beleggers recente informatie versus historische informatie?  
 
Bovengenoemde vragen beschrijven een opwindend pad voor verder onderzoek naar 
hedgefondsen, zonder twijfel even opwindend als de ontwikkelingen van de 
bedrijfstak zelf zullen zijn. 
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Resumen y Conclusiones (Summary in 
Spanish) 
 
 
Fondos de Inversión Alternativa: Flujos de Capital, 
Rendimientos y la Psicología del Inversor.  
 
 
1. Contexto General: Fondos Activos, Fondos Pasivos y el 
Comportamiento del Pequeño Inversor. 
 
Un fondo de inversión es un vehículo financiero que canaliza las fortunas de una 
multitud de pequeños inversores hacia el mercado de activos financieros. De esta 
manera, el administrador o gestor del fondo genera economías de escala que le 
permiten crear a su vez un portafolio de activos eficientemente diversificado. 
Diversificación eficiente, y la consiguiente eliminación de riesgo sistemático, es el 
principal beneficio que el gestor ofrece al pequeño inversor. Distinguimos dos tipos 
de gestores.  Un gestor “pasivo” se limita a crear un portafolio que replica las 
características de retorno y riesgo de un índice del mercado, que por definición es una 
reproducción relativamente fidedigna del mercado de activos en su totalidad. El índice 
representa pues un portafolio ideal en términos de diversificación.  Un gestor “activo” 
vas más allá e intenta crear un portafolio diversificado que genere un rendimiento 
superior al del índice del mercado. Para ello, el gestor activo utiliza su talento y 
experiencia  profesional con el fin de identificar activos sub-valorados o sobre-
valorados con respecto a sus retornos teóricos establecidos en un modelo de equilibrio 
de activos financieros.  Este trabajo de selección activa del gestor tiene un costo para 
el pequeño inversor: el gestor cobra en general 1% del monto total invertido en el 
fondo. Diversas investigaciones han demostrado, sin embargo, que en promedio, el 
rendimiento de fondos activos de inversión no supera ni el rendimiento de fondos 
pasivos ni el rendimiento del índice del mercado utilizado como referencial. Esto 
querría decir que el costo que el pequeño inversor paga al gestor por su trabajo de 
selección activa, es injustificado. Así pues, resulta inexplicable que la  industria de 
fondos activos haya crecido y continúe creciendo y atrayendo a pequeños 
inversionistas a  una tasa muy superior a la de otros vehículos financieros.   
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Una serie de estudios académicos se han concentrado en tratar de explicar este 
fenómeno. Los resultados que arrojan son aun más enigmáticos.  Por un lado, estos 
estudios demuestran que los pequeños inversores concentran masivamente sus 
capitales en el 10% a 20% de fondos activos con los mejores rendimientos durante el 
año precedente. Sin embargo, tal estrategia de inversión es aparentemente 
injustificada, pues por otro lado, no existen pruebas científicas de que aquellos fondos 
activos que sobresalen en rendimiento en un año dado, sean capaces de  persistir  o 
mantener tales rendimientos durante el año siguiente. Un resultado aun más 
sorprendente es que los pequeños inversores, en promedio,  no desinvierten de 
aquellos fondos con bajos rendimientos. Por lo tanto la relación entre flujos de capital 
y rendimiento es convexa: los flujos de capital son extremadamente sensibles en el 
lado de rendimientos positivos, pero insensibles en el lado de rendimientos negativos.  
 
Las aparentes inconsistencias en el comportamiento del pequeño inversor han sido 
analizadas desde diferentes puntos de vista: ya sea bajo modelos de equilibrio en 
condiciones de competencia perfecta y racionalidad completa; ya sea poniendo en 
duda la racionalidad del pequeño inversor y apelando a fenómenos cognitivos; ya sea 
bajo  modelos de información asimétrica.  
 
El presente trabajo es un análisis empírico de las interrelaciones entre flujos de capital 
y rendimiento en un grupo particular de fondos activos, llamados fondos alternativos 
o fondos de cobertura, o mejor conocidos por su denominación en inglés: hedge 
funds. Específicamente: (1) analizamos el grado de persistencia en el rendimiento de 
fondos alternativos; (2) intentamos caracterizar las estrategias de inversión y 
desinversión del inversor en fondos alternativos; y  (3) estudiamos la posibilidad de 
que potenciales fenómenos cognitivos estén a la base de los comportamientos de 
inversión observados.  
 
2. Fondos Alternativos vs. Fondos Tradicionales. Motivación de la Tesis 
 
Un fondo alternativo es en muchos aspectos diametralmente opuesto a un fondo activo 
tradicional. Un fondo alternativo tiene cuatro características esenciales: (1) está sujeto 
a limitado control de autoridades reguladoras;  (2) el gestor no solo recibe el 1% del 
monto total invertido, sino también un incentivo por rendimiento, que consiste en 
general en un 20% del total de beneficios; (3) es un instrumento financiero de limitada 
liquidez, que impone plazos fijos de inversión generalmente largos a sus inversores, 
variando en general de un mes a más de un año, dependiendo del fondo;  (4) como 
todo instrumento alternativo, la información disponible en cuanto a riesgo y 
rendimiento es limitada.   
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La primera característica determina gran parte de las propiedades de un fondo 
alternativo. Su constitución legal es tal que escapa a la definición de un fondo 
tradicional. En particular, el número máximo de inversionistas o asociados no puede 
sobrepasar los 500 (en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica). Gracias a ello, un fondo 
alternativo no está obligado a presentar estados financieros anuales y por lo tanto su 
actividad es más bien opaca. Además, tiene una gran flexibilidad para utilizar 
estrategias de inversión que no le están permitidas a un fondo tradicional, como por 
ejemplo, ventas cortas y uso de derivados financieros. Esa misma flexibilidad le 
permite invertir y desinvertir en múltiples categorías de activos y hacer uso importante 
de apalancamiento.  Por esta razón, un análisis de los componentes de riesgo de un 
fondo alternativo es una tarea compleja. Debido al incentivo de rendimiento que 
recibe el gestor, el fondo procura activamente superar el índice de mercado. Un fondo 
tradicional, por el contrario, está limitado en general a pocas categorías de activos y 
una rotación baja, y por lo tanto tiene menos herramientas para diferenciarse del 
índice.   
 
El monto mínimo de inversión en un hedge fund, es en general de 1 millón de dólares. 
Esto limita el acceso en estos fondos exclusivamente a inversores institucionales e 
individuos con una gran fortuna personal. El término legal para tales inversores es el 
de “inversor sofisticado”.  Esto supone que el inversor tiene un conocimiento técnico 
del mercado financiero  y es capaz de evaluar las propiedades de riesgo de una 
inversión cualquiera. Sin embargo el rápido crecimiento de la industria ha traído 
consigo una mayor competencia entre fondos para atraer flujos de capital, y en 
consecuencia, los montos mínimos de inversión tienden a reducirse, permitiendo el 
acceso en estos fondos a pequeños inversores, menos “sofisticados”.  Otro canal de 
acceso en fondos alternativos para estos pequeños inversores está constituido por los 
fondos de fondos alternativos. Estos son portafolios de fondos, que ofrecen en 
principio diversificación y una cuidadosa selección de gestores de fondos.  
 
Contrariamente a lo que podría suponerse a través de su nombre en inglés  (i.e. hedge 
fund), cuya traducción literal es fondo de cobertura o fondo de protección,  un fondo 
alternativo es en realidad un instrumento de alto riesgo y tiene fines especulativos. 
Los casos de fraude y bancarrota son frecuentes, en tanto el inversor no está 
debidamente protegido en términos legales, dado el limitado control por parte de las 
autoridades de regulación. El alto riesgo se debe precisamente a los niveles de 
apalancamiento y al uso de derivados financieros. Sin embargo, gracias a sus 
estrategias de inversión de alta rotación  en múltiples mercados y categorías de 
activos, los fondos alternativos presentan correlaciones históricas muy bajas con 
dichas categorías.  De aquí se deriva la principal ventaja para un inversor sofisticado: 
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la posibilidad de alcanzar un mayor grado de diversificación a través de la inclusión 
de un fondo alternativo en un  portafolio dado, pero en proporciones limitadas, que en 
general varían entre 1% y 15% del valor total del portafolio. 
 
La industria de fondos alternativos ha crecido espectacularmente a lo largo de los 
últimos diez años. A fines del año 2004 alcanzó un trillón de dólares en total de 
activos invertidos, repartidos en un total estimado de 8000 fondos, en tanto en 1994 la 
industria manejaba tan solo 100 billones de dólares. En ese mismo lapso de tiempo, el 
rendimiento promedio de un fondo alternativo fue de 2.7% trimestral, inferior al 
rendimiento del mercado en 0.3%. Esto pone en serias dudas la capacidad del inversor 
sofisticado de tomar las decisiones de inversión y desinversión adecuadas, generando 
una preocupación creciente por la posibilidad de que los flujos de capital hacia la 
industria de fondos alternativos estén ineficientemente colocados. A esto se añade  la 
potencial situación de  vulnerabilidad de los inversores, especialmente de los menos 
sofisticados.  Estas constituyen las principales motivaciones que nos conducen en este 
estudio a intentar comprender el comportamiento y la dinámica de inversión y 
desinversión  de un inversor en fondos alternativos.  
 
3. Marco Conceptual de la Tesis. 
 
La relación contractual entre un inversor y un gestor de fondos supone una situación 
de información asimétrica al momento de firmar el contrato. Esto es, el inversor 
ignora la verdadera capacidad y talento del gestor y por lo tanto debe inferirlos sobre 
la base de señales de rendimiento pasado. Dado este marco conceptual, tres problemas 
de interés teórico surgen: 
 
(1) Cuán informativo es el rendimiento pasado acerca del rendimiento futuro? 
(2) Cuán sensibles son los flujos de capital a las señales de  rendimiento pasado? 
(3) Cuál es la relación entre flujos de capital y rendimiento futuro? 
 
Estas son las tres relaciones esenciales en las cuales se centra nuestro estudio. El 
primer problema se refiere a la cuestión de persistencia en el rendimiento, y es 
abordado en el Capítulo 2.  El segundo problema se refiere a los factores que 
determinan la toma de decisión del inversor en cuanto a invertir o desinvertir. Este 
problema es ampliamente analizado en la primera parte del Capítulo 3.  El tercer 
problema se refiere a la capacidad del inversor de tomar la decisión adecuada en 
términos de rendimiento futuro, lo cual es analizado en la segunda parte del Capítulo 
3. Finalmente, los Capítulos 4 y 5  integran las tres cuestiones a través de un potencial 
fenómeno cognitivo. A continuación detallamos la metodología de cada capítulo y los 
resultados principales de esta tesis. Los resultados empíricos han sido obtenidos 
199
Resumen y Conclusiones 
 
 
187
 
utilizando la base de datos de fondos alternativos de TASS Management Limited en el 
periodo 1994-2004 y el conjunto de índices de rendimiento por categorías 
CSFB/Tremont. 
 
4. Metodología y Resultados 
 
En el Capítulo 2 analizamos la cuestión de persistencia en el rendimiento de fondos 
alternativos. Los estudios de persistencia están sujetos a un sesgo metodológico de 
supervivencia. Esto se debe a que la metodología  usual consiste primero en obtener 
los deciles de la distribución  de retornos de fondos en un periodo dado, para luego  
evaluar el rendimiento de cada decil en el periodo siguiente. Por lo tanto, tal 
metodología impone necesariamente una condición de supervivencia en el periodo de 
evaluación: dado que solo observamos los fondos que sobreviven de un periodo al 
siguiente, es muy probable que ello conduzca a una sobre-estimación de rendimientos 
de cada decil en el periodo de evaluación, y por consiguiente también una sobre-
estimación de persistencia.  La magnitud del sesgo depende obviamente de la tasa de 
mortalidad de dichos fondos. En este capítulo proponemos un mecanismo de 
corrección de este sesgo. El factor de corrección de retornos es la razón entre la 
probabilidad condicional y la probabilidad incondicional de mortalidad. La 
probabilidad condicional, a su vez, requiere estimar un modelo de mortalidad 
correctamente especificado. Es importante recalcar que al utilizar bases de datos de 
fondos alternativos, existe un potencial problema de auto-selección de fondos. Puesto 
que los fondos alternativos no están obligados legalmente a presentar estados 
financieros, su participación en una base de datos es enteramente voluntaria. 
Asimismo, un fondo puede decidir voluntariamente dejar de participar en la base de 
datos, sin que ello signifique que el fondo ha dejado de existir. Por lo tanto es 
primordial distinguir el caso de mortalidad del caso de auto-selección. Nuestro 
modelo de mortalidad incluye como variables independientes, entre otras, la edad del 
fondo (en meses), el tamaño del fondo (total de activos) y el rendimiento relativo  en 
los pasados 6 trimestres (medido en términos de percentiles de la distribución).  A 
partir de este modelo, obtenemos una estimación de la probabilidad condicional de 
mortalidad, y de allí, el factor de corrección del sesgo. Obtenemos dos resultados 
importantes. Primero, el sesgo es particularmente notorio en horizontes anuales, y en 
el último decil de la distribución, precisamente debido a su alta tasa de mortalidad. Si 
el sesgo no es debidamente corregido, el rendimiento de este decil puede ser 
sobreestimado en un 3.8% anual. Segundo, una vez implementada la corrección del 
sesgo, un claro patrón de persistencia existe en horizontes trimestrales, e incluso en 
horizontes anuales, aunque menos significativo estadísticamente. La diferencia en 
rendimiento entre el primer decil y el último decil de la distribución llega a 8.1% 
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anuales. En otras palabras, el rendimiento pasado de los fondos en el primer decil 
tiene una capacidad predictiva de su  rendimiento futuro.    
 
En el Capítulo 3, analizamos la sensibilidad del inversor al rendimiento pasado de 
fondos alternativos y su capacidad de explotar los patrones de persistencia 
identificados en el Capítulo 2. De acuerdo a la teoría de Berk y Green [2004],  el 
hecho de que el patrón de persistencia es más acentuado en horizontes trimestrales 
con respecto a horizontes anuales, implicaría que  los flujos de capital son menos 
competitivos y sensibles en horizontes trimestrales. En el Capítulo 3  ponemos a 
prueba esta hipótesis. Para ello estimamos un modelo que nos permite diferenciar la 
decisión de inversión (dada por flujos netos de capital positivos) y la decisión de 
desinversión (flujos netos de capital negativos) del inversor promedio en un fondo. 
Nuestro modelo demuestra una fuerte sensibilidad de flujos negativos a rendimientos 
bajos en el trimestre precedente, en tanto los flujos positivos son sensibles a los 
rendimientos altos únicamente en el largo plazo. Otras asimetrías en la respuesta de 
flujos positivos y negativos existen también a nivel de las variables de control. Cabe 
anotar que  los estudios anteriores al nuestro no consideran la posibilidad de esta 
asimetría y por lo tanto integran flujos positivos y negativos en un mismo modelo.  
Los flujos positivos son mucho mas lentos en su respuesta, debido a la opacidad de los 
fondos alternativos  y la asimetría de información, lo cual incrementa los costos y el 
tiempo de obtención de información, así como el tiempo necesario para su análisis. 
Por el contrario, los flujos negativos son relativamente rápidos  debido al monitoreo 
frecuente al que está sujeto el gestor por parte de sus inversores.  La segunda parte del 
Capítulo 3, demuestra, adicionalmente, que el inversor no tiene la capacidad de 
respuesta necesaria para explotar los patrones de persistencia en horizontes 
trimestrales. Como consecuencia los flujos positivos de capital terminan siendo 
colocados en fondos que no logran mantener altos rendimientos.  Por el contrario, el 
inversor tiene una capacidad de respuesta suficientemente rápida en su decisión de 
desinversión que le permite explotar la persistencia de fondos con bajo rendimiento.  
 
En el Capítulo 4 analizamos la posibilidad de que un componente en la respuesta del 
inversor al rendimiento pasado de fondos alternativos tenga su origen en un fenómeno 
cognitivo conocido como la ley de los pequeños números, inicialmente estudiado por 
los psicólogos Tversky y Kahneman [1971]. Este es un heurístico que tiende a ignorar 
la importancia del tamaño de una muestra al hacer inferencias acerca de una 
población. Como resultado, las inferencias realizadas a partir de una pequeña muestra 
suelen ser excesivas. Este es potencialmente el caso de un inversor que realiza 
inferencias acerca del rendimiento futuro de un fondo de inversión a partir de una  
secuencia corta de señales de rendimiento pasado. Si la secuencia muestra un patrón 
de persistencia, en teoría cuanto más extenso es el patrón, más excesivas son las 
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inferencias realizadas, y más exagerada es la respuesta del inversor. Ponemos a prueba 
esta hipótesis a través de dos modelos. El primero es un modelo del rendimiento 
relativo de un fondo (en términos de percentiles de la distribución)  a  partir de  
secuencias de persistencia y otras variables de control. Los resultados de este primer 
modelo confirman la existencia de patrones de persistencia en el caso de fondos 
alternativos. Más aun, cuanto más extenso es el patrón de persistencia,  mayor es la 
probabilidad de que el fondo continúe persistiendo.  Por ejemplo, si un fondo ha 
mantenido rendimientos superiores a la media de la distribución durante cuatro 
trimestres, la probabilidad de que su rendimiento sea superior a la media en el quinto 
trimestre es alrededor del 60%. Pero si la secuencia es de 6 trimestres, la probabilidad 
de que el fondo tenga un rendimiento superior a la media durante un séptimo trimestre 
es del 70%.  A partir de este primer modelo, obtenemos una estimación del 
rendimiento futuro de un fondo, e incorporamos esta variable en un modelo de flujos 
de capital. Entre las variables de control incluimos las secuencias de persistencia 
nuevamente. En principio, si el inversor es racional, su respuesta debería concentrarse 
por completo en el valor esperado de rendimiento, mientras las secuencias de 
persistencia no deberían tener ninguna influencia adicional. Sin embargo, los 
resultados demuestran lo contrario: las secuencias de persistencia tienen un efecto 
residual en la respuesta del inversor, y cuanto más extensa es la secuencia, más 
exagerada es la respuesta. Cabe anotar que los estudios anteriores al nuestro 
consideran el rendimiento pasado tan solo en horizontes anuales e ignoran el efecto de 
una secuencia bien definida de señales de rendimiento trimestrales en la respuesta del 
inversor.  
 
Finalmente, el Capítulo 5 analiza la posibilidad de que un componente en la decisión 
de inversión o desinversión del inversor  se  concentre  al nivel de categorías (o 
estilos) de  fondos alternativos. En que medida el rendimiento promedio de una 
categoría de fondos tiene un efecto en  la respuesta del agregado de inversores?  La 
hipótesis de inversión por estilos -o categorías-, formulada por Barberis y Shleifer 
[2003], supone que los inversores toman en cuenta el rendimiento relativo entre 
categorías en su proceso de inversión.  Por lo tanto este  capítulo estudia la 
sensibilidad de flujos de capital agregados por categoría de fondos. El rendimiento de 
cada categoría de fondos esta a su vez dado por un índice. La complejidad y variedad 
de las estrategias de inversión utilizadas por fondos alternativos, ha llevado a la 
necesidad de crear una taxonomía de estilos de inversión que permita simplificar la 
evaluación y toma de decisión de los inversores. No hay una taxonomía única y 
universalmente aceptada. En general, para cada sistema de clasificación, existe un 
conjunto de índices de rendimiento por cada categoría.  Los resultados de nuestro 
estudio indican una alta sensibilidad del agregado de inversores al rendimiento 
relativo de índices de categorías durante los tres trimestres anteriores. Sin embargo, 
202
Resumen y Conclusiones 
 
 
190
este movimiento coordinado de flujos de capital del agregado de inversores  no está 
justificado en manera alguna por el rendimiento en los trimestres posteriores a la 
inversión. De hecho, no existen diferencias significativas en rendimiento entre 
aquellas categorías con flujos positivos y aquellas con flujos negativos. Esto sugiere 
que los flujos de capital responden a percepciones erradas de rendimiento esperados y 
reflejan simplemente  sentimientos generalizados de optimismo o pesimismo  del 
conjunto de inversores en relación al rendimiento de una u otra categoría. 
 
En resumen, esta tesis arroja cuatro conclusiones importantes:  
 
• El rendimiento pasado de un fondo alternativo tiene un valor predictivo de 
rendimiento futuro. El sesgo de supervivencia es especialmente marcado en el 
último decil. 
• Las decisiones de inversión y desinversión son asimétricas a varios niveles. En 
particular, los flujos negativos de capital responden rápidamente a rendimientos 
bajos en el trimestre anterior. Los flujos positivos responden más lentamente, y 
son sensibles a rendimientos altos en el largo plazo (horizontes anuales).  
• El inversor no tiene la capacidad de respuesta para explotar los patrones de 
persistencia positiva. Sin embargo tiene la capacidad de explotar la persistencia 
de los fondos con rendimientos bajos.  
• Los inversores aparentemente tienen una percepción errada de los patrones de 
persistencia, potencialmente debido a fenómenos cognitivos, tanto a nivel de 
fondos individuales  como a nivel agregado por categorías de fondos. 
 
Quedan por analizarse varios temas, apropiados para futura investigación. Cuáles son 
las implicaciones de los flujos negativos rápidos? Cuál es la percepción de los 
inversores acerca de las probabilidades de mortalidad? Es acaso su respuesta 
exagerada, de forma tal que incrementen a su vez las probabilidades de mortalidad? 
Por otro lado, las asimetrías entre flujos positivos y negativos  quedan completamente 
abiertas a futuro análisis. Finalmente, los aspectos más interesantes de la hipótesis de 
inversión por estilos, quedan aun por ser abordados. Por ejemplo, existe acaso co-
movimiento de retornos de fondos dentro de una misma categoría? Acaso las masivas 
inversiones en una categoría crean externalidades en otras categorías?  
 
Son estas todas fascinantes preguntas, en la misma medida de la evolución futura de la 
industria de fondos alternativos.  
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On Hedge Fund Performance, 
Capital Flows and Investor Psychology
In a relatively short period of time, hedge funds have become major
players in the financial markets. In 2004, the estimated total reached
nearly 8000 funds, and the assets under management had risen to $1
trillion, from nearly $100 billion in 1994. The client base for hedge
funds has expanded beyond foundations and endowments to
company pensions, public pensions, and to less “sophisticated” inves-
tors. However, the increasing and widespread acceptance of hedge
funds as an alternative investment vehicle is disconcerting if we
consider their limited transparency and the restricted liquidity
conditions imposed to investors. On these grounds, serious questions
arise about investors’ ability to make the right investment choices in
hedge funds. This book speaks to these concerns. The four essays
presented here examine the investment process of investors, the
underlying factors determining their choices and the implications for
investors’ wealth and for hedge funds’ performance. Four main
conclusions follow. First, that hedge fund managers exhibit, on
average, persistence in their performance at quarterly horizons,
justifying to some extent an active search for skilled managers;
however, large informational asymmetries prevent investors from
taking timely decisions and exploiting the persistence of good
performing funds while incurring high opportunity costs. In contrast,
investors are able to divest swiftly from the poor performers, which
may have a moderating effect on the risk-taking incentives of
managers. Finally, investors appear to misread the information
available and overreact to persistence patterns, both at the individual
fund level and at the style level. Overall, this study confirms a poten-
tially suboptimal allocation of capital flows across hedge funds,
calling for higher levels of transparency in the demand side for
capital, and more cautious due diligence and increased prudence in
the supply side.
ERIM
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research
School (Onderzoekschool) in the field of management of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics. ERIM was
founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-131-X
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